Again, possibly bewildered as to how to apply this factor, courts post- Ferebe have approached the analysis differently, some from the government's perspective and others from the defendant's. See Ponder, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (considering the government's timing in filing the Death Notice); Le, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (inquiring into whether defendant had sufficient time to prepare for trial given the nature of the aggravating factors); Breeden, No. CR. 3:03CR00013, 2003 WL 22019060, *3 (W.D. Va. 2003) (interpreting the factors in light of defendant's ability to prepare for trial); Hatten, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 578 (analyzing the government's timing and delay in filing the Death Notice). In Ponder, the court again noted that "[t]he same confusion described above about how to approach the first Ferebe factor exists with regard to how to evaluate this one."
18 U.S.C. ยง 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv). It is true that a court may generally not continue a case solely to permit the government to file a timely Death Notice.See United States v. Le, 311 F. Supp. 2d 527, 533 (E.D. Va. 2004); United States v. Breeden, 2003 WL 22019060, *2 (W.D. Va. 2003). In this case, however, the Government has not requested a continuance solely for that purpose.