But this was not error, much less plain error, if the facts surrounding the offense of conviction support a charge that Eason’s firearm or ammunition possession was in connection with conduct that constituted a crime of violence. See United States v. Pate, 854 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 2010).For this inquiry, our review of the facts need look no farther than excerpts from our prior opinion, Eason, 829 F.3d at 635-36 :
In applying these factors, we have consistently held violent felonies committed at different times, different locations, or against different victims may qualify as separate qualifying convictions under the ACCA, even if the offenses were committed within a short period of time of each other. See, e.g. , Pledge , 821 F.3d at 1038 (holding three burglaries committed on the same day were separate predicate offenses under the ACCA because the burglaries were committed in different locations against different victims); United States v. Daniels , 625 F.3d 529, 533–34 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding three burglaries committed over a one-year period on different dates and locations and against different victims qualified as separate violent felonies under the ACCA despite the fact the defendant was arrested on the same day for two of the burglaries). Here, Robinson committed three residential burglaries—each on different days, in different locations, and against different victims—over an approximate three-week span.
The first element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is a showing that the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. See United States v. Daniels , 625 F.3d 529, 532-33 (8th Cir. 2010). "The government need only prove a prior felony conviction—not its specific circumstances."
"United States v. Cowling , 648 F.3d 690, 700 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Johnson , 474 F.3d 1044, 1048 (8th Cir. 2007) ). "We review sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo and reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found [the defendant] guilty." United States v. Daniels , 625 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 2010). Taking "the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and accept[ing] all reasonable inferences that can be drawn" from that evidence, we find the evidence sufficient.
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Munoz had not accepted responsibility. See United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 2010) (reviewing for clear error the district court's finding that the defendant had not accepted responsibility). Finally, we conclude that the district court carefully considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), properly explained its rationale for denying a downward variance, and imposed a substantively reasonable sentence.
Possession of a firearm during a high-speed chase initiated for the sole purpose of concealing that firearm from law enforcement is anything but innocent. Wright's final argument is that the district court incorrectly applied the ACCA by counting Wright's two prior burglary convictions as independent predicate offenses under the ACCA. Wright argues that because he was arrested at the same time for both offenses and because he was likewise sentenced for both offenses at the same time, the district court should have counted these two separate burglary convictions as only one predicate offense under the ACCA. This Court has repeatedly rejected such arguments, see United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 533 (8th Cir.2010), and we do so again here. The conviction and resulting sentence are affirmed.
For instance, in United States v. Daniels, we concluded that the prior burglaries “occurred on different occasions,” as required by the ACCA, based on the “record show[ing] that Daniels' prior burglaries spanned a one-year period, occurred on different dates, related to different victims, and were committed at different locations.” 625 F.3d 529, 533 (8th Cir.2010). Similarly, in Hamell, we concluded that two offenses were sufficiently separate and distinct where the defendant “first stabbed one victim with a knife inside a tavern after an argument,” and, “[a]bout twenty-five minutes later outside the tavern, ... shot at a different victim who had called the police and was approaching [the defendant's] girlfriend.”
The burden lies with the defendant to demonstrate that the reduction is warranted. United States, v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bacon, 617 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 370 (7th Cir. 2008). And a defendant challenging information in a presentence report must "do more than simply deny the information presented."
Evidence submitted at the sentencing hearing shows that Kiefer fled the bank in a car and — after a brief chase — was apprehended by the police, who discovered a firearm next to the stolen currency in his car. Thus, we conclude that the district court properly applied the firearm enhancement, see United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 2010) (standard of review), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1706, 179 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011), because Kiefer possessed the gun while fleeing the scene of his crime, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (relevant conduct under Guidelines includes all of defendant's acts or omissions that occurred "in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for" offense of conviction); § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) (5-level increase applies if firearm was brandished or possessed). We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range.
We review the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529, 534 (8th Cir. 2010). Coleman professes to challenge the career offender Guidelines definition of felony on substantive reasonableness grounds.