In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, a district court does not have jurisdiction to consider or rule on a § 2255 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal of the underlying criminal conviction or sentence. United States v. Dunham, 240 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 975, 976 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting district court's finding that no extraordinary circumstances warranted consideration of § 2255 motion during direct appeal). The appropriate course of action for addressing a § 2255 motion filed during the pendency of the direct appeal is to dismiss the § 2255 action without prejudice.
A district court's decision to depart from the Chapter Seven recommended sentencing range is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Dunham, 240 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2001). II. DISCUSSION
United States v. Diveroli, 729 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); United States v. Dunham, 240 F.3d 1328, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 975, 976 (11thCir. 1990); Blair v. United States, 527 Fed.Appx. 838, 839 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[i]n the absence of extraordinary circumstances, a district court does not have jurisdiction to consider or rule on a § 2255 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal of the underlying criminal conviction or sentence.”);
United States v. Casaran-Rivas, 311 Fed.Appx. 269, 273 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). See also United States v. Dunham, 240 F.3d 1328, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (concluding “that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider and rule on Dunham's § 2255 motion during the pendency of her direct appeal of her sentence” and vacating “the district court's order denying Dunham's § 2255 motion . . . without prejudice to Dunham's right to file a § 2255 motion after the disposition of her direct appeal”).
In Blair v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit explained: In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, a district court does not have jurisdiction to consider or rule on a § 2255 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal of the underlying criminal conviction or sentence. United States v. Dunham, 240 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 975, 976 (11th Cir.1990) (noting district court's finding that no extraordinary circumstances warranted consideration of § 2255 motion during direct appeal). The appropriate course of action for addressing a § 2255 motion filed during the pendency of the direct appeal is to dismiss the § 2255 action without prejudice.
"Even if no party raises the issue, we are obligated to address the district court's jurisdiction to issue a ruling we are reviewing on appeal." United States v. Diveroli, 729 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Dunham, 240 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir.2001)). We deny the Crespos' motion to remand because, as we explain, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction.
II. Even if no party raises the issue, we are obligated to address the district court's jurisdiction to issue a ruling we are reviewing on appeal. United States v. Dunham, 240 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir.2001). Subject to exceptions not relevant here, “ ‘[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over the aspects of the case involved in the appeal.’ ” United States v. Tovar–Rico, 61 F.3d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 402, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982)).
A district court may consider a defendant's need to complete drug treatment as a factor when imposing a term of reimprisonment. United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Pitre, 504 F.3d 657, 664-65 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Brown, 501 F.3d 722, 725-26 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Dunham, 240 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1994). Because Abeita cannot point to any reason to disturb his term of reimprisonment as plainly unreasonable (or just unreasonable), we AFFIRM the judgment.
"[I]t is inappropriate to imprison or extend the term of imprisonment of a federal defendant for the purpose of providing him with rehabilitative treatment." Id.; United States v. Dunham, 240 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[A] court cannot impose an initial incarcerative sentence for the purpose of providing the defendant with rehabilitative treatment." (citing United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000))).
This court lacks jurisdiction to address the § 2255 motion while Defendant's direct appeal remains pending. See United States v. Dunham, 240 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 2001). The court will thus dismiss.