Opinion
No. 01 C 9530
December 14, 2001
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Richard Turner ("Turner") has just tendered a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus — Person in State Custody ("Petition"), using the form provided by this District Court's Clerk's Office for the institution of such 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings. Because the Petition is so patently out of time, in direct violation of the statutory provision that governs the permitted timetable for such proceedings, this Court dismisses the Petition summarily pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts ("Section 2254 Rules").
All further references to Title 28's provisions will simply take the form "Section ___."
Petition Part I ¶ 2 states that the conviction about which Turner complains took place on April 28, 1992, and Petition Part I ¶ 3 accurately reports that the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal on February 11, 1993 (an affirmance reported at 24). Ill.App.3d 236, 608 N.E.2d 906 (4th Dist. 1993)). Although Petition Part I ¶ 4 then goes on to refer to an "affirmance" of the conviction by the Illinois Supreme Court at an unknown date, the actual disposition at that level was the Supreme Court's June 3, 1993 denial of leave to appeal (reported in the table at 151 Ill.2d 575, 616 N.E.2d 345).
Petition Part II ¶ 1 describes Turner's post-conviction effort in the state court system as having been denied on October 3, 1993, with "that denial having been affirmed on May 18, 1995. Thus the time clock for the institution of any federal habeas actions such as the present one began to tick on April 24, 1996 under the teaching of Lindh v. Murphy, 96 P.3d 856, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)) interpreting the subsequently enacted 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act.
More than five and one-half years have elapsed "since that April 1996 date. But Section 2244(d)(1) and (d)(2), with their much shorter timetable, have long since foreclosed any current effort on Turner's part to obtain Section 2254 relief.
That being the case, "it plainly appears from the face of the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court" (Section 2254 Rule 4). This Court therefore dismisses the Petition summarily (id.).
This disposition moots Turner's motion for appointment of counsel, which he submitted together with the Petition.