Opinion
No. 07-4121.
Submitted: August 29, 2007.
Decided: September 13, 2007.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:86-cr-00255-CMH).
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Meghan S. Skelton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, John P. Lohrer Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
Dennis Tyrone Butler pled guilty to the charge of escape in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 751(a) (West 2000 Supp. 2007), and was sentenced to twenty-four months' imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on his constitutional right to a speedy trial. For the following reasons, we affirm Butler's conviction and sentence.
In August 1978, Butler escaped from the lawful custody of the Attorney General after serving only eight years of a sentence of twenty years' to life imprisonment. Butler was indicted on the charge of escape in September 1986, but was not arrested until he turned himself in to law enforcement officials in August 2006. Butler admits that from August 1978 until August 2006, he lived as a fugitive, moving frequently and using approximately thirty different identities in an effort to evade capture and arrest. During that time period, the Government employed numerous investigative techniques in an effort to locate and apprehend Butler.
On balance, we find that the four factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), weigh heavily against Butler. Accordingly, we find no violation of Butler's constitutional right to a speedy trial. We therefore affirm Butler's conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.