U.S. v. Caraza

40 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Mendoza-Burciaga

    981 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1993)   Cited 47 times
    Denying a reversal because the defendant had not alleged prejudice from having to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror — no comment on Nell

    The circumstances that justify warrantless searches include those in which officers reasonably fear for their safety, where firearms are present, or where there is risk of a criminal suspect's escaping or fear of destruction of evidence. Johnson, 862 F.2d at 1138 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 435 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 596 (5th Cir. 1983). The fact that the warrantless search occurred immediately after the arrest of the suspects supports the finding of exigent circumstances.

  2. U.S. v. Siegelman

    640 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2011)   Cited 106 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that untimeliness "is itself a basis upon which to deny" a motion for recusal under section 455

    "[I]f the statement `could have been intended to affect future dealings between the parties,' then the statement is in furtherance of a conspiracy." United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Pattern, 594 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1979)). Finally, "[statements between conspirators which provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among them, or inform each other of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the conspiracy.

  3. U.S. v. Siegelman

    561 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009)   Cited 26 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a motion for recusal was properly denied because it was not timely made

    "[I]f the statement `could have been intended to affect future dealings between the parties,' then the statement is in furtherance of a conspiracy." United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Patton, 594 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1979)). Finally, "[statements between conspirators which provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among them, or inform each other of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the conspiracy.

  4. U.S. v. Grant

    311 F. App'x 186 (11th Cir. 2008)   Cited 1 times

    We have declined to hold that a judge who was not present at trial must read the trial transcript before imposing a sentence, where the record contained "ample evidence that [the sentencing judge] was familiar enough with the trial to impose sentence." United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 437 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). We have also held that a sentencing judge was "sufficiently familiar with [the defendant's] trial to sentence him," where the sentencing judge had ruled on pretrial motions, read the trial transcripts, and read the transcripts of all later proceedings.

  5. U.S. v. Rigatuso

    719 F. Supp. 409 (D. Md. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    And whatever this Court's determination on defendant's competency, it will not be overturned unless it is clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. Ted Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1408 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 437 (11th Cir. 1988). In United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1971), this district's Court of Appeals said:

  6. United States v. Turner

    No. 23-50461 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2025)

    Ante, at 11-20. See Mendoza-Burciaga, 981 F.2d at 197 ("Where officers are lawfully present in a house during a security sweep they may seize evidence in plain view." (first citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971); and then citing United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 435 (11th Cir. 1988))). See, e.g., Buie, 494 U.S. at 335-36 (emphasizing that the circumstances dictate whether the sweep is justified and stating that the sweep must last "no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger" (emphasis added)); id. at 335 n.3 ("A protective sweep is without question a 'search,' as was the patdown in Terry; they are permissible on less than probable cause only because they are limited to that which is necessary to protect the safety of officers and others."

  7. United States v. Deramus

    No. 22-12104 (11th Cir. Oct. 21, 2024)

    This court has refused to require that district judges read the trial transcripts before sentencing, even when the district judge did not preside over the original trial. See United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 437 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). Here, the same judge presided over the trial then sentenced Deramus, thereby having intimate familiarity with Deramus's case.

  8. United States v. Reynolds

    No. 16-16392 (11th Cir. Jun. 20, 2017)   Cited 1 times

    "[T]his record contains ample evidence that [the sentencing judge] was familiar enough with the trial to impose [a] sentence. See United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 437 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). III

  9. United States v. Harrell

    635 F. App'x 682 (11th Cir. 2015)   Cited 6 times

    If a statement could have been intended to affect future dealings between the parties, then the statement is in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir. 1988). In this case, the district court did not clearly err in admitting Wilson's testimony about what Smiley told him.

  10. U.S. v. Rendon

    359 F. App'x 80 (11th Cir. 2009)   Cited 4 times

    [I]f the statement could have been intended to affect future dealings between the parties, then the statement is in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). In general, the out-of-court statements made by co-conspirators Jose Ibarra and Pedro Medina-Villegas to other co-conspirators communicated Rendon's role in the conspiracy.