We find there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to stay. See United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1993) ("A district court's decision regarding the timetable for trial will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."). Similarly, McKenna argues that the district court erroneously granted defendant Christopher J. Hughes's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1993)
True, the prosecution did it in a most dramatic fashion; but it was nonetheless permissible. In United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1993), a similar factual scenario was presented. In Beverly, a drug conspiracy case, the Government elicited evidence as to the defendant's prior shooting and experience with guns on cross-examination and on rebuttal to impeach his testimony that he had no familiarity with guns. The defendant argued that the Government's impeachment evidence ran afoul of 404(b).
This argument lacks merit. A district court has "broad discretion ... on matters of continuances," Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983), and we will reverse for abuse of that discretion only when the denial of the requested continuance "was an 'arbitrary action that substantially impaired the defense,'" United States v. O'Connor, 650 F.3d 839, 854 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1993)). Here, the district court based its decision on the interest of the defendants in a speedy trial, the demands on the court's schedule and docket, and defense counsel's failure to bring the conflict to the court's attention in a timely manner.
"Where a defendant testifies on direct about a specific fact, the prosecution is entitled to prove . . . that he lied as to that fact." United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1993) (permitting use of extrinsic evidence). More precisely, this doctrine provides that when a witness puts certain facts at issue in his testimony, the government may seek to rebut those facts, including by resorting to extrinsic evidence if necessary.
Furthermore, the district court may make credibility determinations which this Court will not disturb unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1993). Here, in light of Amodeo's oral reaffirmance of his grand jury testimony, the Court acted properly within its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing regarding the application of Section(s) 3B1.1(c).
We will not affirm a conviction unless the constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1993). Although Hurtado was compelled to wear prison garb at trial, we believe that any error by the district court was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, the cross-examination was proper impeachment of the defendant's assertions on his direct testimony. See United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Williams, 754 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1985). Defendant's claim of the privilege, furthermore, was properly rejected because the cross-examination was within the scope of the direct.
"When a defendant testifies about a specific fact either on direct or cross-examination, the prosecutor is entitled to prove on cross-examination that he lied as to that fact." United States v. Estevez, 1998 WL 673186, at *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 22, 1998) (citing United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980); United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1993)). "To impeach the defendant's credibility once he has taken the stand, the government may use evidence that it was barred from using in its case in chief."
United States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682, 690 (2d Cir.2010) ; see also United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 476 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir.2007) (sustaining denial of a continuance where defendant was "unable to specify with any particularity how he was prejudiced").United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 641 (2d Cir.1993).United States v. Ellenbogen, 365 F.2d 982, 985 (2d Cir.1966).