Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:94cv3-D-D
November 4, 1996
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By memorandum opinion and order dated August 3, 1995, this court granted the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's and the third party plaintiff's claims in this cause. This court made an Erie — guess and found that the Mississippi Supreme Court would determine that the application of Mississippi's statute of repose, Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-41, would bar the plaintiff's claims in this cause. United States Fidelity Guar. Co. v. Leslie Locke Corp., Civil Action No. 3:94cv3-D-D (N.D. Miss. Aug. 3, 1995) (Davidson, D.J.) (Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment); see also Trust Co. Bank v. United States Gypsum Co., 950 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1992); Moore v. Jesco, Inc., 531 So.2d 815, 817 (Miss. 1988); Reich v. Jesco. Inc., 526 So.2d 550, 551-52 (Miss. 1988); Smith v. Fluor Corp., 514 So.2d 1227, 1230 (Miss. 1987). The plaintiff appealed this court's decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed. United States Fidelity Guar. Co. v. Leslie Locke Corp., 85 F.3d 625, Action No. 95-60506 (5th Cir. May 3, 1996) (Order Affirming District Court's Order "on the basis of the district court's opinion."). The plaintiff then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on the case for review of the Fifth Circuit's decision. On August 13, 1996, the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court returned the petition to the plaintiff as untimely. Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion to Strike and Response, Letter from Clerk of Supreme Court to Plaintiff's Counsel.
On September 19, 1996, the Mississippi Supreme Court issued an opinion analyzing the effect of the Mississippi statute of repose contained at Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-41. McIntyre v. Farrel Corp., — So.2d —, 1996 WL 529544 (Miss. Sep. 19, 1996). On October 9, 1996, the plaintiff filed the instant motion with the court, seeking relief from this court's August 3, 1995 order based upon the contention that in light of the McIntyre decision, the plaintiff's claims are not barred by the statute of repose under Mississippi law. The defendant has responded to the plaintiff's motion and the court has considered all of the parties' submissions in this matter.
After careful consideration, the undersigned is of the opinion that the motion of the plaintiff should be denied without even reaching the question of whether the issuance of the McIntyre decision would affect the merits of the plaintiff's claims in this case. Rule 60(b)(4) is not the proper mechanism through which to ask for relief from judgment in this matter, for this court's prior judgment is not void.See, e.g., Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir. 1995) ("That a subsequent state court resolves the question differently does not render the federal diversity decision invalid . . ."); WRIGHT MILLER, 11 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2862 (2d Ed. 1995) ("A judgment is not void because it is erroneous. It is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law."). Neither is rule 60(b)(5) appropriately applied in this case. See,e.g., Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating 60(b)(5) offers no relief when "law applied by the court . . . has been subsequently overruled or declared erroneous in another and unrelated proceeding.").
Finally, application of Rule 60(b)(6) does not provide the plaintiff with relief from this subsequent change in the law, for it has demonstrated to this court no "extraordinary circumstances" that would warrant such a grant of relief. Changes in decisional law are alone insufficient to serve as "extraordinary circumstances" sufficient to justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief. E.g., Batts, 66 F.3d at 749; Picco. v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 900 F.2d 846, 851 (5th Cir. 1990); Bailey, 894 F.2d at 160. Further, "[t]he general rule that a change in decisional law will not ordinarily warrant Rule 60(b)(6) relief has greater force in anErie case because in this context a federal court is doing no more than fulfilling its obligation scrupulously to determine how a state court would decide a question." Batts, 66 F.3d at 74. The plaintiff argues that a ruling by United States District Judge Biggers of this court mandates a different result. Gilbert v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Miss. 1993). However, this court once reached a conclusion remarkably similar to that of Judge Biggers. Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 153 F.R.D. 103 (N.D. Miss. 1994), rev'd 66 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 1995). In any event, the reasoning of Gilbert and this court's prior Batts opinion are not applicable in this case, for they did not turn upon the declaration of "new" law by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Rather, they turned upon the application of "old" Mississippi products liability law supposedly established before the original decisions in Gilbert and Batts:
[Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage] was decided by the state supreme court on March 25, 1993. On this date, the Mississippi Supreme Court let the rest of the world in on the best kept secret in Mississippi jurisprudence.
In Prestage, the court announced that five years earlier, in 1988, Mississippi products liability law had changed from the "consumer expectation" approach to the "risk-utility" test for defining "unreasonably dangerous" and "defective condition" as those terms are utilized in 402A.See Batts, 153 F.R.D. at 106. This court's opinion was that the establishment of this "old" law was an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting the application of Rule 60(b)(6) relief.Id. at 110. As discussed supra, the Fifth Circuit did not agree.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT
Pursuant to a memorandum opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED THAT:1) the motion of the plaintiff for relief from judgment is hereby DENIED.
All memoranda, depositions, affidavits and other matters considered by this court in denying the plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment are hereby incorporated and made a part of the record in this cause.
SO ORDERED.