U.S. v. Dean

27 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc.

    157 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 1998)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that the enhancement under § 2Q1.2(b) for storage or disposal of hazardous material without a permit does not penalize a defendant twice for the same conduct since § 2Q1.2 applies to offenses that do not involve the failure to obtain a permit

    Defendants' "knowledge of illegality" argument has been rejected by this court. United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1033 (1993). This argument has also been rejected by every other court of appeals that has considered the issue.

  2. U.S. v. Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co.

    CRIMINAL NO. 03-852 (MLC) (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2007)   Cited 7 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding Rule 29 motion filed during trial was moot as to a particular count given the jury's verdict of not guilty on that count

    See United States v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432, 436-40 (6th Cir. 1998);United States v. Wagner, 29 F.3d 264, 265-66 (7th Cir. 1994);United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 964-66 (2d Cir. 1993),cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1071 (1994); United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 190-92 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1033 (1993); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1036-40 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); accord United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991); see also United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1450-51 (11th Cir. 1988) (referencing jury instructions on same with apparent approval); United States v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643, 644-46 (11th Cir. 1992) (same); but see United States v. Johnson Towers, 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985) (discussed infra, nn. 29 52 and accompanying text). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit first articulated this statutory interpretation in Hoflin.

  3. U.S. v. Wagner

    29 F.3d 264 (7th Cir. 1994)   Cited 12 times
    Concluding that the government need not prove a defendant's knowledge of the RCRA's permit requirements

    Thus, the question is simply "how far the initial `knowingly' travels." United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1992). We find that it does not "travel" to (d)(2)(A).

  4. State v. Fettig

    172 Wis. 2d 428 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 14 times   1 Legal Analyses

    On the subject of mens rea in the RCRA in particular, most federal appeals courts take the position that the government need not prove that the person charged knew a permit was required to undertake the subject action. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 190 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Nov. 18, 1992) (No. 92-6629). Those conclusions rested in part, of course, on a reading of the federal statute.

  5. Little Hocking Water Ass'n, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.

    91 F. Supp. 3d 940 (S.D. Ohio 2015)   Cited 23 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Denying summary judgment on plaintiff's merged negligence and qualified private nuisance claims where there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the foreseeability of plaintiff's injury

    It does not exclude industrial wastewaters while they are being collected, stored or treated before discharge, nor does it exclude sludges that are generated by industrial wastewater treatment.” 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(2) ; seeUnited States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 194 (6th Cir.1992). Courts have interpreted this to mean that substances in wastewater that harm the environment while being stored in disposal ponds, or substances which leak, spill, or are poured onto the ground, thus contaminating soil, groundwater or surface waters, are not point source discharges. See Humboldt Baykeeper v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. C 06 02560 JSW, 2006 WL 3411877, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 27, 2006) ; Dean, 969 F.2d at 194.

  6. United States v. Stewart

    No. 23-5691 (6th Cir. Jun. 13, 2024)

    The language stating that defendants were "aided and abetted each by the other" merely charged Stewart in the alternative under a theory of aider and abettor liability. See United States v. VanderZwaag, 467 Fed.Appx. 402, 407 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the government may charge a violation of a statute under both principal liability and liability for aiding and abetting); United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 195 (6th Cir. 1992) (same).

  7. United States v. Williams

    998 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 2021)   Cited 37 times
    Upholding conspiracy conviction where defendant purchased 150 counterfeit Percocet pills for distribution

    An indictment can include an aiding-and-abetting theory without being duplicitous. See United States v. VanderZwaag , 467 F. App'x 402, 407 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Banks , 27 F. App'x 354, 359 (6th Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Dean , 969 F.2d 187, 195 (6th Cir. 1992). Barrett further argues that the charging of the § 841(b)(1)(C) enhancement provision "is significant because it adds an element to the distribution offense, but does not implicate the possession charge."

  8. Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth.

    913 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2019)

    When a polluting factory operator claimed that the hazardous waste dumped into a lagoon was exempt from RCRA because the lagoon was governed by the CWA, we explained that "only the actual discharges from a holding pond or similar feature into surface waters ... are governed by the Clean Water Act, not the contents of the pond or discharges into it." United States v. Dean , 969 F.2d 187, 194 (6th Cir. 1992). So too with coal ash ponds.

  9. U.S. v. Washington

    127 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 1997)   Cited 87 times
    Holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panel's published decision

    The mere existence, however, of multiple theories of liability or multiple factual predicates for violation of a statute does not render the indictment duplicitous. See United States v. Hixon, 987 F.2d 1261, 1265 (6th Cir. 1993) (an indictment under statute which subjects several alternative acts to the same punishment may charge any or all acts conjunctively without duplicity, and government need only prove violation of one of the alleged acts to prove violation of the statute); United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 195 (6th Cir. 1992) (principal liability and liability for aiding and abetting charged in same count does not render count duplicitous; acts proscribed by statute, stated in disjunctive, may be charged in the conjunctive in the indictment). Count II of the indictment charged only one offense, possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. §(s) 846.

  10. U.S. v. Kraig

    99 F.3d 1361 (6th Cir. 1996)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that charging the defendants under the defraud portion of 18 U.S.C. § 371 was appropriate where the defendants were alleged to have violated several tax statutes including both 26 U.S.C. § 7206 and 26 U.S.C. § 7201 because "no provision of the tax code covers the totality and scope of the conspiracy"

    Contrary to Kraig's assertion, the precedents in our Court hold that the evidence need not show that Kraig was the manager or supervisor of five other persons, but rather that he had a managerial or supervisory role in illegal conduct involving five or more persons. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 197 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1033 (1993) (guidelines require five participants, not five subordinates to defendant). The criminal activity here clearly involved more than five participants.