“Arrest” means federal arrest. See United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Banks, 761 F.3d 1163, 1181 (10th Cir. 2014) (“A defendant's constitutional speedy-trial right attaches when he is arrested or indicted on federal charges, whichever come[s] first.”).
The constitutional right to a speedy trial “attaches when the defendant is arrested or indicted, whichever comes first.” United States v. Black, 830 F.3d 1099, 1112 (10th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “Arrest” means federal arrest. See United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Banks, 761 F.3d 1163, 1181 (10th Cir. 2014) (“A defendant's constitutional speedy-trial right attaches when he is arrested or indicted on federal charges, whichever come[s] first.”). Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial attaches at the point of federal criminal charges and is “not triggered by prior state arrest or indictment.”
Not only were Lieutenant Paul and his fellow officers lawfully on the premises pursuant to a valid search warrant — thus reducing any significant concern that applying the inevitable discovery doctrine in this case would subvert the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement — the evidence here, and the logical inferences therefrom, demonstrate that the police would have obtained Heath's currency during a valid search conducted pursuant to a well-established exception to the warrant requirement, namely, a search incident to a lawful arrest. See United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1357 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[E]ven assuming that the [pat-down search of the defendant was conducted] prior to [the discovery of] the cocaine [on his companion], [the defendant] could . . . have been searched seconds later, once the cocaine provided probable cause to arrest. . . . Therefore, the search was incident to a lawful arrest regardless of the exact sequence of events. . . .") (emphases added); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982) (recognizing, without inquiring whether the officers would necessarily have arrested the defendant, that the "discovery of the marijuana in the van provided probable cause to arrest [the defendant], and upon arrest the officers unquestionably would have searched [the defendant] and discovered the marijuana in his pocket") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying inevitable discovery exception because, although the defendant had been "prematurely arrested," the police had reasonable sus
“Arrest” means federal arrest. See United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attaches at the point of federal criminal charges and is “not triggered by prior state arrest or indictment.” Allen, 986 F.2d at 1356; see also Madden, 682 F.3d at 930 (quoting United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Arrest by state authorities on state charges does not trigger the speedy trial provisions of the Federal Constitution.”).
“Arrest” means federal arrest. See United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Banks, 761 F.3d 1163, 1181 (10th Cir. 2014) (“A defendant's constitutional speedy-trial right attaches when he is arrested or indicted on federal charges, whichever come[s] first.”).
The U.S. Constitution guarantees the accused in all criminal prosecutions "the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial 'attaches only when a formal criminal charge is instituted . . . .' " United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v.MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 (1982)). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit clarified that "a formal criminal charge" means "a federal charge," and held that "a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not triggered by prior state arrest or indictment."
In explaining the origins of this unique application of the "search incident to arrest" doctrine, the Tenth Circuit stated that "a search cannot precede an arrest and then serve as part of its justification." United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1357 (10th Cir. 1993). Although this authority was not cited by the Government, the Government argued that officers "had probable cause to arrest him, thereby allowing them to search the vehicle incident to that arrest."
United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir. 1993).
"We review de novo the 'ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.'" United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir. 1993)). "[W]e accept the factual findings of the district court" and its credibility determinations "unless they are clearly erroneous."
Generally, "[w]e review de novo the 'ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.'" United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Allen, 986 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir. 1993)). When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, "we accept the factual findings of the district court . . . unless they are clearly erroneous."