Real parties in interest offer no argument related to the legislative history of the FCA. Courts that have considered this issue have uniformly found no implication that Congress intended to grant federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over FCA claims. In U.S. ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc. (N.D.Ill.1992) 797 F.Supp. 624, 632 (Hartigan ), the district court reviewed the legislative history of the FCA and found “no evidence that Congress addressed or even considered the question of concurrent state court jurisdiction over FCA claims.” Further, the court found “no suggestion that Congress, in its deliberations, affirmatively intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction over such claims on the federal courts.”

This is precisely the type of activity Congress hoped to foster and encourage with its 1986 Amendments to the FCA. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 624, 630-31 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Thus, the Court finds that the purpose of the FCA is fulfilled when an individual who, through his own investigative efforts, unearths evidence of fraud against the Government and brings a qui tam action.

Further, courts have held that an "investigation" undertaken at the relator's own initiative may form the basis for a qui tam action. See U.S. ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 624, 630-31 (N.D.Ill. 1992). Lamers' knowledge of the offending bus service is also "independent" because it does not derive from prior public disclosure.

Indeed, a few federal courts had accepted jurisdiction in qui tam cases brought by the States — thus indicating their view that States were included among the "persons" who may bring qui tam actions as relators under § 3730(b)(1). See United States ex rel. Woodard v. Country View Care Center, Inc., 797 F.2d 888 (CA10 1986); United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (CA7 1984); see also United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 624 (ND Ill. 1992). Not only do these cases express the view of those federal judges who thought a State could be a "person" under § 3730(b)(1), but the cases also demonstrate that the States considered themselves to be statutory "persons." In fact, in the Dean case, the United States filed a statement with the court explicitly stating its view that "[t]he State is a proper relator.

At least one court has held that knowledge obtained through an investigation can be the basis for a qui tam action. See United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 624, 630-31 (N.D. Ill. 1992). In Hartigan the state of Illinois had brought a qui tam action based on information it had disclosed to the federal government after an extensive state investigation into fraud on a federally funded highway construction contract. Hartigan provides a near-perfect analogy to the Dean case involving Wisconsin's medicaid fraud investigation.

In a number of instances, States have brought suits under the FCA as qui tam plaintiffs, clearly indicating that they viewed themselves as "person[s]" within the meaning of § 3730(b)(1). See, e.g., United States ex rel. Woodard and State of Colorado v. County View Care Center, Inc., 797 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1986); United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984); United States ex rel. Hartigan and State of Illinois v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill. 1992). That view clearly was also shared by Congress. For example, in discussing a bill to amend the Act in 1986, the Senate Report cited the decision in United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, in which the Seventh Circuit had refused to allow the State of Wisconsin to act as a qui tam relator in a Medicaid fraud action, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction over such a suit because the United States already possessed the information on which the suit was premised, even though the information had been unearthed solely by the State of Wisconsin.

While both the plain language of the statute and the legislative history demonstrate a clear intent to reverse this aspect of Dean, Congress manifested no such intent regarding the first holding of Dean and the numerous other cases following Pettis. See Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419 (noting that the restrictive interpretation that barred suits by original sources was "too much for Congress"); United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., 797 F. Supp. 624, 629 (N.D.Ill. 1992) (noting congressional dissatisfaction with "original source" aspect); Erickson ex rel. United States v. American Inst. of Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 917 (E.D.Va. 1989) (noting that original language of Senate bill broadened jurisdictional bar, but added original source provision). The legislative history of the 1943 amendments indicates that at least some members of Congress mistakenly believed that an original source could bring a suit under those amendments.

SeeMoses H. Cone , 460 U.S. at 28, 103 S.Ct. 927 (admonishing that Colorado River abstention is inappropriate "[i]f there is any substantial doubt" that the state court action is "an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the issues"). Defendants urge this Court to follow United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros. , 797 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill. 1992). But, defendants' reliance on that case is misplaced.

See United States ex rel. Paul v. Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 370, 375 (S.D. Tex. 1994) ("The False Claims Act states that an action arising under it 'may' be brought in federal court. Thus, pursuant to the language of the statute, there is concurrent jurisdiction between the federal and state courts.") (citations omitted), aff'd per curiam, 53 F.3d 1282 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[S]tate courts have concurrent jurisdiction over FCA claims."); United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 624, 631 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over FCA claims); Driscoll v. Super. Ct., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 364, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) ("Based on the deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction, our analysis of the FCA under Gulf Offshore, and relevant case law, we conclude that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over FCA retaliation claims."). The language of the Release was broad, specifying a release of "all claims."

In that case, the court found that the state and federal cases were parallel partly because in both actions "Illinois s[ought] to recover for the false statements and misrepresentations made by predominantly the same contractors and their subcontractors." U.S. ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 624, 634 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Here, the state case does not present claims of misrepresentation or false statements. --------