Summary
In United States v. Buckeridge, 326 F. App'x 72 (3d Cir. 2009), the government "rightly conceded" that, based on Flores-Figueroa, the defendant's conviction for aggravated identity theft "must be vacated" because the government had "made no effort" to prove that the defendant knew that the means of identification he misused belonged to another person.
Summary of this case from U.S. v. MorganOpinion
No. 08-2744.
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 21, 2009.
Filed: June 1, 2009.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands (D.C. No. 07-cr-00017), District Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez.
Ishmael A. Meyers, Jr., Esq., Office of United States Attorney, St. Thomas, USVI, for Appellee.
Jesse A. Gessin, Esq., Office of Federal Public Defender, St. Thomas, USVI, for Appellant.
Before: BARRY, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Sandra Buckeridge appeals her conviction for aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (Count IV). Buckeridge argues that § 1028A(a)(1) requires that the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew the documents she used in committing her underlying felony belonged to an actual person. This issue, which was the subject of a difference of opinion among the United States Courts of Appeals, was resolved by the Supreme Court in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). In Flores-Figueroa, the Court held that the Government must show that the defendant knew that the means of identification he used belonged to another person in order to prove aggravated identity theft. Id. at 1888. Because the Government made no effort to prove that Buckeridge had such knowledge, it has rightly conceded in its supplemental brief that Buckeridge's conviction for aggravated identity theft must be vacated. Accordingly, we will vacate Buckeridge's conviction on Count IV and remand for resentencing.