U.S. v. Eliely

26 Citing cases

  1. Rhodes v. Dobbs

    C/A No. 1:20-cv-1725-JFA-SVH (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2020)   Cited 1 times

    Land v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989). After this request was denied, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider in which he argued he has met the standard in United States v. Eliely, 276 F. App'x 270, (4th Cir. 2008), because he has shown substantial constitutional claims on which he has a high probability of success, and exceptional circumstances making a grant of bail necessary for the habeas remedy to be effective. The Magistrate Judge again disagreed with this argument and denied Petitioner's request for bond.

  2. Coreas v. Bounds

    Civil Action No. TDC-20-0780 (D. Md. Sep. 18, 2020)   Cited 5 times

    Respondents nevertheless argue that this Court may not conduct bail reviews as part of its overall consideration of the habeas petition in the absence of explicit statutory authority to do so. It is firmly established, however, that federal courts have inherent authority to grant bail to habeas petitioners, even absent express statutory authority. See, e.g., Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2001); Lucas v. Hadden, 790 F.2d 365, 367 (3d Cir. 1986); Baker v. Sard, 420 F.2d 1342, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that on a claim of illegal detention, "the court's jurisdiction to order release as a final disposition of the action includes an inherent power to grant relief pendente lite, to grant bail or release, pending determination of the merits"); see also United States v. Eliely, 276 F. App'x 270, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (referencing the standard for release on bail of a prisoner pending a collateral attack on the conviction). In Mapp, the court applied this principle to immigration detainees and held that federal courts have the inherent authority to grant bail to habeas petitioners detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), the predecessor agency to ICE, for violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").

  3. Geddings v. U.S.

    No. 5:06-CR-136-D, No. 5:08-CV-425-D (E.D.N.C. Jun. 29, 2010)

    The court has the authority to release a prisoner on recognizance pending the resolution of a post-conviction motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Eliely, 276 Fed. Appx. 270, 270-71 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished) (collecting cases); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). In order to obtain release on bail pending consideration of a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner must show a substantial constitutional claim on "which he has a high probability of success, and exceptional circumstances making a grant of bail necessary for the habeas remedy to be effective."

  4. Brandon v. United States

    3:17-cv-655-MOC (W.D.N.C. Sep. 30, 2021)

    Petitioner failed to demonstrate that her release pending the outcome of this proceeding is warranted. See generally United States v. Eliely, 276 Fed.Appx. 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Before a prisoner may be released on bail pending a collateral attack on his conviction, he must show substantial constitutional claims on which he has a high probability of success, and exceptional circumstances making a grant of bail necessary for the habeas remedy to be effective.”).

  5. United States v. Aigbekaen

    Crim. JKB-15-0462 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2021)

    In ruling on those motions, this Court explained that, "[b]efore a prisoner may be released on bail pending a collateral attack on his conviction, he must show [1] substantial constitutional claims on which he has a high probability of success, and [2], exceptional circumstances making a grant of bail necessary for the habeas remedy to be effective." (ECF No. 464 at 2 (quoting United States v. Eleily, 276 Fed.Appx. 270, 270 (4th Cir. 2008).) The Court then denied both motions because Aigbekaen failed to show that he had a high probability of succeeding on his § 2255 motion.

  6. United States v. Aigbekaen

    CRIM. NO. JKB-15-0462 (D. Md. Jul. 1, 2021)

    “Before a prisoner may be released on bail pending a collateral attack on his conviction, he must show [1] substantial constitutional claims on which he has a high probability of success, and [2] exceptional circumstances making a grant of bail necessary for the habeas remedy to be effective.” United States v. Eleily, 276 Fed.Appx. 270, 270 (4th Cir. 2008). “Courts generally have defined ‘exceptional reasons' as circumstances which are ‘clearly out of the ordinary, uncommon, or rare.'” United States v. Vilaiphone, Crim. No. MR-08-0232, 2009 WL 412958, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 18, 2009) (citation omitted).

  7. Brown v. Clarke

    1:21cv39 (TSE/JFA) (E.D. Va. Jun. 22, 2021)

    While federal district courts have the inherent authority to grant a state prisoner bail during the pendency of habeas proceedings, see, e.g., Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001), "[b]efore a prisoner may be released on bail pending a collateral attack on his conviction, he must show substantial constitutional claims on which he has a high probability of success, and exceptional circumstances making a grant of bail necessary for the habeas remedy to be effective." United States v. Eliely, 276 F. App'x. 270, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Lee v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993); Calley v. Callaway, 496 F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1974)). Brown has not carried his burden and his motion will be denied.

  8. Coreas v. Bounds

    Civil Action No. TDC-20-0780 (D. Md. Jan. 25, 2021)   Cited 1 times

    In order to be released on bail pending resolution of a habeas petition, a petitioner must show (1) "substantial constitutional claims on which he has a high probability of success"; and (2) "exceptional circumstances making a grant of bail necessary for the habeas remedy to be effective." United States v. Eliely, 276 F. App'x 270, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Lee v. Jabe, 989 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1993), and Calley v. Callaway, 496 F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1974)); seealso Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that "a habeas petitioner should be granted bail only in unusual cases, or when extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist which make the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective" (citation omitted)). II. High Probability of Success

  9. Young v. Antonelli

    Civil No. 0:18-1010-CMC (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2021)

    This court has the inherent authority to grant release on bond to a habeas petitioner who, like Young, warrants immediate relief and release. See Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2000) (so holding); see also Lucas v. Hadden, 790 F.2d 365, 367 (3d Cir. 1986); Baker v. Sard, 420 F.2d 1342, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that on a claim of illegal detention, "the court's jurisdiction to order release as a final disposition of the action includes an inherent power to grant relief pendente lite, to grant bail or release, pending determination of the merits"); United States v. Eliely, 276 F. App'x 270, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (referencing the standard for release on bail of a prisoner pending a collateral attack on the conviction). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Young's request for immediate release on personal recognizance is hereby granted.

  10. Rhodes v. Dobbs

    C/A No.: 1:20-1725-JFA-SVH (D.S.C. Sep. 4, 2020)

    Petitioner has not identified any of the narrow circumstances appropriate for granting a motion to reconsider. Instead, Petitioner argues he has met the standard in United States v. Eliely, 276 F. App'x 270, (4th Cir. 2008), because he has shown substantial constitutional claims on which he has a high probability of success, and exceptional circumstances making a grant of bail necessary for the habeas remedy to be effective. The court disagrees.