Although he packages that claim as a procedural one, McMurtry's argument at base amounts to a challenge to the way the district court exercised its discretion under § 3553(e) to evaluate his cooperation. See United States v. Johnson, 997 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1993) (characterizing argument that limited size of court's reduction "was unreasonable" as one challenging extent of reduction); United States v. Correa, 995 F.2d 686, 687 (7th Cir. 1993) (making same characterization of argument that court imposed sentence "in violation of law" for believing it was good policy not to give large reduction to drug dealers); United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1990) (making same characterization of argument that court "acted unreasonably" in not granting greater reduction). And we do not have jurisdiction to review discretionary refusals to reduce sentences so long as the district court appreciated its discretion to sentence below a statutory minimum.

___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1118, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992). In other words, unless the departure is from an incorrectly calculated guidelines range, a defendant may appeal the extent of a downward departure only if it is based on a violation of law.United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 217-18 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2801, 115 L.Ed.2d 974 (1991); United States v.Gant, 902 F.2d 570, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1990). A defendant cannot circumvent that rule by simply characterizing the departure as an incorrect application of the guidelines.

But valuing substantial assistance given as part of a cooperation agreement under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) is a matter within the sentencing court's discretion, and thus counsel rightly concludes that an appellate claim challenging the reduction as too little would be frivolous because we lack jurisdiction to review the contention. See18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Shaffer, 993 F.2d 625, 628–29 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 217–18 (7th Cir.1990). Although these cases predate United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), we have explained in discussing sentence reductions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) that Booker did not alter our limited jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), which is also the source of our jurisdiction here.

Moreover, the decision to refuse the defendant a downward departure was well within the district court's discretion and, were we able to conclusively determine that the district court actually exercised this discretion, we would not even review that action. See United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1990). Unfortunately, the district court did not provide any case-related indication that it considered the downward departure before exercising its discretion not to grant it.

As we have already made clear, we do not have jurisdiction to review this determination of the district court. See United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206, 111 S.Ct. 2801, 115 L.Ed.2d 974 (1991). 2.

If section 523(a)(11) also preserves the common law collateral estoppel doctrine, as Rigdon contends, it would be virtually identical in effect to section 523(a)(4). Congress could not have meant for such a specific provision to be mere surplusage. See United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206, 111 S.Ct. 2801, 115 L.Ed.2d 974 (1991) (citing United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 1989)). We do not believe that Congress, in enacting section 523(a)(11), engaged in a "meaningless legislative exercise."

Because the defendant has failed to offer documentation of the alleged promise, we need not address his argument that the district court failed to consider his role in providing information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Ronald Hausknecht, Donna Hausknecht, Darryl Erdman, Christopher Unger, Ronald Zabinski, John Sawyer, Steven Bahr, Steven Kraina, James Kobb, and Jerry Damarrow. Moreover, as we have stated on numerous occasions in the past, this court simply lacks jurisdiction to review the extent of a downward departure form an otherwise lawful sentence. United States v. Johnson, 997 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Stowe, 989 F.2d 261, 264 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 96, 116 L.Ed.2d 67 (1991); United States v. Heilprin, 910 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1990) ("where the defendant fails to suggest any law that the district court violated in departing downward, his appeal will be denied"); United States v. Gant, 902 F.2d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 1990). The court was under no obligation to make findings on each and every investigation in which the defendant claims he participated, rather, the government's "recommendation . . . function[s] as the court's starting point in determining the extent of the departure."

However, to interpret the phrase "in violation of law" as permitting a defendant to appeal from a downward departure simply because the district court fails to state reasons therefor, would impermissibly erode the jurisdictional limitation contained in § 3742(a)(3), which restricts defense appeals to upward departures. Cf. United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2801, 115 L.Ed.2d 974 (1991) (no jurisdiction under § 3742(a)(2) to review defendant's claim that the extent of a downward departure was a misapplication of the Guidelines). The dominant purpose of a statement of reasons is to assist appellate review.

Because subsection three limits appellate jurisdiction to sentences "greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guidelines range," this court has refused jurisdiction over appeals challenging only the extent of a downward departure. United States v. Gant, 902 F.2d 570, 572 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2801, 115 L.Ed.2d 974 (1991). Despite our holdings in Dean and Gant, Thomas urges us to accept jurisdiction under § 3742(a)(1) and § 3742(a)(2), which allow review of sentences that were "imposed in violation of law" and that conflict with the Guidelines.

We note that in other jurisdictions the Government itself has endorsed departure in part on the basis of the very "minor nature of [a defendant's] previous convictions" and in the same manner as applied to Lawrence and Reyes. United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 215, 216 (7th Cir. 1990).