The refusal to hold a competency hearing when the evidence suggests that such a hearing is necessary is a violation not only of state and federal statutes, but of the Due Process Clause as well. See Nichols, 56 F.3d at 416; Nicks v. United States, 955 F.2d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 1992); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 877 (2d Cir. 1988). Absent a reasonable doubt of competency, however, a hearing is not required.

We have not previously considered the competency of a self-identified Sovereign Citizen in a published opinion; and in a prior case dealing with a tax skeptic we remanded for a competency hearing. See United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 877-79 (2d Cir. 1988). Here, however, we agree with the district court that DiMartino's actions and statements did not in themselves constitute reasonable cause to doubt his competency.

To protect this right, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) requires the district court to order a hearing sua sponte to determine the mental competence of a defendant "if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense." § 4241(a); see also United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 877 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986). A district court's determination that "reasonable cause" to hold a competency hearing is absent is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Auen, 846 F.2d at 877; Vamos, 797 F.2d at 1150.

This appeal concerns a matter previously before this court. The relevant facts are set out fully in United States v. Auen, ("Auen I") 846 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1988). In Auen I, we were asked to determine whether the district court erred when it did not make a specific determination of Defendant-Appellant Donald Auen's competency to stand trial, and whether Auen was denied his right to assistance of counsel.

The requirement that the trial judge determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial if there is reasonable ground for believing the defendant incompetent is required not only by the New York and federal statutes, but also by the Constitution's due process clause. E.g., Harris v.Kuhlmann, 346 F.3d at 349-50; United States v. Quintieri, 206 F.3d at 1232; United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d at 416;Nicks v. United States, 955 F.2d at 168 (citing Pate v.Robinson, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S. Ct. at 842); United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973, 982 (8th Cir. 1991) ("The issue framed byPate and Drope is not whether the defendant was competent to stand trial or plead guilty, but whether the absence of a hearing on the question of his competency amounted, in the circumstances of the case, to a denial of due process."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2140 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d at 716;United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 877 (2d Cir. 1988);Galandreo v. Perlman, No. 02-CV-6799, 03-MISC-0066, 2003 WL 23198790 at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003) (Weinstein, D.J.).

To be sure, we have held that, "[i]n exercising its discretion, the district court must 'make findings on the record concerning the defendant's competency where the facts presented to the court warrant such an inquiry.'" Dimartino, 949 F.3d at 71 (quoting United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988)); cf. United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164, 170-72 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (remanding for findings where the defendant "made repeated references to 'radio raves,' 'microwave channels,' and a conspiracy involving MGM Studios and the government with the object of publicly broadcasting his thoughts"); Auen, 846 F.2d at 878-79 (remanding for findings where the defendant relayed stories that could "only be characterized as the product of a disturbed mind" as well as "various irrational, paranoid beliefs" regarding his prosecution, including a fear of "psychopolitical terrorism"). But the facts presented to the district court in this case did not warrant such an inquiry.

Certainly, the abuse of discretion standard does not mean no review at all. See, e.g., United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1988) (employing the abuse of discretion standard but reversing the district court's decision not to hold a hearing); see also Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc); In re Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1988). See United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 285 n. 1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 195, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1989); United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1988); Streetman v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036, 107 S.Ct. 888, 93 L.Ed.2d 841 (1987).

Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. 183; see Commonwealth v. Santiago, 579 Pa. 46, 65, 855 A.2d 682 (2004) (explaining United States Supreme Court decisions concerning nunc pro tunc competency inquiries to reflect admonition that retrospectively determining competency is inherently difficult, in some cases insurmountably difficult, but not per se prohibited). See, e.g., United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2010) (remanding for nunc pro tunc competency determination if trial court determines meaningful hearing can be held); United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 260 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Giron-Reyes, 234 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1293 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988) (same); see also McMurtrey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth framework for analyzing meaningfulness of nunc pro tunc competency hearing); United States v. Savage, 505 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating validity of nunc pro tunc competency determinations tied to permissibility); Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 674-75 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming nunc pro tunc competency determination in part because permissible), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1285, 127 S. Ct. 1819, 167 L. Ed. 2d 328 (2007); Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1286-87 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996) (remanding for nunc pro tunc competency determination if permissible), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1267, 117 S. Ct. 2440, 138 L. Ed. 2d 200 (1997); Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802-803 (8th Cir. 1996) (remanding for nunc pro tunc competency determination); Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining nunc pro tunc competency determination permissible if based on observations and evidence con

Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at 183, 95 S.Ct. 896; see Commonwealth v. Santiago, 579 Pa. 46, 65, 855 A.2d 682 (2004) (explaining United States Supreme Court decisions concerning nunc pro tunc competency inquiries to reflect admonition that retrospectively determining competency is inherently difficult, in some cases insurmountably difficult, but not per se prohibited). See, e.g., United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164, 171–72 (2d Cir.2010) (remanding for nunc pro tunc competency determination if trial court determines meaningful hearing can be held); United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 260 (3d Cir.2003) (same); United States v. Giron–Reyes, 234 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir.2000) (same); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1293 (4th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir.1988) (same); see also McMurtrey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112, 1131–32 (9th Cir.2008) (setting forth framework for analyzing meaningfulness of nunc pro tunc competency hearing); United States v. Savage, 505 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir.2007) (stating validity of nunc pro tunc competency determinations tied to permissibility); Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 674–75 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming nunc pro tunc competency determination in part because permissible), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1285, 127 S.Ct. 1819, 167 L.Ed.2d 328 (2007); Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1286–87 n. 6 (11th Cir.1996) (remanding for nunc pro tunc competency determination if permissible), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1267, 117 S.Ct. 2440, 138 L.Ed.2d 200 (1997); Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802–803 (8th Cir.1996) (remanding for nunc pro tunc competency determination); Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir.1995) (explaining nunc pro tunc competency determination permissible if based on observations and evidence contemporaneou

If "the People fail to meet their burden of establishing defendant's competency at the [relevant] time ... or if it is not feasible to conduct a reconstruction hearing, then ... the judgment and [conviction] should be vacated and further proceedings on the indictment should be conducted." Id. at 665-66; see also United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988). More than eight years have passed since Musaid's trial.