On June 15, 2009, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Mr. Ezell's conviction and sentence. United States v. Ezell, 337 F. App'x 623 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court held that, applying the "modified categorical approach," it was clear Ezell's second-degree burglary convictions "were generic burglaries of 'buildings' under the ACCA."
Ezell exhausted his direct appeal in 2010. See United States v. Ezell, 337 Fed.Appx. 623, 624 (9th Cir.2009) (affirming district court). He filed an unsuccessful § 2255 petition later that year.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a charging instrument alleging burglary of a “building” combined with a street address suffices to establish a building. United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 694, 698 (9th Cir.2011) ; United States v. Stephens, 237 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.2001) ( inclusion of the term “building” with a street address “provide an adequate basis to conclude that ‘building’ is used in its usual sense.”); United States v. Ezell, 337 Fed.Appx. 623, 624 (9th Cir.2009) (accord); but see United States v. Adams, 358 Fed.Appx. 820, 821 (9th Cir.2009) (“Without drawing an impermissible inference, there is an insufficient factual basis to establish that the street address listed in the indictment was necessarily that of a dwelling or other structure that would satisfy generic burglary.”). Under Snyder, I likely could find that the term “dwelling” and the street address established a building.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a charging instrument alleging burglary of a "building" combined with a street address suffices to establish a building. United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stephens, 27 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (inclusion of the term "building" with a street address "provide an adequate basis to conclude that 'building' is used in its usual sense."); United States v. Ezell, 337 Fed. App'x 623, 624 (9th Cir. June 15, 2009) (accord); but see United States v. Adams, 358 Fed. App'x 820, 821 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009) ("Without drawing an impermissible inference, there is an insufficient factual basis to establish that the street address listed in the indictment was necessarily that of a dwelling or other structure that would satisfy generic burglary."). Under Snyder, I likely could find that the term "dwelling" and the street address established a building.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a charging instrument alleging burglary of a "building" combined with a street address suffices to establish a building. United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stephens, 27 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (inclusion of the term "building" with a street address "provide an adequate basis to conclude that 'building' is used in its usual sense."); United States v. Ezell, 337 Fed. App'x 623, 624 (9th Cir. June 15, 2009) (accord); but see United States v. Adams, 358 Fed. App'x 820, 821 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009) ("Without drawing an impermissible inference, there is an insufficient factual basis to establish that the street address listed in the indictment was necessarily that of a dwelling or other structure that would satisfy generic burglary."). Under Snyder, I likely could find that the term "dwelling" and the street address established a building.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a charging instrument alleging burglary of a "building" combined with a street address suffices to establish a building. United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stephens, 27 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (inclusion of the term "building" with a street address "provide an adequate basis to conclude that 'building' is used in its usual sense."); United States v. Ezell, 337 Fed. App'x 623, 624 (9th Cir. June 15, 2009) (accord); but see United States v. Adams, 358 Fed. App'x 820, 821 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009) ("Without drawing an impermissible inference, there is an insufficient factual basis to establish that the street address listed in the indictment was necessarily that of a dwelling or other structure that would satisfy generic burglary."). Under Snyder, I likely could find that the term "dwelling" and the street address established a building.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a charging instrument alleging burglary of a "building" combined with a street address suffices to establish a building. United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stephens, 27 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) ("building" with a street address "provide an adequate basis to conclude that 'building' is used in its usual sense"); United States v. Ezell, 337 Fed. App'x 623, 624 (9th Cir. June 15, 2009) (accord); but see United States v. Adams, 358 Fed. App'x 820, 821 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009) ("Without drawing an impermissible inference, there is an insufficient factual basis to establish that the street address listed in the indictment was necessarily that of a dwelling or other structure that would satisfy generic burglary."). Under Snyder, I likely could find "dwelling" and the street address established a building.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a charging instrument alleging burglary of a "building" combined with a street address suffices to establish a building. United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stephens, 27 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (the term "building" with a street address "provide an adequate basis to conclude that 'building' is used in its usual sense."); United States v. Ezell, 337 Fed. App'x 623, 624 (9th Cir. June 15, 2009) (accord); but see United States v. Adams, 358 Fed. App'x 820, 821 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009) ("Without drawing an impermissible inference, there is an insufficient factual basis to establish that the street address listed in the indictment was necessarily that of a dwelling or other structure that would satisfy generic burglary."). Under Snyder, I likely could find that the term "dwelling" and the street address established a building.
The Ninth Circuit has held that a charging instrument alleging burglary of a "building" combined with a street address suffices to establish a building. United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stephens, 27 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) ("building" and a street address "provide an adequate basis to conclude that 'building' is used in its usual sense."); United States v. Ezell, 337 Fed. App'x 623, 624 (9th Cir. June 15, 2009) (accord); but see United States v. Adams, 358 Fed. App'x 820, 821 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009) ("Without drawing an impermissible inference, there is an insufficient factual basis to establish that the street address listed in the indictment was necessarily that of a dwelling or other structure that would satisfy generic burglary."). Under Snyder, I likely could find that the term "dwelling" and the street address established a building.