But "the mere entry of a guilty plea does not entitle a defendant to a sentence reduction as a matter of right." United States v. Edwards, 272 F.3d 812, 815 (6th Cir. 2001). In the same paragraph, Defendant also asserts, without any citation, that this "significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility" "outweighs" his conduct inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.
The factual aspect of a determination that a defendant has accepted responsibility should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. See United States v. Webb , 335 F.3d 534, 536–37 (6th Cir. 2003) ; United States v. Edwards , 272 F.3d 812, 815 (6th Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Kennedy , 595 Fed.Appx. 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2015). If, however, “the only issue presented is the propriety of applying the reduction to the uncontested facts, the decision is reviewed de novo.”
Although "a defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction in order to obtain a reduction . . . a defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility." Id.; see also United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206, 1216 (6th Cir. 1992) (defendants' efforts to minimize their roles in drug conspiracy justify denial of reduction for acceptance of responsibility); United States v. Reeves, 100 Fed. App'x 470, 471 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that a "defendant's attempt to minimize his own role in the offense is inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility") (citing United States v. Edwards, 272 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2001)). The district court did not clearly err in determining that Sengmany did not accept responsibility and therefore was not entitled to a reduction in his offense level on that basis.
A district court's finding on the issue of acceptance of responsibility is entitled to deference and will be reversed only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Edwards, 272 F.3d 812, 815 (6th Cir. 2001). To be eligible for an acceptance of responsibility credit, a defendant must accept responsibility as to all counts charged.
We review a district court's legal interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Edwards, 272 F.3d 812, 815 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 756 (6th Cir. 2000)). This standard of review is not altered by the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).
Pacheco relies on two cases in support of his claim, both are inapposite. In United States v. Edwards, 272 F.3d 812, 817 (6th Cir. 2001), the defendant was given one point for his prior convictions for reckless driving and for his administrative suspension of license where he served only two days in prison but was subject to one year probation for the offenses which subjected him to a total of one point under Sentencing Guideline §4.A1.1(c). Similarly, his reliance on United States v. Rollins, 378 F.3d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 2004) is misplaced for the same reason that defendant there was not sentenced to any prison time for his misdemeanor crime but merely to probation and thus, was subject to one point only under § 4A1.1(c).
Movant's attempt to blame others for which there is not any proof is inconsistent with this reduction. See United States v. Edwards. 272 F.3d 812. 816 (6th Cir. 2001). A guilty plea does not automatically entitle a defendant to acceptance of responsibility reduction, particularly given Movant's repeated violations of the conditions of pretrial release.
Further, the entry of a guilty plea does not, as a matter of right, entitle a defendant to a sentence reduction. United States v. Edwards, 272 F.3d 812, 815 (6th Cir. 2001). But the entry of a guilty plea "combined with truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense . . . will constitute significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility. . . ."