Opinion
No. 97 C 6335.
February 26, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner, Leroy Rupert (Rupert), seeks a writ of habeas corpus against the East Moline Correctional Center Warden, Sergio Molina, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before the Court is Rupert's writ of habeas corpus in which he raises three grounds for relief: (1) the State failed to establish a complete chain of custody of the cocaine used at trial; (2) the trial court's sentence was based on facts not admitted into evidence; and (3) petitioner did not have the right to confront and cross-exam a witness at trial.
Prior to June 10, 1998, petitioner was in custody of Warden Lamark Carter at the Dixon Correctional Center. Petitioner has been moved to the East Moline Correctional Center where Sergio Molina is the warden.
The factual findings of a state trial or appellate court are presumed true in a federal habeas proceeding unless the petitioner can rebut the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). The petitioner has not challenged the appellate court's summary of facts. Accordingly, the following facts are drawn from the appellate court's opinions.
Following a jury trial, Rupert was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Rupert to 18 years of imprisonment. Rupert appealed his conviction and sentence to the First District Appellate Court (Appellate Court), arguing that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of cocaine over his objection's to the chain of custody, and the trial court improperly assumed facts not in evidence when imposing his sentence. On June 27, 1996, the Appellate Court affirmed Rupert's conviction and sentence. People v. Rupert, No. 1-94-0425, Jun. 27, 1996 (Rule 23 order). Rupert filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court raising the same two issue raised at the appellate level. On October 2, 1996, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition for leave to appeal. On November 6, 1996, Rupert filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The petition for post-conviction was denied.
A federal court will not grant habeas corpus relief on any claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). A habeas corpus petition must survive procedural default before a federal court may address the merits of the petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991) ( Coleman).
Generally, there are three ways a procedural default occurs: (1) where the petitioner fails to raise a federal constitutional issue in the state courts ( Bocian v. Godinez, 101 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 1996)); (2) when a state court rejects a petitioner's claims pursuant to an adequate and independent state procedural or substantive ground ( Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30); and (3) if the petitioner completely failed to assert the claim in the state court ( Moleterno v. Nelson, 114 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 1997)).
A petitioner may be excused from a procedural default if he or she can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or a failure to review the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 526 (7th Cir. 1999). Cause sufficient to excuse a procedural default is defined as "some objective factor external to the defense" which precludes the petitioner's ability to pursue his or her claims in state court. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) ( Murray). Ordinarily, this requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
To demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice the petitioner must show that `a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.' Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (Schlup) quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. Thus, the petitioner must show "that is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
Respondent argues Rupert's first two claims are procedurally barred because he failed to present the substance of his federal claims to the state courts. A federal habeas petitioner must present the substance of his federal claims to the state courts to enable the state courts the opportunity to apply constitutional principles and correct any constitutional errors committed by the trial court. United States v. Fairman, 731 F.2d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 1984) ( Fairman). Presentation of a similar state-law claim is not sufficient to meet this requirement. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). The petitioner must present his claims "in such a way to fairly alert the state court to any applicable constitutional grounds for the claim." Fairman, 731 F.2d at 453.
A four prong test is used to determine whether a petitioner has fairly presented an issue to the state courts. Verdin v. O'Leary, 972 F.2d 1467, 1473 (7th Cir. 1992) ( Verdin). The test includes whether the petitioner's argument to the state courts (1) relied on pertinent federal cases employing a constitutional analysis; (2) relied upon state cases applying a constitutional analysis to similar factual situations; (3) asserted the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific constitutional rights; or (4) alleged a pattern of facts that is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation. Verdin, 972 F.2d at 1473-474. All four prongs of the test need not be met. Similarly, satisfaction of one of the prongs is not necessarily sufficient to avoid procedural default. Kurzawa v. Jordan, 146 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 1998).
Rupert has not satisfied any of the prongs. Rupert's two claims to the state courts included an argument that evidence was incorrectly admitted into evidence and the trial court's sentence was incorrect. Rupert did not rely on any federal cases in his appellate briefs or his petition to this Court. Furthermore, he did not identify any constitutional violation in either the state court or this Court. Without the clear identification of what constitutional claim, if any, Rupert is presently asserting, it is not appropriate for this Court to review Rupert's state courts briefs to determine whether he relied upon state cases applying a constitutional analysis to a similar fact pattern. See United States v. Bowen, No. 00 C 4065, 2000 WL 1307514 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 12, 2000). Rupert's appellate briefs also fail to demonstrate that he asserted a claim in sufficient detail to call to mind a specific constitutional right or allege a pattern of facts typical of constitutional litigation.
Respondent also argues Rupert's third claim is defaulted because he failed to present the third claim as a constitutional claim to the state courts. For a petitioner to raise an issue on habeas review, the state courts must have had an opportunity to address the issue. Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir. 1995). Rupert did not raise his third claim to the state courts; therefore the state courts did not have an opportunity to apply constitutional principles and correct any errors committed by the trial court. Thus, Rupert's third claim is also defaulted.
Rupert has also failed to demonstrate he should be excused from procedural default. Rupert has not argued, or shown, that there was cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or that lack of review will result in a miscarriage of justice. There is no evidence and Rupert does not allege that some external factor external to Rupert's defense precluded his ability to pursue his claims in state court to establish cause for his default or that actual prejudice resulted because of an alleged violation of federal law.
In addition, Rupert does not allege, and the evidence does not establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred, i.e., that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found Rupert guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The state court fully addressed Rupert's claim that the cocaine lacked the proper chain of custody, finding that the State's witnesses established a chain of custody sufficiently complete to demonstrate that it was improbable that the contraband was either tampered with or substituted. The state court also fully addressed Rupert's sentence, finding that the court's statements in relation to Rupert's sentence, when taken in context, do not indicate that it improperly relied on some speculated amount of controlled substance as argued by Rupert. Accordingly, Rupert has procedurally defaulted his claims.
For the reasons herein, Rupert's Writ for Habeas Corpus is denied.