Opinion
CR. NO. 00-63.
March 12, 2002.
MEMORANDUM
Defendant, Nicholas Chavez-Gavina, entered a plea of Guilty to the offense of re-entry into the United States following deportation. He was sentenced by this Court and has now filed a Motion for an Order Granting him Good Time Credit.
The Government filed a Response to this Motion containing a Declaration of James Cochran, Inmate Systems Manager, at the Ray Brook, New York Federal Correctional Institution. In that Declaration, Mr. Cochran notes that in order to initiate the Bureau of Prisons Administrative Remedy process, Chavez-Gavina must first file a request with the Institution. If he is dissatisfied with the response, he may appeal to the Regional Director and, thereafter, to the General Counsel. Only after having taken these steps, would he have exhausted his administrative remedies. Chavez-Gavina did submit an inmate request to Mr. Cochran and received a negative response, but he has not initiated and exhausted the proper and necessary administrative remedies.
Federal inmates seeking habeas relief are required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a petition. The Bureau of Prisons administrative remedy program is published at 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. Under this program, an inmate may seek formal review of an issue which relates to any aspect of their confinement.
The "Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995" ("PLRA"), amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, states that "No action shall be brought . . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." Booth v. Churner, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 1999). The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an appropriate basis for dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Gonzalez v. Perrill, 919 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1990); Arias v. United States Parole Commission, 648 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1981).
Chavez-Gavina is challenging the manner in which his sentence is being executed; he does not seek to vacate the sentence as illegally imposed. Therefore, any potential federal jurisdiction relating to the computation of his sentence would properly be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The proper venue for this would be the Northern District of New York.See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979); Gomori v. Arnold, 533 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 851.
The Government is correct in asserting that the appropriate jurisdictional basis to challenge sentence credit and sentence computation is 28 U.S.C. § 2241, federal habeas corpus. See United States v. Grimes, 641 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1981). The authority to grant pre-sentencing jail credit is vested in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, not the sentencing court. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992);United States v. Bell, 48 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v.Brann, 990 F.2d 98, 103-04 (3d Cir. 1993).
For these reasons, the Court enters the following Order.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of MARCH, 2002, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Order Granting Good Time Credit and the Government's Response thereto, including the Declaration of the Inmate System's Manager for the Federal Correctional Institution, Ray Brook, New York, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion is DISMISSED for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. If the Defendant had exhausted administrative remedies, the proper venue for this Motion would be in the District of his confinement, the Northern District of New York.