The fact that the federal authorities muscled in on the van and began an administrative forfeiture proceeding before the state court action was filed did not confer jurisdiction on the federal court. We stated in [ United States v. $79,123.49 in United States Cash & Currency, 830 F.2d 94, 98 (7th Cir.1987)], and maintain here as well, that jurisdiction obtained by mere possession ‘goes much too far.’ ”); United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.1989) (“[W]e reject, as did the Seventh Circuit, the argument that the fact of federal possession of the res takes jurisdiction from the state court and bestows it upon the district court. Although we are familiar with the maxim, ‘possession is nine-tenths of the law,’ we prefer to apply the remaining one-tenth and decline to ‘substitute a rule of force for the principle of mutual respect embodied in the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine.’ The district court must decline federal jurisdiction over money taken from the state court's jurisdiction in such a manner.

She correctly points out that civil forfeiture actions are in rem proceedings, and that "when state and federal courts each proceed against the same res, `the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.'" United States v. $79,123.49 in U.S. Cash and Currency, 830 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195, 55 S.Ct. 386, 388-89, 79 L.Ed. 850 (1935)). Thus, her argument continues, because the state court case was on file when the federal court case was commenced, the district court could not acquire in rem jurisdiction over the van.

Id. at § 11488.4(i)(4). A common-law rule of long standing prohibits a court, whether state or federal, from assuming in rem jurisdiction over a res that is already under the in rem jurisdiction of another court. Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195, 55 S.Ct. 386, 389, 79 L.Ed. 850 (1935); United States v. $79,123.49 in United States Cash and Currency, 830 F.2d 94, 95 (7th Cir. 1987); Knaefler v. Mack, 680 F.2d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1982) (dictum); Butler v. Judge of United States Dist. Ct., 116 F.2d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 1941); cf., United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444, 450 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071, 104 S.Ct. 981, 79 L.Ed.2d 217 (1984). The purpose of the rule is the maintenance of comity between courts; such harmony is especially compromised by state and federal judicial systems attempting to assert concurrent control over the res upon which jurisdiction of each depends.

The purpose of the doctrine is to promote comity between courts, Penn General, 294 U.S. at 195, and to avoid the "logical and practical difficulty of two courts simultaneously vying for possession or control of the same property." United States v. $79,123.49, 830 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1987).

The court finds that the prosecutor, through its control of the case, through filing the indictment in federal court and through the informal agreement with the state prosecutors, has constructive possession of the property. In support of its position the government relies on United States v. $79,123.49 in United States Cash and Currency, 830 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1987). In that case the State filed an action in state court seeking the forfeiture of currency found on the defendants at the time of their arrest for attempting to purchase marijuana from a state undercover agent.

To the contrary, such a transfer circumvents disposition of the res by the circuit court, as required by both Illinois statutes that authorize actions for forfeiture."), superseded by statute , 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/505(d) (West 1991), as recognized in United States v. Sixty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($62,600.00) , 899 F.Supp. 378 (N.D. Ill. 1995) ; United States v. $79,123.49 in U.S. Cash & Currency , 830 F.2d 94, 98 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the seizure by federal authorities was invalid because they failed to obtain a turnover order from the state district court), superseded by statute , Wis. Stat. § 961.555(1) (1993); In re 28 Grams of Marijuana , 278 F.Supp.2d at 1107 ("When federal authorities seek to gain control over a res already in the control of a state court, the proper procedure is to seek [a] turnover order from that court." (citation omitted) ).

Civil forfeitures involving court action are in rem proceedings. United States v. $79,123.49 in U.S. Cash Currency, 830 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1987); Humphrey, 539 N.W.2d at 2; see Minn. Stat. § 609.531, subd. 6a(a) (1996). Under the rule of exclusive jurisdiction, if a federal and state court each has the power to proceed against the res, "the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other."

"The logical and practical difficulty of two courts simultaneously vying for possession or control of the same property is the key" to the conflict. United States v. $79,123.49 in U.S. Cash & Currency , 830 F.2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1987) ; see also Hagan v. Lucas , 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400, 403, 9 L.Ed. 470 (1836) ("A most injurious conflict of jurisdiction would be likely, often, to arise between the federal and the state courts; if the final process of the one could be levied on property which had been taken by the process of the other."). But the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine does not generally apply to situations where one action is in rem and the other in personam.

"Since the earliest days of the Republic the rule has been established that, when state and federal courts each proceed against the same res, `the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.'" United States v. $79,123.49 in United States Cash and Currency, 830 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935)); see also United States v. One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van, 924 F.2d 120, 121 (7th Cir. 1991). "The purpose of the rule is `[t]o avoid unseemly and disastrous conflicts in the administration of our dual judicial system, and to protect the judicial processes of the court first assuming jurisdiction.'"

Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412, 84 S. Ct. 1579, 1582, 12 L.Ed.2d 409 (1964); Princess Lida of Thurn Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 465-66, 59 S.Ct. 275, 280-81, 83 L.Ed. 285 (1939). Although the rule relied on by the Defendant has an admirable pedigree, it is not applicable to the facts before us. The cases in which the rule was established, and those to which it applies, involve separate tribunals vying for jurisdiction over the same property. Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 465, 59 S.Ct. at 280; Penn Gen. Casualty, 294 U.S. at 194, 55 S.Ct. at 388; Cassity v. Pitts, 995 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. $79,123.49 in United States Cash Currency, 830 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1987). For instance, in $79,123.