Opinion
No. 98 C 8211
September 13, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Tyrone Williams ("Williams") was convicted of murder in Illinois state court. Williams unsuccessfully challenged this conviction on direct appeal and in a post-conviction action in state court. Williams has now filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in this court.
BACKGROUND
In April, 1982, Williams was convicted of the murder of Jesse Lee in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois(Case No. 81-4519). He was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment. Williams appealed the conviction, raising the following issues: (1) that the improper hearsay testimony of Officer Jaros deprived him of a fair trial; and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to 40 years' imprisonment. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed William's conviction on January 31, 1984, in an unpublished order (Case no. 82-1477). (`Appellate Decision #1".) The parties dispute whether Williams sought review before the Illinois Supreme Court.
Shortly after his trial in case no. 81-4519, Williams, represented by the same attorney, was tried and convicted of another murder and sentenced to natural life imprisonment (Case no. 82-0222). Williams appealed, claiming that he received ineffective assistance because his defense attorney was preoccupied by criminal proceedings pending against him. This conviction was also affirmed, see People v. Williams, 138 Ill. App.3d 1041, 487 N.E.2d 13,93 Ill. Dec. 569 (1985), and the Illinois Supreme Court declined review.
In 1991, Williams filed a pro se petition for post-conviction reliefin case no. 81-4519, raising extensive ineffective assistance claims (akin to his claims in case no. 82-0222) and prosecutorial misconduct claims. Counsel was ultimately appointed for him, and counsel filed an amended petition challenging William's conviction in case no. 82-0222. The State moved to dismiss both petitions. The trial court granted both motions on February 26, 1998. Williams appealed, claiming that the state court decision was invalid because no preliminary examination was made within 30 days (per Illinois statute) and that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615 was not complied with. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court in an unpublished order on March 30, 1998. ("Appellate Decision #2".) Review before the Illinois Supreme Court was not sought.
In his Habeas Petition, Williams initially claims that he sought review in the Illinois Supreme Court for his "first" post-conviction petition. (Petition at 5.) However, he appears to have misunderstood the question, and deemed his petition to the trial court, which was appealed, his "first petition," and deemed his appeal his "second petition."(Petition at 4-5). He ultimately concedes that the claims were not presented to the Illinois Supreme Court.(Petition at 9).
In his petition for habeas relief, Williams challenges case no. 81-4519 on the following grounds:
Given the confusion in the post-conviction proceeding, ascertaining which conviction Williams is challenging is a critical first step. As he has identified the conviction by case number, sentence, victim, and alternate killer, it is clear he is referring to case no. 81-4519.
1. that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Jaros' hearsay testimony;
2. that his sentence was excessive under the Eighth Amendment because the trial court failed to properly consider his youth and rehabilitative potential;
3. that defense counsel was ineffective because counsel was distracted by criminal charges pending against him and failed to adequately prepare Petitioner's case;
4. that defense counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to seek discovery, failed to interview State's main witness, failed to interview defense witnesses, failed to locate alibi witness, and failed to prepare a defense;
5. that defense counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to object to prejudicial remarks by prosecutor regarding gang associations; and
6. that trial judge erred in admitting evidence of gang association.
Williams presented his claims in terse, laundry list fashion, with no citation to authority, legal argument, or recitation of significant facts. The Respondent answered that the claims had been procedurally defaulted and were meritless. Williams did not file a supporting memoranda nor a reply to Respondent's answer.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Through the mechanism of habeas corpus, a federal court may vacate a state prisoner's conviction or sentence where that prisoner is being held in violation of the United States Constitution or other federal laws or treaties. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; McGowan v. Miller, 109 F.3d 1168, 1172 (7th Cir. 1997). A federal court may grant a prisoner's § 2254 petition if the state court "adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or — (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Determinations of factual issues made by the state court are presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden of rebutting them by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The U.S. Supreme Court only recently addressed the new standard.
Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). "[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law." Id. at 1522. "[A] federal habeas court making the `unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of the clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 1521 (rejecting the "all reasonable jurists" standard). The Supreme Court's formulation does not appear to be significantly different than the formulation the Seventh Circuit has developed in its AEDPA cases. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Gilmore, 189 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 1999) ( "[T]he `criterion for assessing the reasonableness of a state court's application of Supreme Court case law, pursuant to § 2254(d)(1), is whether the determination is at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.'") (quoting Sweeney v. Park, 113 F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 1997)); Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 748-49 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997)("The statutory unreasonableness' standard allows the state court's conclusion to stand if it is one of several equally plausible outcomes"). As Judge Evans succinctly put it "[t]he upshot of all this is that federal review is now severely restricted; the fact that we may think certain things could have been handled better by the state trial judge or by the prosecuting attorney or by a state reviewing court means very little." Sanchez, 189 F.3d at 623.
