A court acting in equity exercises its discretion with care. United States v. Aiken, 867 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1989) suggests that the Court has authority to exercise its discretion to enter injunctive relief as a remedy for default judgment where warranted. After reviewing the complaint and the expert's report in question, the Court finds that there is sufficient support for the 23 ADA violations Plaintiff addresses to grant the default judgement.

An injunction is an extraordinary remedy. A court acting in equity exercises its discretion with care. United States v. Aiken, 867 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1989) suggests that the Court has authority to exercise its discretion to enter injunctive relief as a remedy for default judgment where warranted. However, as set forth above, the Court must accept only well-pleaded allegations in the complaint on a motion for default judgment.

Case law suggests that injunctive relief by way of a default judgment is available, especially in cases like this one, where there is no doubt regarding Defendants' notice of the proceedings. See e.g., U.S. v. Aiken, 867 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1989) (maintaining a permanent injunction and default judgment against a mining company after the sole shareholder's death).

After reviewing the facts of the case before it, the court concluded that although the defendant was not an officer, director or shareholder of the corporate permittee, he was its agent because he acted as its spokesman and advisor, he had an interest in the equipment used on the mining site, his guaranty on the corporate promissory note was to be paid through the sale of coal removed from the site, and he had assumed the responsibility of attempting to comply with applicable mining reclamation requirements. See also United States v. Aiken, 867 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Peery, 862 F.2d 567 (1988). "Given the relationship between the SMCRA and KRS Chapter 350, we believe that in the interest of consistency, it is logical and appropriate to adopt the definition of "agent" set forth in Dix Fork, supra, for purposes of Kentucky law, and to utilize that definition in determining whether Couch was G W's agent.