But marginal-deterrence arguments stand a chance only if the sentencing scheme actually encourages criminals to commit more-serious crimes (for example, if the punishment for robbery were the same as that for murder, then robbers would have an incentive to murder any witnesses to their robberies). See United States v. Beier, 490 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir.2007). The child-pornography sentencing scheme gives no such encouragement; offenders worse than Reibel can be given consecutive sentences or prosecuted separately for child molestation (or another crime).

But marginal-deterrence arguments stand a chance only if the sentencing scheme actually encourages criminals to commit more-serious crimes (for example, if the punishment for robbery were the same as that for murder, then robbers would have an incentive to murder any witnesses to their robberies). See United States v. Beier, 490 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 2007). The child-pornography sentencing scheme gives no such encouragement; offenders worse than Reibel can be given consecutive sentences or prosecuted separately for child molestation (or another crime).

Id.Although Klug does not use the term “marginal deterrence,” see United States v. Beier, 490 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir.2007), he essentially contends that others will not be deterred from producing “hard-core” child pornography because his own sentence would not have been higher even if he had produced child pornography by sexually abusing the boys in his care. But we have explicitly rejected the utility of marginal deterrence in cases involving the production of child pornography.

More importantly here, the defendant is responsible for producing evidence that supports a lower sentence; a defendant who fails to do so is "at the mercy of the instincts and intuitions of the sentencing judge." United States v. Beier, 490 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2007). Watters finally argues that her sentence is substantively unreasonable because she is a first-time sex offender, she does not pose a great danger to the community, and other similar defendants have received lower sentences.

A defendant touting a personal characteristic as a mitigating factor, e.g., cognitive impairments, must provide evidence that the trait is cause for a lower sentence. See United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d 440, 455 (7th Cir. 2014) (age); United States v. Annoreno, 713 F.3d 352, 358 (7th Cir. 2013) ("mental characteristics" including bipolar disorder and depression); United States v. Durham, 645 F.3d 883, 898 (7th Cir. 2011) ("multiple cognitive and intellectual deficits"); United States v. Portman, 599 F.3d 633, 637-38 (7th Cir. 2010) (age); United States v. Beier, 490 F.3d 572, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2007) ("cluster of personal experiences and characteristics," including depression, below-average IQ, and sexual abuse in childhood). Moreover, a district judge need not accept a defendant's argument that mental deficits warrant a reduced sentence.

In its sentencing order, the district court focused almost entirely on the risks of recidivism, stating that a person who cannot appreciate the criminality of his conduct will be " more rather than less likely to be a recidivist, a factor under § 3553(a) that would favor a longer sentence." In reaching this conclusion, the district court heavily relied on United States v. Beier, 490 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2007), a child pornography case in which the defendant argued that § 3553(a) required a below-guidelines sentence due to the defendant's own abuse as a child and low IQ. There, we held that a defendant must show why personal characteristics act as a mitigating, not potentially aggravating, factor in a case where the defendant may not be able to control his sexual impulses. Beier, 490 F.3d at 574. This is true of many personal characteristics, such as age. A young defendant might argue that his age is a mitigating factor if the defendant has strong ties to a supportive family, but age could also be used as an aggravating factor if the young defendant already has an extensive criminal history.

15). Chapman would like to add to his existing § 2255 motion a claim that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because she (1) failed to "submit reports or affidavits from experts, or any other evidence, to demonstrate a causal relationship between Chapman's criminal history, employment history, and acceptance of responsibility and his individual likelihood of reoffending," United States v. Chapman, 694 F.3d 908, 914-15 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added), as opposed to general recidivism studies, in an effort to argue for a lower sentence, (2) failed to "offer empirical evidence that the compulsion to produce child pornography 'is so far diminished' at age 46 - or even at 61, the age he would be after serving 15 years - 'as to render the person relatively harmless, or indeed that it is diminished at all,'" id. at 915 (quoting United States v. Beier, 490 F.3d 572, 574-75 (7th Cir. 2007)), (3) failed to offer "evidence 'to indicate [Chapman's childhood history of sexual abuse] makes a person less able to avoid becoming a child molester, let alone becoming a producer of child pornography,'" Chapman, 694 F.3d at 915 (quoting Beier, 490 F.3d at 574, and (4) failed to present evidence "to substantiate counsel's assertion that Chapman's drug use prompted him to commit sexual abuse or produce child pornography," Chapman, 694 F.3d at 916. The Government has not responded to the motion.

To be entitled to a lower sentence based upon diminished capacity, a criminal defendant must establish not only that he suffers from diminished capacity, but must also link it to the factors under § 3553(a) to show that he should receive a lower sentence. In United States v. Beier, 490 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit concluded that even if a defendant successfully establishes diminished capacity, it does not follow that the defendant is entitled to a lower sentence. In Beier, a child molester/child pornographer argued on appeal that the district court erred by failing to impose a shorter sentence based upon the fact that he was molested as a child.

Bridgewater’s history and characteristics—when combined with the nature and circumstances of his offense—made it entirely reasonable for the district court to fashion its sentence to quash any residual impulse or desire to recidivate. Cf. United States v. Beier , 490 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2007) ("The more difficult it is for a person to resist a desire for sexual contact with children, the more likely he is to recidivate, and this is an argument for a longer prison sentence."). C. Constitutionality of Considering Dismissed Conduct

But the degree to which mental illness is deemed mitigating or aggravating, and the weight accorded that factor, lies within the sentencing judge's broad discretion. See United States v. Warner , 792 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 2015) ("Ultimately, it falls on the district court to weigh and balance the various factors and to make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.") (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Beier , 490 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2007) ("The statute does not attach weights to these factors, thus leaving the sentencing judge with enormous latitude...."). Although Kluball does not dispute these principles, he contends that the record at sentencing did not permit the district court to conclude that "his history suggests that there is no structure or treatment that realistically suggests that it's going to have any ... lasting impact on [his] ability to conform himself to ... lawful behavior...."