Opinion
Case No. 04-40027-01-RDR.
August 20, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is presently before the court upon the following motions filed by the defendant: (1) motion to suppress evidence; and (2) motion to suppress confession. Having heard evidence on these motions, the court is now prepared to rule.
The defendant is charged with assault of a minor causing serious bodily injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6). This case arises following the discovery of some severe injuries to the adopted child of the defendant.
In the motion to suppress evidence, the defendant seeks to suppress evidence that was seized from her residence on January 30, 2004. She asserts that (1) the consent to search that she signed was coerced or otherwise involuntary or, even if voluntary, was the fruit of her illegal detention and involuntary confession; and (2) the authorization to search the premises issued by the military magistrate was not a proper substitute for the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment, and no exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search and seizure of the defendant's residence.
In the motion to suppress confession, the defendant seeks to suppress various statements she made to law enforcement officials. Specifically, she seeks to suppress: (1) a three-page handwritten statement dated January 29, 2004; (2) an eight-page typewritten statement dated January 30, 2004; (3) a videotaped "reenactment" made on January 30, 2004; (4) any oral statements not reduced to writing on January 29 and 30, 2004; (5) all oral statements made on February 12, 2004; and (6) statements taken by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents on February 12, 2004 and February 19, 2004. She contends that these statements should be suppressed because: (1) she was in custody when questioned by law enforcement officers and was not warned of her right to remain silent and to counsel as required by Miranda; (2) all statements following the initial unwarned custodial statements were fruit of the initial unwarned statements; and (3) the statements were involuntary, having been coerced through psychological pressure and implied threats.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On January 29, 2004 the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) of the United States Army at Fort Riley, Kansas received a telephone call from the Geary County Hospital indicating the possibility of child abuse involving a military dependent. The baby had skull fractures and was malnourished. CID agents were sent to the hospital to talk with medical personnel about the injuries to Kendrick Craddock, who was one month old.
2. James Suprynowicz, a special agent with the CID, went to a residence on Fort Riley where he found the defendant and the biological mother of the child. The defendant had adopted the child. The defendant lived on Fort Riley with her husband, who was a member of the military. Agent Suprynowicz knocked on the door of the residence at approximately 10:00 p.m. and asked the women if they would be willing to talk about the baby. They agreed to do so. Agent Suprynowicz then asked them if they would talk to him at his office. They agreed to follow him to his office for further discussions.
3. The defendant and the biological mother followed Agent Suprynowicz to the CID headquarters on Fort Riley. Agent Suprynowicz interviewed the defendant. Prior to the interview, he told her that she was free to go and she did not have to say anything. She agreed to talk with him. After some discussion, Agent Suprynowicz asked the defendant to write down her statement. This request occurred at approximately 11:00 p.m. The defendant wrote her statement in about thirty minutes. Agent Suprynowicz left the room while she was completing the statement. When he returned, he reviewed it and asked a few questions about it. He again told her that she was free to go. He asked if she would be willing to answer some more questions. Again, she agreed to do so. They then sat down at a computer and the defendant typed the narrative statement she had written. She then responded to various questions set forth by Agent Suprynowicz.
4. During the course of the question and answer period, Agent Suprynowicz repeatedly asked the defendant if she wanted anything to drink or eat. He also asked if she needed bathroom breaks. She took several breaks during the session with some lasting as long as twenty minutes. Finally, Agent Suprynowicz allowed her to smoke anytime she desired. The defendant was very cooperative during this time period. She made no objections and never asked to leave. She was generally alert and coherent. At times, she appeared unemotional and detached. At other times, she was emotional, agitated and upset. She was taking anti-depressant medication at the time of the interview. She indicated that she was fine and that the medication was not a problem. They completed the session at approximately 5:30 a.m. The question and answer colloquy ends as follows:
Q. How were you treated during this interview?
A. Nice.
Q. Where (sic) you afforded breaks, bathroom breaks, food and drink?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there anything else you want to add to this statement?
A. No.
The defendant signed the typewritten statement and question and answer session under the following certification:
I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 8. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OR PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERSION (sic), UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.
5. Following the conclusion of the question and answer session, Agent Suprynowicz told the defendant she was free to leave. The defendant indicated that she had no place to go and that she wanted to take a nap. The defendant could not return to her residence because it had been sealed at the request of CID officials. Agent Suprynowicz arranged for her to get some sleep on a couch in one of the rooms at CID headquarters. The defendant rested until 10:00 a.m., when Agent Suprynowicz awakened her and asked her for consent to search her residence. She had no problem in agreeing to a search. Agent Suprynowicz provided her with a written consent to search form, and she readily signed it. Agent Suprynowicz believed that the defendant was coherent and understood what was transpiring. The defendant signed the form just below the following statements:
I have been requested by the undersigned USACIDC Special Agent to give my consent to a search of my person, premises or property as indicated below. I have been advised of my right to refuse a search of my person, premises, or property. (If you do not give your consent, do not sign this form).
