Therefore, the law in jurisdictions where actual authority was required was not altered. United States v. Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff'd sub nom United States v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 149 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 1998) (determining that authority relied upon must be real and not apparent), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 2365 (1999); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1235-37 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that defendant could only be exonerated if he relied on real and not apparent authority); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984) (declining to adopt apparent authority from Barker and instead requiring actual authority). This Court approves and will follow the holding in United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1994), which limits the use of the defense of public authority to those situations where the government agent in fact had the authority to empower the defendant to perform the acts in question.
The court correctly held that Johnson could not use the defenses of entrapment by estoppel or public authority, unless he could show that he relied on official government communications before acting in a manner proscribed by law. See United States v. Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D.Fla. 1995). Entrapment by estoppel occurs when a government official incorrectly informs a defendant that certain conduct is legal, the defendant believes the government official and is then prosecuted for acting in conformity with the official's advice.
To the extent issues relating to compliance with the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) arise, they can be addressed in subsequent motion practice. See 18 U.S.C. App. III; see also United States v. Rezag, 134 F.3d 1121, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("When classified materials may be relevant to criminal proceedings, [CIPA] provides procedures designed to protect the rights of the defendant while minimizing the associated harm to national security."); United States v. Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1995) ("[CIPA] 'established a procedural framework for ruling on questions of admissibility involving classified information before introduction of the evidence in open court'") (quoting United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1989));United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 135, 137 (D.D.C. 1990). II. Identification of Exhibits
United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. 1563, 1571-72 (S.D. Fl. 1994) (holding that court rulings at a Section 6 hearing are not "factual questions that are relevant to the determination of guilt or innocence"). Cf. United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172-73 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that in camera hearing to ascertain whether to disclose the identity of a confidential informant involved resolution of the legal question of the materiality of her testimony and concluding that exclusion of defendant from the hearing (which his attorney was permitted to attend) did not qualify as a breach of the Confrontation Clause) The Court adopts these precedents and holds that the Defendant's exclusion from the hearing, should one be held, is not unconstitutional.