U.S. v. Davis

8 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Kimber

    395 F. App'x 237 (6th Cir. 2010)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that lock on common hallway door broken by other tenants did not undermine plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy

    Upon a suppression motion, "[i]t is the government's burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show through clear and positive testimony that . . . valid and voluntary consent to the search was obtained." United States v. Davis, 283 Fed.Appx. 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1999)). A search pursuant to third-party consent will not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the party granting consent had either actual authority or apparent authority to do so.

  2. United States v. Lecronier

    625 F. Supp. 3d 633 (E.D. Mich. 2022)

    A live-in girlfriend may voluntarily consent to a search of her shared residence. United States v. Ables, 280 F. App'x 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (collecting cases); United States v. Grayer, 232 F. App'x 446, 449 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Davis, 283 F. App'x 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (holding that a co-occupant has "common authority to consent to a search"). In addition, Loudenslager testified that, though Scioli had an out-of-state driver's license and lived with Defendant for four months, she shared a bedroom with him, kept clothes at their apartment, and was listed in the police database as living there due to prior incidents—all which led Loudenslager to "reasonably believe" that Scioli had "authority over the [apartment] in common with [Defendant]."

  3. United States v. Rogers

    Case No. 19-4175 (6th Cir. May. 27, 2021)   Cited 10 times

    On a suppression motion, "[i]t is the government's burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show through clear and positive testimony that . . . valid and voluntary consent to the search was obtained." United States v. Davis, 283 F. App'x 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1999)). Whether Berry had actual authority to consent to the search is a close question, but we need not answer it because Berry had apparent authority.

  4. U.S. v. Tatman

    397 F. App'x 152 (6th Cir. 2010)   Cited 34 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, a party consenting to a search may withdraw or restrict the scope of consent at any time

    These arguments are based on Randolph's warning against upholding searches where there is "evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection." Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121, 126 S.Ct. 1515; see, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 351 Fed.Appx. 69, 72 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a suppression argument based on Randolph because, while the defendant was present when the co-tenant gave consent, he "did not refuse to consent to search the apartment" and "did not object after [the co-tenant] gave her consent"); United States v. Penney, 576 F.3d 297, 309 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting Randolph-based argument where defendant did not object but was never asked for consent even though he "was in custody at the same police station when and where" his co-tenant gave consent); United States v. Davis, 283 Fed.Appx. 370 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting suppression argument because "[a]t the time the search was conducted, [the defendant] was asleep in the house and did not respond to the police officers' request to gain entry" and thus "was unavailable to object to the search and did not in fact refuse consent"); Ayoub, 498 F.3d at 540-41 (rejecting defendant's allegation that the police intentionally bypassed him in order to ask someone else with apparent authority for consent to search). In sharp contrast to the defendants in these cases, Tatman actually objected to Clark's entry and did so while Clark was still standing in his front doorway and well before the search began.

  5. United States v. Deakins

    1:21-CR-058-CEA-SKL (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 23, 2022)

    Furthermore, it is the Government's burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show that “valid and voluntary consent to the search was obtained.” United States v. Davis, 283 Fed.Appx. 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1999)).

  6. United States v. Livingston

    CRIMINAL NO. 1:09-CR-0072-03 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2014)   Cited 1 times

    In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that the search of an apartment is reasonable when a resident with common authority gives consent while the defendant is asleep inside at the time of entry. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179-80, 188-89; see also United States v. Davis, 283 F. App'x 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that defendant who was asleep and did not respond to police officer's requests to enter was unavailable to refuse consent).

  7. United States v. Clay

    1 F. Supp. 3d 688 (E.D. Ky. 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that the fact that live-in girlfriend did not have a key, her name was not on the lease, and her statements were only corroborated by evidence found after the entry did not vitiate her ability to consent to a search, and noting that there is no case authority requiring a consenting co-habitant to produce a key or a lease

    Thus, the Government must establish “by a preponderance of the evidence, ... through clear and positive testimony that ... valid and voluntary consent to the search was obtained.” United States v. Davis, 283 Fed.Appx. 370, 373 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir.1999)). There is no issue here as to voluntariness, but the Government likewise must “bear[ ] the burden of establishing the effectiveness of a third party's consent.”

  8. United States v. Schultz

    Case No. 13-20023 (E.D. Mich. May. 29, 2013)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that while officers were lawfully on defendant's property to conduct a knock and talk, they exceeded the scope of their authority by wandering around his yard away from the house and driveway without his consent in search of marijuana plants

    The government bears the burden to prove, "by a preponderance of the evidence and through clear and positive testimony, that 'valid and voluntary consent to the search was obtained.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 283 F. App'x 370, 372-73 (6th Cir. 2008)). The government has not sustained this burden, and the evidence that was seized in violation of Mr. Schultz's Fourth Amendment rights will be suppressed.