Id. See United States v. Buffington, 879 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (N.D.Ga. 1995) ("Congress clearly intended to relax the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences in this limited context.") (footnote omitted); Shendur v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 85, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[Section] 3553(f) reflects a congressional decision that mandatory minimum sentences no longer be applied mechanically."). See also United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Section(s) 5C1.2 (Nov. 1995) (incorporating Section(s) 3553(f) verbatim).

at *7 (7th Cir. Oct. 23, 1995) (affirming district court's conclusion that defendant was ineligible for a Section(s) 3553(f) reduction because "he produced no information concerning the offense; if he did not know the identities of [drug suppliers or buyers], then he should have at least communicated that fact to the government"); United States v. Wrenn, 66 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting applicability of Section(s) 3553(f), stating defendant "did not provide the government with all of the information and evidence he had concerning the very crime to which he pleaded guilty [and observing] he claimed to have a number of reliable customers to whom he supplied cocaine, but he supplied nary a name to the government"); United States v. Saint Martinez, No. 94-277, 1995 WL 328127 at *2 (D.N.J. May 24, 1995) (holding defendant ineligible for safety valve because he "failed to provide information that was highly likely to be [in] his possession," including identities of co-conspirators); United States v. Buffington, 879 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1995) ("Defendant is obliged to provide information relevant to his own course of conduct and his immediate chain of distributors, i.e., from whom he bought and to whom he sold, if he wishes to avail himself of the benefits of Section(s) 3553(f)."); see also Vincent L. Broderick, Flexible Sentencing and the Violent Crime Control Act of 1994, 7 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 128, 129 (1994) (describing Section(s) 3553(f)(5) as a "'tell all that you can tell' requirement").

This portion of Flanagan addresses whether defendants with pending appeals when § 3553(f) was enacted can qualify for safety-valve relief on remand. Additionally, Flanagan cited just one district court case in support, United States v. Buffington, 879 F.Supp. 1220, 1222 (N.D.Ga.1995). That case was before the district court for an original sentencing—there was no remand.

Other courts similarly have read the safety valve disclosure requirement broadly. See United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 124 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that "a defendant must truthfully provide all information he has concerning the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct" (citing United States v. Long, 77 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 1996))); Acostas-Olivas, 71 F.3d at 377 (accepting the argument that defendant must "tell the government all he knows about the offense of conviction and the relevant conduct, including the identities and participation of others"); United States v. Buffington, 879 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (finding that defendant must disclose information "relevant to his own course of conduct and his immediate chain of distribution").C. The Truthfulness of Mr. Montes' Safety Valve Statement

At the very least, Scharon should have disclosed the identity of the person on whose behalf he was acting. See United States v. Buffington, 879 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1995). CONCLUSION

No opinion has suggested that the disclosure requirement of Section(s) 5C1.2 applies only in the case of a defendant convicted of conspiracy. See also United States v. Buffington, 879 F. Supp. 1220, 1222-23 (N.D.Ga. 1995) (noting that, "[w]hile an actual conspiracy is not necessary," a defendant must provide information about his immediate chain of distribution). For the purposes of Chapters Two and Three of the Sentencing Guidelines, "relevant conduct" expressly includes the following:

71 F.3d at 377-78 (emphasis added). In United States v. Buffington, 879 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (N.D. Ga. 1995), the district court addressed "the extent of the information a defendant must provide in order to satisfy subsection (5)." The court held that the "[d]efendant is obliged to provide information relevant to his own course of conduct and his immediate chain of distribution, i.e., from whom he bought and to whom he sold, if he wishes to avail himself of the benefits of § 3553(f).

We therefore do not address that issue. Nevertheless, without expressing an opinion regarding whether the provision should apply at a resentencing, we note that district courts have found that the provision applies to a resentencing on remand. See e.g., United States v. Buffington, 879 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (N.D.Ga. 1995). The Government argues that the district court should not have applied the safety valve because Flanagan did not satisfy subsection five. Subsection five provides that, by the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant must have "truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence" he has regarding the offenses.

Before granting relief under sec. 3553(f), the court may reasonably require a defendant to reveal information regarding his chain of distribution. United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 143 (7th Cir. 1995); Wrenn, 66 F.3d at 3; United States v. Buffington, 879 F. Supp. 1220, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1995). The government also notes that Baker attempted to minimize his role in the offense by objecting to paragraph 28 of the presentence report, which states that Baker supplied "most" of the cocaine for the conspiracy.

A defendant is obliged to provide information relevant to his own chain of distribution, i.e., from whom he bought and to whom he sold, if he wishes to avail himself of the benefits of § 3553(f). United States v Buffington, 879 F.Supp. 1220, 1222-23 (N.D. Ga 1995). Every court which has considered this issue has held the same. See United States v Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v Romo, 81 F.3d 84, 85 (8th Cir. 1996).