A federal court may not review the merits of claims raised in a § 2254 petition unless the petitioner has (1) exhausted all the remedies available to him in state court; and (2) fairly presented his federal claims in state court first. McGowan, 109 F.3d at 1172. To exhaust a claim, "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1732 (1999). In Illinois, the claims must be presented through both levels of the two-tiered appellate process, which includes a petition for review by the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. at 1732-33 (failure to do so results in a procedural default). In sum, a petitioner can procedurally default a claim by completely failing to raise the claim in the state court system or where the state court has declined to address the merits of the claim because of petitioner's failure to comply with a state procedural rule or where petitioner failed to properly appeal his claim in the state court system. See U.S. ex rel. Johnson v. Tally, 47 F. Supp.2d 943, 947 (N.D. Ill. 1999). If a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim, a federal court cannot reach the merits of that claim unless the petitioner demonstrates (1) cause for and actual prejudice from failing to raise the claim as required, or (2) that enforcing the default would lead to a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Seward v. Gilmore, 80 F.3d 1205, 1211-12 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)). The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception requires a claim that the petitioner be actually innocent of the crime. Id. at 1212. While pro se pleadings are construed liberally, the petitioner "must at least briefly summarize the facts in support of each claim for relief." Etienne v. Weber, No. 97 C 5647, 1999 WL 417354 at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1999). Section 2254 and Rule 2(c) do not require federal courts to winnow through the entire state court record to ascertain whether there are any facts which could support habeas relief. Tally, 47 F. Supp.2d at 953-4. The petitioner is required to state facts that indicate a genuine possibility of constitutional error. Id. (notice pleading inadequate.) This is consistent with the more general rule that a court need not address arguments that are undeveloped. See United States v. Martinez, 169 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
We begin with a procedural issue that is muddying the waters. Williams apparently previously sought federal habeas review. Neither side brought this to the court's attention; the court was put on notice by a passing reference to an unsuccessful federal habeas action in case 81-4519 by William's counsel in his appellate brief in the state post-conviction proceeding. See Docket #9, Respondent's Exhibits, Exhibit H at page 8. If the current petition is a second or successive habeas petition, this court would be deprived of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (U.S. Court of Appeals must authorize such a filing).
A review of the court's automated docket shows a habeas petition filed by the Petitioner in 1991 in this court. (Case no. 91 CV 6562.) The case was initially terminated on the merits; however, pursuant to a motion to reconsider, that order was vacated and the case dismissed without prejudice. However, that the prior case was dismissed without prejudice does not automatically mean that the current petition is not a second or successive petition. See Potts v. United States, 210 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2000).
After examining the file in case no. 91 CV 6562, we are convinced post-conviction counsel misidentified the conviction in his brief. The case file shows that the petition in the previous habeas case was directed to Petitioner's conviction in case no. 82-0222. Habeas case 91 CV 6562 was dismissed without prejudice because Petitioner's state post-conviction case was still pending. (See this court's order of June 4, 1993.) This may have been the source of the confusion, as the state post-conviction proceeding was originally directed at Petitioner's conviction in case no. 81-4519, not 82-0222. See Docket #42,43, State's Motion to Vacate Judgment. Nonetheless, as the previous habeas petition was directed to a different conviction, Petitioner's current petition is not a second or successive petition vis a vis his conviction in case no. 81-4519.
A. Procedural Default
William's claims #3-6 are procedurally defaulted by his failure to seek review in the Illinois Supreme Court, as required by Boerckel. Significantly, even applying the pre- Boerckel rule, these claims would be defaulted, as his state post-conviction appeal raised only two state procedural issues. Moreover, Williams as not presented cause or prejudice for this default, nor raised a claim of actual innocence.
While the Respondent's brief was filed while the Boerckel case was still pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Respondent nonetheless specifically reserved the argument that petitioner must raise all his claims through the entire Illinois court system, including the Illinois Supreme Court, to avoid a procedural default.
