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denying motion for reconsideration where movant "point[ed] to no facts or law that the Court overlooked in reaching its conclusion, and instead simply reiterate[d] the facts and arguments that the Court already considered and rejected"
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S12 01 CR 74 (SAS)
February 5, 2004
Timothy J. Treanor, David M. Rody, New York, New York For the Government
Neil B. Checkman, Esq, Edgar Marino Sanchez (Pro Se), New York, New York, For Defendant and Defendant Appearing Pro Se
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
By letter dated January 27, 2004, Defendant Edgar Sanchez requests reconsideration of this Court's December 23, 2003 Memorandum Opinion and Order in United States v. Delvi, et al., 01 Cr. 74, 2003 WL 23018790 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003), denying his motions for (1) an order compelling the Government to file, on Sanchez's behalf, a motion pursuant to section 5K1. of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and section 3553 of Tile 18 of the United States Code; (2) a downward departure pursuant to section 5K2.0 of the Sentencing Guidelines; and (3) an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Government acted in bad faith in declining to enter into a cooperation agreement with him or file a motion pursuant to section 5K1.1.
Sanchez's request for a downward departure pursuant to section 5K2.0 was based on the same facts supporting his request for an order requiring the Government to file a motion on his behalf under section 5K1.1. It was denied because whe re a defendant argues that he is entitled to a downward departure pursuant to section 5K1.1, he cannot claim entitlement to a downward departure, based on the same facts, under section 5K2.0 because "the `very existence of § 5K1.1 de monstrates that the sentencing commission clearly considered the question of whether assistance to the government should be taken into account.'" Delvi, et al., 2003 WL 23018790, at *1 (quoting United States v. El-Gheur, 201 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2000)). The Court did not consider whether Sanchez is entitled to a downward departure pursuant to section 5k2.0 on other grounds.
"The standard to be applied in deciding reconsideration motions in criminal cases has not been clearly established. Neither the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Local Criminal Rules expressly provide for reconsideration motions." United States v. Mottley, No. 03 Cr. 303, 2003 WL 22083420, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2003). However, other judges in this district have applied the Local Rule 6.3 standard. See id.; United States v. Greenfield, No. 01 Cr. 401, 2001 WL 1230538, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2001) (applying Local Rule 6.3 standard "[g]iven the parties' positions, and the interests of justice"); United States v. Kurtz, No. 98 Cr. 733, 1999 WL 349374, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1999)("A motion to reconsider will not be granted unless the movant demonstrates that the court has overlooked controlling law or material facts."). Accordingly, the Court will apply the Local Rule 6.3 standard.
Local Rule 6.3 may have been promulgated with the intention that its applicati on be limited to civil cases. However, Sanchez sets forth no alternative standard, and simply stated, the only logical reason for a court to reconsider a prio r decision — civil or criminal — is if the court overlooked controlling facts or law. Thus, even if Local Rule 6.3 is not applicable to criminal cases, I conclude that the standard for reconsideration underlying Rule 6.3 should apply to criminal cases.
Pursuant to Local Rule 6.3, reconsideration is appropriate where a court overlooks "controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion . . . and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered the result before the court." Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp.2d 390, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Kurtz, 1999 WL 349374, at *6 (denying motion to reconsider because the defendant failed to show that the court overlooked controlling facts or law); Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The standard for granting . . . a motion [for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court."). Local Rule 6.3 is "narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the Court." Dellefave v. Access Temps., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 6098, 2001 WL 286771, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001); see also Mottley, 2003 WL 22083420, at *1 (denying motion for reconsideration because "[d]efendant's argument for reconsideration is nothing more than a restatement of the arguments laid out in his Reply memorandum."); Carolco Pictures. Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (purpose of Local Rule 6.3 is to "ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters").
With this standard of review in mind, Sanchez's motion for reconsideration is denied. Sanchez points to no facts or law that the Court overlooked in reaching its conclusion, and instead simply reiterates the facts and arguments that the Court already considered and rejected in the December 23, 2003 Memorandum Opinion and Order. Thus, Sanchez presents no "matters that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the [C]ourt." Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
SO ORDERED.