"When considering whether evidence concerning [Cooper's] prior conviction was properly admitted for impeachment purposes, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review." United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2008). Under Rule 609(a)(1)(B), a crime punishable by more than one year in prison "must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant."
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). Perjury involves a finding of intent to testify falsely, not simply a finding that testimony was inaccurate or false. United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695, 702 (8th Cir. 2008). In other words, the district court must find that the defendant provided "false testimony concerning a matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory."
Generally, under Rule 609(a), a defendant's prior conviction may be used to attack their character for truthfulness, should they choose to testify, if the crime of conviction was a felony offense and “the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect” to the Defendants. United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695,699 (8th Cir. 2008); see United States v. Stoltz, 683 F.3d 934, 938-39 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing how Rule 609(a) applies to witnesses generally, not a defendant who testifies)
Generally, under Rule 609(a), a defendant's prior conviction may be used to attack their character for truthfulness, should they choose to testify, if the crime of conviction was a felony offense and “the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect” to the defendant. United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2008); see United States v. Stoltz, 683 F.3d 934, 938-39 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing how Rule 609(a) applies to witnesses generally, not a defendant who testifies). And “for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime require proving-or the witness's admitting-a dishonest act or false statement.”
Under Rule 609(a), a defendant's prior conviction may be used to attack their character for truthfulness, should they choose to testify, if the crime of conviction was a felony offense and “the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect” to the defendant. United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2008); see United States v. Stoltz, 683 F.3d 934, 938-39 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing how Rule 609(a) applies to witnesses generally, not a defendant who testifies)
These crimes were punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and are crimen falsi offenses since they "implicate dishonesty and deceit and certainly bear upon [the witness's] credibility and veracity." Slade, 2013 WL 5873576, *5 (citing United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2008) (concluding that credit card fraud is a crime of dishonesty containing an element of deceit, which relates to a witness's "propensity to testify truthfully"); Foye v. Cameron, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185329, at *13, 2012 WL 6952791, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2012) (noting that the crime of access device fraud is a crime of dishonesty)). "Moreover, any crime that requires proof of intent to defraud ‘by definition involves some element of deceit, which would bear upon one's propensity to testify truthfully.’ "
" "In ruling on a motion for a new trial, a district court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict; it may weigh the evidence and evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses." United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695, 701 (8th Cir. 2008). But a motion for a new trial should be granted only where "the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred . . . ."
" Fed. R. Evid 609(a)(1)(B). "[P]rior convictions are highly probative of credibility 'because of the common sense proposition that one who has transgressed society's norms by committing a felony is less likely than most to be deterred from lying under oath.'" United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir. 2005)). Because Defendant's 2009 delivery of a controlled substance conviction was a felony conviction subject to imprisonment for more than one year and is less than ten years old, see Fed. R. Evid. 609(b), it "must be admitted" unless its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
" Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). "[P]rior convictions are highly probative of credibility 'because of the common sense proposition that one who has transgressed society's norms by committing a felony is less likely than most to be deterred from lying under oath.'" United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir. 2005)). Based on the centrality of Defendant's credibility to this case (in the event he chooses to testify) and the generally high probative value of prior convictions to a defendant's credibility, the court finds that the convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and theft in the second degree are highly probative in this case.
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides two avenues for admitting a defendant's prior convictions for impeachment purposes. United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2008). First, Rule 609(a)(2) states that crimes involving dishonesty or false statements are admissible, regardless of the punishment.