The district court's reference to the government's requested sentence was not in error or otherwise inappropriate, as an upward departure or variance was within the range of options at sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (authorizing an upward departure from the guidelines range if the court finds an aggravating circumstance of a kind not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission); United States v. Maybou, 379 Fed.Appx. 489, 491-92 (6th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming upward variance given to a correctional officer because of "the peculiar trust that society places in police officers"); United States v. Arroyo, 546 F.3d 54, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming upward variance given because defendant was a police officer). In sum, the district court considered appropriate factors and provided adequate, internally-consistent reasons in imposing a reasonable sentence.
Insofar as Urciuoli challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the facts are to be taken in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. United States v. Arroyo, 546 F.3d 54, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2008). The pertinent events and proceedings are as follows.
The court concluded, however, that those factors did not outweigh the need for an above-guidelines sentence, which would reflect the seriousness of Maybou's offense and deter similar conduct by other police officers. Given the unique danger created by police officers' ability to obscure their criminal conduct behind the veil of police authority, and the threat posed to prison safety and discipline by the introduction of illegal narcotics, this conclusion was not unreasonable. Cf. United States v. Arroyo, 546 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2008) (affirming an upward departure where the district court found that a police officer set a very bad example by buying and making available illegal drugs). Moreover, to the extent that Maybou suggests "that the district court should have balanced the § 3553(a) factors differently, it is `simply beyond the scope of our appellate review, which looks to whether the sentence is reasonable, as opposed to whether in the first instance we would have imposed the same sentence.'"
This is so both as to drug cases involving the same issue as our case and as to cases (we list many in an addendum) involving other kinds of drug or non-drug conspiracies having an additional element separating a more serious one from a less serious one. This court has assumed the same in passing, United States v. Arroyo, 546 F.3d 54, 56 (1st Cir. 2008), but has not formally decided the issue. United States v. Carroll, 140 Fed.Appx. 168, 169 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Ruhbayan, 406 F.3d 292, 295-96 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 917, 126 S.Ct. 291, 163 L.Ed.2d 255 (2005); United States v. Araujo, No. 98-21008, 2000 WL 309408, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb.28, 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Neely, No. 94-5107, 1996 WL 60329, at *2 (4th Cir.) (unpublished), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861, 117 S.Ct. 166, 136 L.Ed.2d 109 (1996); United States v. Valencia, No. 94-10348, 1995 WL 444658, at *4 (9th Cir.) (unpublished), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1001, 116 S.Ct. 546, 133 L.Ed.2d 449 (1995); United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 703 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Underwood, No. 94-5897, 1995 WL 241992, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr.25, 1995) (unpublished); United States v. Garcia, 27 F.3d 1009, 1014-15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Chavez v. United States, 513 U.S. 1009, 115 S.Ct. 531, 130 L.Ed.2d 435