"Vertical relatedness means that the acts are related to the enterprise." United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 216 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 251 (2010), and cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 953 (2011). "To show that the predicate acts are vertically related to the RICO enterprise, the government must establish (1) that the defendant 'was enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over the affairs of the enterprise,' or (2) that 'the predicate offenses are related to the activities of that enterprise.'"

Id.Similarly, in United States v. Burden , 600 F.3d 204, 214–16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Buchanan v. United States , 562 U.S. 953, 131 S.Ct. 251, 178 L.Ed.2d 251 (2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described the evidence of enterprise as " ‘somewhat contradictory’ " and having "limitations" given the lack of structure in the narcotics group, but ultimately rejected a sufficiency challenge. The court cited evidence that the organization had "multiple members who joined in the shared purpose of selling drugs and promoting such sales" from one common location, "where they were able to traffic drugs out of the public's eye, stored guns, and planned the violent acts they undertook."

To establish racketeering, the "government must prove both that an enterprise exists and that the conduct in furtherance of the enterprise comprises a pattern." United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 216 (2d Cir. 2010). To show a pattern, the government must prove "[a]t least two predicate acts" that are "related and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We provided a more detailed description of Burden's offense conduct in our opinion considering his first direct appeal of his conviction and sentence. See United States v. Burden (Burden I ), 600 F.3d 204, 211–13 (2d Cir. 2010). The jury also convicted Burden of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, and several other VCAR counts, including multiple counts of conspiracy to murder and attempted murder.

"We will affirm if any rational finder of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 2010). We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction.

However, "[u]nder the dual sovereignty principle, a defendant may be prosecuted for the same conduct by more than one sovereign without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause because breaking the laws of each constitutes separate offenses." United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 229 (2d Cir. 2010). As relevant here, "[s]tate and federal governments are separate sovereigns in this analysis."

That Stanley committed the crime of violence to maintain his position in the enterprise. Doc. #127 at 9-14 (jury instructions); United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 220 (2d Cir. 2010) (outlining VCAR elements). Although Stanley does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that he murdered Washington, he argues that the evidence was not legally sufficient for any of the remaining four VCAR elements.

Rather, "the acts must be related and 'amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.'" United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 216 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992)). To satisfy the "relatedness requirement . . . [t]he racketeering acts must be related to each other ('horizontal' relatedness), and they must be related to the enterprise ('vertical' relatedness)."

Id. at 1155 n. 3 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 225 (2d Cir.2010), cert. denied,562 U.S. 1169, 131 S.Ct. 953, 178 L.Ed.2d 804 (2011) (“[T]he broader significance of Davis [was] the declarant's purpose in speaking matters.”) (emphasis added).

In the watershed case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of most "out-of-court statement[s] made by a declarant who does not testify at trial, where the statements] [are] deemed 'testimonial.'" United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 223 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62). Reasoning that "witnesses" against the accused are those who "bear testimony," and defining "testimony" as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact," the Supreme Court differentiated between "[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers [who does bear testimony] [and] a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance [who] does not [bear testimony]."