U.S. v. Daniels

15 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Eason

    907 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 2018)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that first-degree battery conviction in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201 for "purposefully causing physical injury to a person with a firearm" qualified as a crime of violence

    But this was not error, much less plain error, if the facts surrounding the offense of conviction support a charge that Eason’s firearm or ammunition possession was in connection with conduct that constituted a crime of violence. See United States v. Pate, 854 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 2010).For this inquiry, our review of the facts need look no farther than excerpts from our prior opinion, Eason, 829 F.3d at 635-36 :

  2. United States v. Robinson

    43 F.4th 892 (8th Cir. 2022)   Cited 5 times
    Discussing Wooden and concluding that the defendant's prior burglary offenses occurred on separate occasions without remanding for further fact-finding

    In applying these factors, we have consistently held violent felonies committed at different times, different locations, or against different victims may qualify as separate qualifying convictions under the ACCA, even if the offenses were committed within a short period of time of each other. See, e.g. , Pledge , 821 F.3d at 1038 (holding three burglaries committed on the same day were separate predicate offenses under the ACCA because the burglaries were committed in different locations against different victims); United States v. Daniels , 625 F.3d 529, 533–34 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding three burglaries committed over a one-year period on different dates and locations and against different victims qualified as separate violent felonies under the ACCA despite the fact the defendant was arrested on the same day for two of the burglaries). Here, Robinson committed three residential burglaries—each on different days, in different locations, and against different victims—over an approximate three-week span.

  3. United States v. Hellems

    866 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2017)   Cited 15 times
    Recognizing that a trial court must first warn a defendant before it can remove him from the courtroom for disruptive behavior

    The first element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is a showing that the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. See United States v. Daniels , 625 F.3d 529, 532-33 (8th Cir. 2010). "The government need only prove a prior felony conviction—not its specific circumstances."

  4. United States v. Gaines

    859 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 2017)   Cited 9 times
    In Gaines, we rejected a similar argument about testimony from a gang expert, saying that "we have repeatedly held explanatory evidence like this to be admissible."

    "United States v. Cowling , 648 F.3d 690, 700 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Johnson , 474 F.3d 1044, 1048 (8th Cir. 2007) ). "We review sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo and reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found [the defendant] guilty." United States v. Daniels , 625 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 2010). Taking "the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and accept[ing] all reasonable inferences that can be drawn" from that evidence, we find the evidence sufficient.

  5. United States v. Munoz-Ramon

    614 F. App'x 857 (8th Cir. 2015)   Cited 3 times

    The district court did not clearly err in finding that Munoz had not accepted responsibility. See United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing for clear error the district court's finding that the defendant had not accepted responsibility). Finally, we conclude that the district court carefully considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), properly explained its rationale for denying a downward variance, and imposed a substantively reasonable sentence.

  6. United States v. Wright

    682 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2012)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that "Wright drove the vehicle with the knowledge that the firearm was present in the vehicle with him. This is sufficient to establish his constructive possession of the firearm."

    Possession of a firearm during a high-speed chase initiated for the sole purpose of concealing that firearm from law enforcement is anything but innocent. Wright's final argument is that the district court incorrectly applied the ACCA by counting Wright's two prior burglary convictions as independent predicate offenses under the ACCA. Wright argues that because he was arrested at the same time for both offenses and because he was likewise sentenced for both offenses at the same time, the district court should have counted these two separate burglary convictions as only one predicate offense under the ACCA. This Court has repeatedly rejected such arguments, see United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 533 (8th Cir.2010), and we do so again here. The conviction and resulting sentence are affirmed.

  7. U.S. v. Willoughby

    653 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2011)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that the distance factor cut against counting drug sales separately when the two buyers "stood side-by-side" and "virtually no distance separated the two sales"

    For instance, in United States v. Daniels, we concluded that the prior burglaries “occurred on different occasions,” as required by the ACCA, based on the “record show[ing] that Daniels' prior burglaries spanned a one-year period, occurred on different dates, related to different victims, and were committed at different locations.” 625 F.3d 529, 533 (8th Cir.2010). Similarly, in Hamell, we concluded that two offenses were sufficiently separate and distinct where the defendant “first stabbed one victim with a knife inside a tavern after an argument,” and, “[a]bout twenty-five minutes later outside the tavern, ... shot at a different victim who had called the police and was approaching [the defendant's] girlfriend.”

  8. U.S. v. Elliott

    431 F. App'x 481 (7th Cir. 2011)

    The burden lies with the defendant to demonstrate that the reduction is warranted. United States, v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bacon, 617 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 370 (7th Cir. 2008). And a defendant challenging information in a presentence report must "do more than simply deny the information presented."

  9. U.S. v. Kiefer

    417 F. App'x 590 (8th Cir. 2011)   Cited 1 times

    Evidence submitted at the sentencing hearing shows that Kiefer fled the bank in a car and — after a brief chase — was apprehended by the police, who discovered a firearm next to the stolen currency in his car. Thus, we conclude that the district court properly applied the firearm enhancement, see United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 2010) (standard of review), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1706, 179 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011), because Kiefer possessed the gun while fleeing the scene of his crime, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (relevant conduct under Guidelines includes all of defendant's acts or omissions that occurred "in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for" offense of conviction); § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) (5-level increase applies if firearm was brandished or possessed). We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range.

  10. U.S. v. Coleman

    635 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2011)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that even without the presumption of reasonableness, defendant's sentence was reasonable because the district court explained that the decision not to grant a downward variance "was necessary to afford adequate deterrence, to protect the public, to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and to further the congressional intent of severely sentencing career offenders"

    We review the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 2010). Coleman professes to challenge the career offender Guidelines definition of felony on substantive reasonableness grounds.