Claims #1 and 2 are somewhat more problematic. The Respondent has represented that the Clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that no review in the Illinois Supreme Court was sought after Petitioner's direct appeal. Further, the Petitioner did not indicate in his habeas petition whether such review was sought after his direct appeal. Thus, it would appear that Boerckel bars these claims as well. However, during the course of its review, this court noted a representation by the Petitioner in his pro se state post-conviction petition that he had sought review in the Illinois Supreme Court after his direct appeal was denied (appeal number 59891). See Docket #9, Respondent's Exhibits, Exhibit B at page 1. Contacting the Illinois Supreme Court, court staff was informed that Petitioner filed a request to proceed pro se on March 6, 1984, which the Illinois Supreme Court deemed an appeal, and that this appeal was summarily denied on June 5, 1984. The question obviously arises as to why Respondent did not discover this appeal. Significantly, per the Illinois Supreme Court Clerk's Office, the appeal was not listed on the automated docket associated with case 82-1477 (Petitioner's direct appeal). It was instead listed in a miscellaneous pro se docket, which was located only when court staff provided the Clerk with the appeal number (#59891) winnowed from Petitioner's state court brief. Under these circumstances, given the Petitioner did not help matters by making no reference to the appeal in his habeas petition, we are disinclined to see any bad faith on the part of the Respondent.
Unfortunately, discovering this appeal does not definitively resolve the issue of whether claims #1 and #2 have been preserved, inasmuch as we do not know what claims the Petitioner actually raised before the Illinois Supreme Court or whether the court disposed of the claims on an independent and adequate state law ground. Nonetheless, delaying the case further while Respondent obtained this information is unwarranted. As Petitioner's claims cannot prevail, we will presume that they are preserved and address them.
B. Surviving Claims
Petitioner first challenges the admission of Officer Jaro's hearsay statement that an unidentified person said "Spanky" (Petitioner's nickname) was the possible killer. Petitioner states, without elaboration, that the admission of this evidence violated his rights under the 14th Amendment.
It is difficult to obtain habeas relief based upon an allegedly errant evidentiary ruling. "Rules of evidence are designed in the interest of fair trials." United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 352 (1969). "But unfairness in result is no measure of unconstitutionality." Id. "But apart from trials conducted in violation of express constitutional mandates, a constitutionally unfair trial takes place only where the barriers and safeguards are so relaxed or forgotten . . .that the proceeding is more a spectacle. . . . or trial by ordeal . . . than a disciplined contest." Id. at 356. To be of constitutional significance for purposes of habeas relief, "an erroneous evidentiary ruling must be so prejudicial that it compromises the petitioner's due process right to a fundamentally fair trial." Howard v. O'Sullivan, 185 F.3d 721, 723-24 (7th Cir. 1999). "This means the error must have produced a significant likelihood that an innocent person has been convicted." Id. at 724. As such, "evidentiary questions are generally not subject to review in habeas corpus proceedings." Id.
There is nothing unreasonable about the state court's analysis of this issue or any basis for concluding that the statement in any conceivable way deprived the Petitioner of a fair trial. As properly noted by the Illinois court, the objection to Officer Jaro's statement was sustained and the statement itself was merely cumulative to other strong identification evidence presented at trial. See Appellate Decision #1 at 5-6. See also Appellate Decision #2 at 9.
Petitioner also claims that his sentence is excessive under the 8th Amendment. Petitioner argues that he was only 20 years of age and a first-time offender and that the trial court did not accord adequate weight to his rehabilitative potential.
Generally, federal courts do not review state sentencing determinations that fall within the statutory limit. Koc v. McBride, 124 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, "[a] sentence violates the Constitution if it is extreme and `grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Three factors are used to determine proportionality:"(l) the inherent gravity of the offense, (2) the sentences imposed for similarly grave offenses in the same jurisdiction, and (3) sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986-87 (opinion of Scalia, 3.)
The Illinois Appellate Court summarily rejected Petitioner's contention, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in considering the cold-blooded nature of the offense and the need to deter such conduct. ( See Appellate Decision #1 at 6.) Petitioner has not meaningfully attempted to establish any of the Harmelin factors, and this court's review compels us to conclude that there is nothing unreasonable about the state court's decision. The crime in question was a brutal gang murder, and, given the gravity of this offense, there is nothing grossly disproportionate about a forty-year sentence. Significantly, Petitioner received natural life for his subsequent murder conviction, and the State sought the death penalty in that case.
As the Illinois Court viewed the claim totally in terms of whether the trial judge abused his discretion, one wonders whether this claim was actually presented to the state court as a federal (8th Amendment) claim. As the Respondent has represented that Petitioner's appellate brief could not be located, we will give the Petitioner the benefit of the doubt.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES William's Petition for a Writ of Habeas of Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, with prejudice, and this case is terminated. If Williams wishes to appeal the denial of his habeas petition, he must file a Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit with the Clerk of the Court, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 219 South Dearborn Street, 20th Floor, Chicago, Illinois 60604, within thirty (30) days of the entry of judgment in this case. Any appeal of the habeas petition should be accompanied by a request for a certificate of appealability, including a statement as to why a certificate should issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; FED. R. APP. P. 22(b).