A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if it is marked by significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.United States v. Brovm, 557 F.3d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If objections are properly preserved, we review sentences for procedural reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
Presentence reports, while often an important resource, are not a mandatory part of the sentencing process. Both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Sentencing Guidelines expressly provide that a district judge may sentence a defendant without a presentence report "[if] the court finds that the information in the record enables it to meaningfully exercise its sentencing authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and the court explains its finding on the record."United States v. Brown, 557 F.3d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 32(c)(1)(A)(ii); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.1(a)(2)). While a district court may sentence a defendant without a presentence report, the defendant may not waive preparation of a presentence report.
We review a district court's determination that a presentence report is not required for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Brown, 557 F.3d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 2009). We find no such abuse of discretion.
Despite its brevity, the court's explanation was a reasonable exercise of its authority and comported with Hamill's preference as to the timing of his sentencing hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.3d 297, 300-01 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding the court's sentencing decision under Rule 32 because the court properly exercised its discretion in part by considering the defendant's preferred timing for the hearing). III.
As already noted, a sentence is substantively unreasonable when it is arbitrary, based on impermissible factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor. United States v. Brown, 557 F.3d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 2009). This court has noted that there is some overlap between the inquiries for procedural and substantive reasonableness.
"[A] sentence may be substantively unreasonable when the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor." United States v. Brown, 557 F.3d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We presume that a sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence as a matter of both procedure and substance. United States v. Brown, 557 F.3d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 2009). A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if it is marked by significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.
"[A] sentence may be substantively unreasonable when the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor." United States v. Brown, 557 F.3d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Castaneda-Comacho did not object to his sentence before the district court.
"A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable where the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor." United States v. Brown, 557 F.3d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 2009) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2884, 174 L.Ed.2d 593 (2009) (citation omitted). In this case Perez-Lopez argues that her sentence is procedurally unreasonable "because the court paid only lip service to consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and failed to adequately explain the reasons for the sentence imposed."
Clark, 110 F.3d at 17-18 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Gainous, 134 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (relying on Clark, holding that "§ 3553(a) authorizes consideration of the safety valve statute when a defendant is otherwise properly resentenced under § 3582(c)(2)"). Washington also relies on United States v. Brown, 547 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2008), but we vacated this decision upon rehearing, and our substituted opinion, 557 F.3d 297 (6th Cir. 2009), does not address a § 3582(c)(2) sentencing modification. V.