Accordingly, officers who reasonably believe that a prohibited individual possesses ammunition have probable cause to seize relevant items pursuant to a search warrant or to arrest the individual. See United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 808 (8th Cir. 2001) ("A state police officer who knew [the defendant] was a convicted felon would likely know it was a federal crime for him to possess ammunition, and would surely know that possession of ammunition is `linked' to the state law crime of possessing a firearm."). For example, in United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1163 (7th Cir. 1994), the court concluded that officers had probable cause to seize an empty ammunition box found during execution of search warrant because the empty box suggests that its contents had been used in a firearm.

First, we must determine whether the pretrial publicity was "so extensive and corrupting" that we must presume "unfairness of constitutional magnitude" existed. [ United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 2001)] (quoted sources and internal marks omitted)[, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 880 (2001)].

Before embarking on his review of the extensive evidence of news coverage submitted by the defendant, the magistrate judge noted the following: In assessing a motion for change of venue prior to questioning potential jurors, the court must determine if the media coverage has been "so inflammatory or accusatory as to presumptively create [`]a trial atmosphere that had been utterly corrupted by press coverage.[']" U.S. v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2001) ([quoting] Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2035 (1975)). A court assessing the effect of pretrial publicity must distinguish between largely factual publicity and that which is invidious or inflammatory. U.S. v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1984).

"I believe the officer *** in this case should have inquired whether there was EO.I.D. card regarding the seizure of the bullets." In so ruling, the circuit court principally relied on a federal case: United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2001). We are persuaded by the Blom reasoning as well.

A North Dakota grand jury indicted Rodriguez, who moved to change venue to Minnesota, citing pretrial publicity. This court examines denials of change-of-venue motions based on pretrial publicity under a two-tier standard for presumed prejudice and actual prejudice. United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 2001). Rodriguez argues: (a) the district court erred by not finding a presumption of prejudice in North Dakota, (b) jurors' voir dire statements demonstrated actual prejudice, (c) Criminal Rule 21 required transfer of venue, and (d) by denying additional funds for a venue study, the district court violated Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985).

This court "will not overturn the district court's finding that a prospective juror can put aside any pretrial opinion and render a verdict based upon the evidence at trial unless the error is manifest." United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 805-06 (8th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted). Barraza asserts that Juror 43 was not impartial, and that the district court erred by not striking him for cause, citing United States v. Sithithongtham, 192 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 1999).

The two-tiered analysis begins with a determination of whether the pretrial publicity has been "so extensive and corrupting that a reviewing court is required to `presume unfairness of constitutional magnitude.'" United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 303, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1977)); accord United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701, 707 (8th Cir. 2003). See also United States v. Johnson, 354 F. Supp. 2d 939, 981 (N.D. Iowa 2005) ("The decision in Blom makes clear that, in this circuit, the two-tiered analysis is the appropriate analysis for the district court, as well as the appellate court, to apply.") The Blom court further held:

When reviewing whether pretrial publicity violates a criminal defendant's right to a trial by a panel of impartial and indifferent jurors, we engage in a two-tier analysis. See United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir.2001); see also Skilling v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2914–17, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010). “At the first tier, the question is whether pretrial publicity was so extensive and corrupting that a reviewing court is required to presume unfairness of constitutional magnitude.”

When reviewing whether pretrial publicity violates a criminal defendant's right to a trial by a panel of impartial and indifferent jurors, we engage in a two-tier analysis. See United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2914-17 (2010). "At the first tier, the question is whether pretrial publicity was so extensive and corrupting that a reviewing court is required to presume unfairness of constitutional magnitude."

We review a denial of a motion for a change of venue for abuse of discretion. United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 2001). We employ a two-tiered analysis when the motion is based on pretrial publicity. Id. The tier-one analysis involves a determination of whether the pretrial publicity was so extensive and corrupting that unfairness of constitutional magnitude must be presumed. Id.