Fed.R.Crim.P. 14(a). We have interpreted this provision to require a defendant to demonstrate โthe lack of a fair trial due to actual, compelling prejudice.โ United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir.2009). The presence of prejudice must be balanced against the interests of judicial economy.
In the Eleventh Circuit, "the general rule is that Defendants indicted together should be tried together, especially in conspiracy cases." United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cassano, 132 F.3d 646 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985). Notwithstanding the general rule, Rule 14(a) permits a severance of Defendants for trial if their joinder "appears to prejudice a defendant."
Rather, the defendant must establish that the joint trial resulted in a "specific and compelling prejudice" to her. United States v. Liss, 265 F.3d 1220, 1228 (11th Cir. 2001). We have held that severance may be necessary where, inter alia, (1) the defendants rely upon mutually antagonistic defenses, and (2) a cumulative and prejudicial "spill over" effect may prevent the jury from making an individualized determination as to each defendant because it cannot sift through the evidence as necessary. United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 2009). The jury pronouncing different verdicts for the various defendants and counts is evidence that the jury properly sifted through the evidence to make the requisite individualized determinations as to each defendant.
In this circuit, the rule about joint trials is that โdefendants who are indicted together are usually tried together.โ United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1268 (11th Cir.2007); see also Puiatti, 626 F.3d at 1309; United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir.2009); United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1236 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 989 (11th Cir.2001); United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 984 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 857 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 65 (5th Cir.1973). In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) permits the joinder of defendants in the same indictment "if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction," and the general rule is that defendants who are indicted together should be tried together, especially in conspiracy cases. United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1268 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Cobb, 185 F.3d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537-38 (1993). Rule 14 authorizes the severance of properly joined defendants for trial if their joinder "appears to prejudice a defendant . . . ."
Post-Booker,, "the imposition of a sentence by the district court in a criminal case . . . involves a two-step process."United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). "First, the district court must still determine the appropriate sentencing range under the Guidelines.
But a district court may make reasonable inferences "based on common sense and ordinary human experience." United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1367 (11th Cir. 2009) ("We are unable to say that the district court's inference that the cash came from trafficking in methamphetamine was 9
The district court reasonably inferred that the cash constituted drug proceeds based on Kohler's role as a courier and a telephone conversation recorded by the jail in which the manager of the conspiracy, Isaias Villa, discussed the contents of the backpack with Kohler. See United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 2009). And Kohler did not object during sentencing when a witness for the government referred to the cash as drug proceeds.
We also review the denial of a motion to sever for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009). Finally, we review limitations placed on cross-examination by the district court for abuse of discretion.
Although Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a) permits a severance of a joint trial if joinder "appears to prejudice a defendant," we "will not reverse the denial of a motion for severance in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). We recognize four types of prejudicial joinder that will generally require severance: (1) where the defendants rely on "mutually antagonistic defenses"; (2) where one defendant would exculpate the defendant moving for severance at a separate trial but will not testify in a joint setting; (3) where inculpatory evidence admissible against one defendant is not admissible against the other; and (4) "[w]here a cumulative and prejudicial 'spill over' effect may prevent the jury from sifting through the evidence to make an individualized determination as to each Defendant."