U.S. v. Anton

4 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Grieveson, (S.D.Ind. 2000)

    110 F. Supp. 2d 880 (S.D. Ind. 2000)   Cited 2 times

    The Seventh Circuit revisited the mens rea requirement of Section 1326 in a later case, again involving Mr. Anton; apparently, Mr. Anton was deported no fewer than four times, with the latest leading to the second opinion. See United States v. Anton, 888 F.2d 53, 54 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Anton II"). In this second case, Mr. Anton argued that the district court had erred by excluding evidence concerning the amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), which ruling, Mr. Anton contended, deprived him of the opportunity to present evidence which could have demonstrated his reasonable belief that he may have been eligible for amnesty.

  2. U.S. v. Grieveson, (S.D.Ind. 2000)

    Cause No. IP00-0071-CR-01-B/F (S.D. Ind. Aug. 28, 2000)

    The Seventh Circuit revisited the mens rea requirement of Section 1326 in a later case, again involving Mr. Anton; apparently, Mr. Anton was deported no fewer than four times, with the latest leading to the second opinion. See United States v. Anton, 888 F.2d 53, 54 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Anton II"). In this second case, Mr. Anton argued that the district court had erred by excluding evidence concerning the amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), which ruling, Mr. Anton contended, deprived him of the opportunity to present evidence which could have demonstrated his reasonable belief that he may have been eligible for amnesty.

  3. U.S. v. Canals-Jimenez

    943 F.2d 1284 (11th Cir. 1991)   Cited 66 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an alien who approached the immigration officer upon arrival at a U.S. airport was not “found” in the United States

    It is equally important to note that although no other reported cases discuss the question of constitutional vagueness, there has been appellate review of cases in which defendants were convicted of being "found in" the United States, including authority controlling in this Court. See, e.g., United States v. Oris, 598 F.2d 428 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 945, 100 S.Ct. 304, 62 L.Ed.2d 313 (1979); United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Anton, 888 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1989). In none of these cases did the court deem the issue of vagueness important enough to address.

  4. U.S. v. Barrera-Paniangua

    122 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ill. 2000)   Cited 3 times
    Holding in context of immigration law that "whatever intent exists is 'implicit' in the language of the statute and therefore the indictment"; citing United States v. Dixon, 596 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1979)

    Further, we held that even if the government could establish these three factors, a defendant might nonetheless successfully challenge his arrest by proving that he "reasonably believed that he had the consent of the Attorney General to reenter the United States." . . . U.S. v. Anton, 888 F.2d 53, 54-55 (7th Cir. 1989) This language limits Anton to whether a mistake of law defense exists and makes clear that the government need only prove intent after a defendant has raised his claim of an honest but unknowing entrance into the country.