U.S. v. Antico

136 Citing cases

  1. U.S. v. Bryant

    556 F. Supp. 2d 378 (D.N.J. 2008)   Cited 29 times
    Granting motion to sever fourteen out of twenty counts where one defendant was not alleged to have known about the conduct alleged in the other counts and where there was a risk of prejudicial "spillover."

    To prove mail fraud, the government must establish "(1) the defendant's knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the mails . . . in furtherance of the scheme." United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001). Congress has clarified that "the term `scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."

  2. U.S. v. McGeehan

    584 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 2009)   Cited 10 times
    Noting prior Third Circuit caselaw which endorsed the limiting principle "that state law must provide the specific honest services owed by the defendant in a fiduciary relationship"

    To establish a violation of these statutes, the Government must prove "(1) the defendant's knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the mails or interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme." United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001). In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987), the Supreme Court considered the reach of § 1341 and acknowledged that the mail fraud statute had been "interpreted broadly."

  3. U.S. v. Kemp

    500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007)   Cited 311 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that bribery requires "'a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act,'" and extends to agreements to provide a "stream of benefits" in exchange for official acts

    To prove mail fraud, the government must establish "(1) the defendant's knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the mails . . . in furtherance of the scheme." United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir.2001). Congress has clarified that "the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."

  4. U.S. v. Murphy

    323 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2003)   Cited 38 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Stating "[w]e thus endorse . . . the decisions of other Courts of Appeals that have . . . required a state law limiting principle for honest services fraud"

    In our recent decisions interpreting honest services fraud, we emphasized the need to establish a violation of state law in such cases to serve as a limiting principle on the federal prosecution of local political actors. See United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 693 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262 n. 18 (3d Cir. 2001). Although the Government suggests that Murphy's violation of the New Jersey Bribery Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2, which was the predicate offense in the Travel Act charges, could serve as the state law source of a fiduciary obligation, we are not persuaded by this argument.

  5. U.S. v. Delle Donna

    552 F. Supp. 2d 475 (D.N.J. 2008)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that a political candidate and his wife, both of whom ran certain campaign committees, owed a fiduciary duty to those committees and to the campaign itself, even though the committees and the campaign were presumably not obligated to pay the candidate and his wife for their services

    In addition to "the existence of a scheme to defraud" under one of these theories, the substantive elements of mail fraud pursuant to § 1341 are "the use of the mails — whether the United States Postal Service or a private carrier — in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme," and "culpable participation by the defendant, that is, participation by the defendant with specific intent to defraud." United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 279 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that mail fraud elements include "(1) the defendant's knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the mails . . . in furtherance of the scheme.") (quoting United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001)). The Indictment also charges Defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 2.

  6. United States v. Allinson

    CRIMINAL ACTION No. 17-390-2 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 30, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    The Third Circuit has not had occasion to address what constitutes an explicit quid pro quo, as it has addressed the quid pro quo requirement only in the non-campaign contribution context. See United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 343 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 260 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Bradley, 173 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1999). As Allinson notes, the "wink and a nod" phrase appears in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), a Supreme Court case decided shortly after McCormick.

  7. United States v. Fountain

    792 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2015)   Cited 42 times
    Upholding a Hobbs Act extortion conviction where the evidence proves " that the payor made a payment to the defendant because the payor held a reasonable belief that the defendant would perform official acts in return, and that the defendant knew the payor made that payment because of that belief."

    Accordingly, after reviewing the legislative history and evaluating competing constructions of the statute, the Supreme Court held in Evans that to prove a conviction for extortion under color of official right, “the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.” 504 U.S. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1881.We interpreted Evans in United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245 (3d Cir.2001), and explained that “no ‘official act’ ... need be proved to convict under the Hobbs Act.” Id. at 257.

  8. U.S. v. Kincaid-Chauncey

    556 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2009)   Cited 78 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that quid pro quo need not be tied to a specific official act, so long as evidence shows a pattern of gifts in exchange for official actions

    Nevertheless, "[a]lmost all the circuits that have addressed this precise issue have held that the quid pro quo requirement applies to all Hobbs Act extortion prosecutions, not just to those involving campaign contributions." United States v. Tucker, 133 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases); see also Evans, 504 U.S. at 278, 112 S.Ct. 1881 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he rationale underlying the Court's holding [in McCormick] applies not only in campaign contribution cases, but in all § 1951 prosecutions."); Ganim, 510 F.3d at 143; United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 258 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 972-73 (7th Cir. 2001); Collins, 78 F.3d at 1035; United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 553 (11th Cir. 1994). In Tucker, we assumed without deciding that a prosecution for extortion under color of official right in the non-campaign contribution context required a quid pro quo. 133 F.3d at 1215 (upholding against a sufficiency of the evidence challenge Hobbs Act color of official right extortion convictions).

  9. U.S. v. Urban

    404 F.3d 754 (3d Cir. 2005)   Cited 423 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce is needed to sustain a Hobbs Act conviction

    "Thus, the statute supports two classes of extortion: extortion induced by `wrongful use of force' and extortion `under color of official right.'" United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 255 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, the government pursued the "under color of official right" theory of Hobbs Act extortion.

  10. U.S. v. Panarella

    277 F.3d 678 (3d Cir. 2002)   Cited 151 times
    Holding that "a public official who conceals a financial interest in violation of state criminal law while taking discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit that interest commits honest services fraud"

    In interpreting § 1346, we therefore look to both post- McNally cases interpreting § 1346 and pre- McNally cases interpreting § 1341 and § 1343 for guidance. See United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262, 2001 U.S.App. LEXIS 25318, at *41 n. 16 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[C]ommentary and judicial reflection indicate that [§ 1346] was enacted to overturn McNally and restore the evolution of mail and wire fraud to its pre- McNally status."); United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e consider pre- McNally cases as persuasive authority in evaluating the scope of honest services."). "Honest services fraud typically occurs in two scenarios: (1) bribery, where a legislator was paid for a particular decision or action; or (2) failure to disclose a conflict of interest resulting in personal gain."