See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-González, 775 F.3d 483, 504 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Dávila-Félix, 667 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Bryant, 571 F.3d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 2009) (all applying § 4B1.1's "Career Offender" enhancement for defendants convicted of a "crime of violence" or "controlled substance offense" for the third time); see also United States v. Martínez-Benítez, 914 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2019) (ditto for § 2K2.1(a)(4), increasing the guideline sentence for defendants who commit firearms offenses with a prior conviction for a "controlled substance offense" or "crime of violence"). We've used the approach to characterize both past convictions and crimes "freshly committed," United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703, 704-06 (1st Cir. 1992), even when the defendant wasn't convicted of the covered offense, see United States v. Gary, 74 F.3d 304, 316-17 (1st Cir. 1996) (using the categorical approach to decide that an offense was a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), which increases a defendant's guideline sentence if he possessed a firearm "in connection with . . . a crime of violence" or "controlled substance offense"). Although Taylor interpreted the definition of "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), we adopted its approach early on to classify "crime[s] of violence" under the Career Offender guideline (§ 4B1.1), because, we explained, "[t]he definition of a 'violent felony' for purposes of the [ACCA] [was] the same in all material respects as the definition of a 'crime of violence'" in § 4B1.2(a) (which § 4B1.1 incorporates).

See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-González, 775 F.3d 483, 504 (1st Cir. 2015) ; United States v. Dávila-Félix, 667 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2011) ; United States v. Bryant, 571 F.3d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 2009) (all applying § 4B1.1's "Career Offender" enhancement for defendants convicted of a "crime of violence" or "controlled substance offense" for the third time); see also United States v. Martínez-Benítez, 914 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2019) (ditto for § 2K2.1(a)(4), increasing the guideline sentence for defendants who commit firearms offenses with a prior conviction for a "controlled substance offense" or "crime of violence"). We've used the approach to characterize both past convictions and crimes "freshly committed," United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703, 704–06 (1st Cir. 1992), even when the defendant wasn't convicted of the covered offense, see United States v. Gary, 74 F.3d 304, 316–17 (1st Cir. 1996) (using the categorical approach to decide that an offense was a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), which increases a defendant's guideline sentence if he possessed a firearm "in connection with ... a crime of violence" or "controlled substance offense"). Although Taylor interpreted the definition of "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), we adopted its approach early on to classify "crime[s] of violence" under the Career Offender guideline (§ 4B1.1), because, we explained, "[t]he definition of a ‘violent felony’ for purposes of the [ACCA] [was] the same in all material respects as the definition of a ‘crime of violence’ " in § 4B1.2(a) (which § 4B1.1 incorporates).

Id. at 225 (citing, inter alia, Phillips, 732 F. Supp. at 262-63). More recently, in United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703 . . . (1st Cir. . . . 1992), the First Circuit extended this rationale, holding that being a felon in possession is not a crime of violence for purposes of the sentencing guidelines. This rationale should extend further to cover the Bail Reform Act for two reasons.

In the proceedings prior to Bell II, the defendant, Richard Bell, had appealed the district court's finding that his conviction for receipt and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was a "crime of violence." See United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703, 703-04 (1st Cir. 1992) (" Bell I"). The district court's finding triggered a sentence enhancement under the Guidelines' career offender provision, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and was the sole ground for Bell's first appeal.

Determining whether a previous conviction represents a crime of violence necessitates a formal categorical approach. See DeLuca, 17 F.3d at 8; De Jesus, 984 F.2d at 23; United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703, 704 (1st Cir. 1992); Fiore, 983 F.2d at 3; see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2159, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (adopting categorical approach for analogous determination under Armed Career Criminal Act); United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 223-24 (1st Cir. 1992) (same). As a rule, this type of approach is restricted to an examination of how the legislature has defined the crime, without any concomitant inquiry into the details of the defendant's actual criminal conduct.

Bell originally challenged his sentence as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines, contending that the offense of conviction — being a felon in possession of a firearm — was not a crime of violence. See id. at 249; United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703, 704 (1st Cir. 1992) ( Bell I). Bell contended that he should have been sentenced instead under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988). See Bell II, 988 F.2d at 249; Bell I, 966 F.2d at 704.

We bought counsel's wares, holding "that, where the offense of conviction is the offense of being a convicted felon in knowing possession of a firearm, the conviction is not for a 'crime of violence' and that, therefore, the career offender provision of the federal sentencing guidelines does not apply." United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703, 703 (1st Cir. 1992). Hence, we vacated Bell's sentence and remanded for resentencing in light of our opinion.

A formal categorical approach — an approach that looks to a prior offense's statutory provenance rather than to its actual facts — is the method of choice for determining whether a felony constitutes a targeted crime within the meaning of this definition. See United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703, 704 (1st Cir. 1992); accord U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, comment (n. 2) (directing judicial inquiry to "the conduct set forth ( i.e., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted"); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2159, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (adopting categorical approach for similar definitional inquiries under the Armed Career Criminal Act); United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 223-24 (1st Cir. 1992) (same). Thus, rather than examining the actual circumstances underlying the earlier conviction, we examine only the statutory formulation of the crime charged (here, larceny from the person) to see if that crime is a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender guideline.

Decisions interpreting the ACCA constitute persuasive authority when a court is called upon to construe the career offender guideline. See United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703, 705 (1st Cir. 1992). For another thing, we believe that Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), relied upon by both the appellant and the government, is entirely consistent with the Commission's (and the district court's) view that conspiracy convictions can serve as predicate offenses.

We have considered these residual clauses to be relatively interchangeable, and have treated interpretations of one as persuasive authority relative to the other. See, e.g., Santos, 363 F.3d at 22 n. 5; United States v. Meader, 118 F.3d 876, 882 n. 8 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703, 704-06 (1st Cir. 1992). The parties have not briefed the issue of whether ABDW might also be classified as "crime of violence" under a different provision of U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(a), and we express no opinion here on the question.