Opinion
Criminal Action No. 03-349-2.
November 2, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Defendant Stacey Crittenton ("Crittenton") was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and of aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. Before the court is his motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
A motion for judgment of acquittal is evaluated under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29., which requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, draw reasonable inferences from the evidence in the government's favor and uphold the jury's verdict unless we determine that no reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged. United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1991). A motion for a new trial, governed by FED. R. CRIM. P. 33, requires us to determine whether the jury's verdict is so contrary to the weight of the evidence that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2003).
"A conspiracy conviction requires that one agreed to commit an unlawful act and intended to commit the underlying offense." Id. (citation omitted). "A conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance requires that one knowingly and intentionally possessed the substance with the intent to distribute it." Id. (citation omitted). "An aiding and abetting conviction requires that another committed the substantive offense and that the one charged with aiding and abetting knew of the substantive offense commission and acted with the intent to facilitate it." Id. (citation omitted).
At the trial, the government presented evidence that Crittenton's co-defendant, Naim Pryor ("Pryor"), conducted a drug deal outside of his car. After Pryor re-entered his car and drove off, police kept him under constant surveillance until his vehicle was stopped and he was arrested. During the arrest, Crittenton was discovered to be a passenger in the car and was seen shoving an object into a compartment in the passenger side door. The object was discovered to be a bag containing 24 red ziplock packets of crack cocaine. Six additional, matching ziplock packets of crack cocaine were found in one of Crittenton's pockets. Another bag containing seven blue glassine packets of heroin was found in Crittenton's other pocket. A search of the car found additional heroin and crack cocaine in packets identical to those found on Crittenton. Crittenton also possessed, among other items, a "tally" sheet, $323 in cash, and a piece of paper folded accordion-style into seven sections, with each section having the word "smacc" and Crittenton's cell phone number written on it. The search of the car also revealed other items including cocaine, marijuana, and a "paid" stamp.
We find that the jury properly found beyond a reasonable doubt that Crittenton committed the accused crimes. Moreover, the jury's findings were not contrary to the weight of the evidence. A jury could reasonably infer that Crittenton and Pryor were co-conspirators, that Crittenton possessed the controlled substances with intent to distribute them, and that Crittenton aided and abetted Pryor. A reasonable inference may be drawn that Crittenton was present in the vehicle during the drug deal since the car was under constant surveillance by the police and he was not seen entering or leaving the car until the point of arrest. Crittenton was seen hiding an object in the passenger compartment of the car that turned out to be a bag of drugs. He possessed drugs in containers that were identical to drug containers discovered throughout the car. He possessed items from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that either a sale had just occurred or that sales were impending — the $323, the "tally" sheet, and the piece of paper folded accordion-style into seven sections, with each section having the word "smacc" and Crittenton's cell phone number written on it. While Crittenton argues that an expert at trial testified that "smacc" could be a person's name, he acknowledges that the expert also testified that the term is slang for heroin.
Accordingly, we are denying Crittenton's motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial on the ground of insufficient evidence.