The rule holding an agent individually responsible where he acts for a nonexistent principal is derived from the case law and subsequently included in our statutes. See Shiflett v. John W. Kelly Co., 16 Ga. App. 91 ( 84 S.E. 606); Powers v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 19 Ga. App. 706 ( 91 S.E. 1062); Hagan v. Asa G. Candler, Inc., 59 Ga. App. 587 ( 1 S.E.2d 693); Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. Lewis, 78 Ga. App. 236 ( 50 S.E.2d 843); Brown-Wright c. Corp. v. Bagen, 112 Ga. App. 300, 302 ( 145 S.E.2d 294); U.S. I. F. Atlanta Corp. v. Hagy, 136 Ga. App. 350 ( 221 S.E.2d 227); Evans v. Smithdeal, 143 Ga. App. 287 ( 238 S.E.2d 278). In Brown-Wright c. Corp. v. Bagen, 112 Ga. App. 300, 302, supra, it was held: "`The disclosure of an agency is not complete for the purpose of relieving the agent from personal liability unless it embraces the name of the principal; without that, the party dealing with the agent may understand that he intended to pledge his personal liability and responsibility in support of the contract and for its performance.