6. At approximately 11:00 a.m., Agent Suprynowicz asked the defendant if she was willing to go to her residence and do a video reenactment. The defendant again agreed. Special Agent Stacy Lane of the FBI took the defendant to her residence for the reenactment. The defendant never asked to leave and never complained. The defendant was again told that she was not in custody and that she could leave. The defendant once again indicated she understood what she was being told. They went to the defendant's residence and conducted a reenactment of the defendant's conduct with the defendant using a doll to represent the baby. This video took about thirty minutes. Agent Suprynowicz again made it clear to the defendant that she was free to leave at any time. After the completion of the video, the defendant was allowed to collect clothes, toiletries and medication for removal from the residence. She was asked where she wanted to be taken. She mentioned a friend's house, but the friend was unavailable. Agent Lane returned the defendant to CID headquarters. Subsequent arrangements were made by CID officials to place the defendant with a military family pending further investigation.
7. Lisa Medrano, who was in charge of the CID office at Fort Riley, was involved in the investigation of the defendant. During the evening of January 29, 2004, Agent Medrano advised the magistrate at Fort Riley about the information she had received during the investigation. Agent Medrano was seeking authority to search the defendant's residence. At approximately 7:30 p.m., Magistrate Misti Rawles gave Agent Medrano oral authority to search the defendant's residence. The next day, Agent Medrano dropped off an affidavit and a search and seizure authorization form at the magistrate's office. The search of the defendant's residence occurred during the late afternoon of January 30, 2004. The authorization was subsequently signed by the magistrate on March 24, 2004. Agent Medrano actually signed the affidavit before a notary public on March 24, 2004.
8. Agent Lane interviewed the defendant on February 12, 2004. The interview lasted approximately four hours. Prior to the interview, Agent Lane told the defendant that she was free to leave. The defendant indicated that she understood. During the interview, the defendant was allowed to take breaks and repeatedly asked if she wanted something to drink or to leave to have lunch.
9. On February 17, 2004 Special Agent Terrell Leonard of the CID asked the defendant if she was willing to provide some blood for analysis. Agent Leonard told the defendant that she had the right to refuse. The defendant voluntarily agreed to provide the blood. A blood sample was subsequently taken that day.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. "It is well established that police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question." United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). Miranda warnings need not be given simply because questioning takes place at the police station or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). Instead, Miranda only applies when an individual is subject to "custodial interrogation." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see also United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1993). Concerning the question of custody, the Supreme Court has held that a person is not in custody for Miranda purposes unless his "freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quotation omitted). Furthermore,Miranda's "in custody" requirement is measured objectively, the proper inquiry being whether "a reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood his situation . . . as the functional equivalent of formal arrest." Id. at 442.
2. The court has carefully reviewed each of the interviews involving the defendant. The court finds no evidence to support a finding that the defendant was in custody on any of the occasions that she spoke with law enforcement officers. During each interview, the defendant was advised that she could leave at any time and that she did not have to speak with the officers. She was asked each time if she minded traveling to certain locations to speak with the officers. Each time, she readily agreed. The defendant was never handcuffed or deprived of her freedom in any way. Law enforcement officers repeatedly made every effort to provide her with comfortable surroundings and to ask her if she needed anything. There was no evidence of any coercive tactics, nor of anything coercive about the atmosphere of any of the meetings which would have led the defendant to believe that she was not free to leave at any time. The court simply does not find that a reasonable person would have understood that she was under arrest. Accordingly, the court finds no merit to the defendant's contention that the statements she gave were made in violation ofMiranda.
3. Moreover, the court finds no evidence that the statements were the product of threats or coercion by the law enforcement officers. "The [F]ifth [A]mendment's privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the admission of incriminating statements where governmental acts, threats or promises cause the defendant's will to become overborne," thus rendering the statements involuntary. United States v. Matthews, 942 F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 1991). In determining whether the defendant's will was overborne, this court looks at the totality of the circumstances. Id. Again, the court finds that the statements made by the defendant were voluntary. The court found no evidence of any coercive behavior by law enforcement officers. The defendant was repeatedly told that she was free to go and did not have to talk with the officers. She consistently indicated that she understood her situation. Accordingly, the court finds that the statements made by the defendant were voluntary.
4. In sum, the court finds that the defendant's motion to suppress confession must be denied.
5. The Fourth Amendment typically requires that law enforcement officers obtain a warrant before conducting a search. United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363, 1365-66 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998). A warrant is not required, however, when the defendant consents to the search. Id. The determination of whether the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the search of her residence is a question of fact based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1366. To establish voluntary consent, the government bears the burden of proving "that there was no duress or coercion, express or implied, that the consent was unequivocal and specific, and that it was freely and intelligently given." United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. The court finds that the defendant freely and voluntarily gave consent to search her residence. The court again finds no coercive behavior by law enforcement officers in the request for consent to search. Given this determination, the court need not consider the defendant's arguments concerning the authorization to search by the magistrate. The search was properly conducted based upon the defendant's consent to search, so no further authorization was necessary.
7. Accordingly, the court shall deny defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress evidence (Doc. # 18) be hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress confession (Doc. # 19) be hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.