U.S. v. Belevin-Ramales

5 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Yun Zheng

    CRIMINAL 21-51-DLB-CJS (E.D. Ky. Apr. 13, 2022)

    However, the Sixth Circuit has not overruled Susnjar, and it nonetheless remains binding on courts within the Circuit, because โ€œ[w]hile the Sixth Circuit may well one day revisit its decision in Susnjar, [the District Court] cannot perform that function.โ€ United States v. Belevin-Ramales, 458 F.Supp.2d. 409, 411 (E.D. Ky. 2006). In Susnjar, the Sixth Circuit held โ€œthe natural meaning of the word โ€˜harbor' to be to clandestinely shelter, succor, and protect improperly admitted aliens[.]โ€

  2. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

    543 F. Supp. 2d 842 (E.D. Tenn. 2008)   Cited 5 times
    Granting summary judgment as to one of two alleged RICO predicate acts and granting summary judgment as to all RICO claims based on inability to show causation

    " The term "harbor" has been interpreted as "conduct tending substantially to facilitate an alien's remaining in the United States illegally." SeeSusnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1928); UnitedStates v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 459 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Belevin-Ramales, 458 F. Supp. 2d 409, 410-11 (E.D. Ky. 2006). Thus, Plaintiffs must provide admissible evidence such that a reasonable jury could find Defendants (1) committed actions to substantially facilitate an alien remaining in this country illegally and (2) did so with knowledge or a reckless disregard of the fact that the alien illegally entered or remained in the United States.

  3. United States v. Yun Zheng

    87 F.4th 336 (6th Cir. 2023)

    That court stated that "any jury instructions in this case must define the term 'harbor' in a manner consistent with Susnjar and should not state that [the] government does not have to prove that the Defendant[s] harbored the alien with the intent to assist the alien's attempt to evade or avoid detection by law enforcement." United States v. Belevin-Ramales, 458 F. Supp. 2d 409, 411 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). But we are not bound by the decisions of a district court.

  4. HAGER v. ABX AIR, INC.

    Case No. 2:07-cv-317 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2008)   Cited 11 times

    Although Plaintiff argues that "the continuing authority ofSusnjar is `questionable,' given the subsequent amendments to the immigration statutes" (Pl. Resp. p. 7 n. 5, R. at 35), the Sixth Circuit has not overruled Susnjar and this Court is obligated to follow it. See Trollinger I, 2007 WL 1574275 at *8 (accepting and applying Susjnar's definitions to a RICO claim brought on the basis of a violation of ยง 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii));United States v. Belevin-Ramales, 458 F.Supp.2d 409, 411 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (considering and rejecting an argument thatSusnjar has been abrogated or implicitly overruled and using theSusnjar definition in jury instructions). While Susnjar did not define "shield," the principle of noscitur a sociis, the idea that "a word is known by the company it keeps," Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995), tells the Court that this term should be given a meaning similar to "conceal" and "harbor."See S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection, 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006) (stating that noscitur a sociis is properly "invoked when a string of statutory terms raises the implication that the words grouped in a list should be given related meaning" (internal quotation omitted)).

  5. Hernandez v. Balakian

    480 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (E.D. Cal. 2007)   Cited 7 times
    Denying the defendants' motion to dismiss a RICO action due to a suggestion in Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002) that "the Ninth Circuit will not require the specific pleading mandated by Loiselle with regard to pleading the predicate act set forth in Section 1324" and the requirements of notice pleading

    Defendants argue from Zavala that the allegations that Defendants conspired to provide housing to illegal aliens and directed their hiring personnel to obtain such housing does not suffice to allege violation of the predicate Act set forth in Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). Defendants assert that there must be allegations that the housing was provided to illegal aliens to conceal them and avoid their detection by immigration authorities. In so arguing, Defendants cite United States v. Belevin-Ramales, 458 F.Supp.2d 409 (E.D.Ky. 2006) (rejecting United States' jury instruction for a violation of Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) that the government does not have to prove that the Defendant harbored the alien with the intent to assist the alien's attempt to evade or avoid detection by law enforcement) and United States v. Kim, supra, 193 F.3d at 574 (evidence at trial was sufficient to establish that Kim knew or recklessly disregarded Farfan's status as an illegal alien and took steps designed to help her remain in his employ). Zavala does not support dismissal of this claim because of the allegation that Defendants directed their hiring personnel to obtain housing for them, something that is not alleged in Zavala.