Opinion
No. 98 C 3051
January 18, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On March 26, 1999, Judge Coat, the district court judge previously assigned to this case, denied Respondent's motion to dismiss Petitioner's habeas corpus petition as untimely finding that the Supreme Court's Bracy v. Gramley decision, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed. 2d 97 (1997), announced a new rule of law made applicable to cases on collateral review. Giangrande v. Roth, No. 98 C 3051, 1999 WL 184184 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29 1999). In Outlaw v. Sternes, 235 F.3d 453 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit expressly disagreed with Judge Coar and held "that Bracy did not establish a new rule of constitutional law." Id. at 455. As such, Respondent presently moves for reconsideration of Judge Coar's March 26, 1999 ruling and for the dismissal of Petitioner's Habeas Corpus petition. In response, Petitioner raises a new argument, that despite the untimeliness of his petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) ("AEDPA"), and the Seventh Circuit holding that the Supreme Court has not announced a new rule of constitutional law that would excuse his delay, see 28 U.S.C. § 2544 (d)(1)(C), Petitioner is entitled to relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) because this court possesses "equitable powers to open a void judgment procured through fraud." (Petitioner's Resp. at 2.)
The habeas corpus petitioner in Bracy, like Petitioner here, was tried and convicted before Cook County Circuit Court Judge Thomas Maloney, a corrupt judge known to have taken bribes to fix cases pending before him. Although Bracy did not bribe Maloney, Bracy contented that he was denied his due process right to a fair trial because Maloney attempted to cover-up his corruption by adopting a pro-prosecution attitude in cases where he did not take bribes. Bracy, 520 U.S. at 902, 117 S.Ct. at 1796. The Supreme Court held "that petitioner ha[d] made a sufficient factual showing to establish 'good cause,' as required by Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), for discovery on his claim of actual judicial bias in his case," Id., 520 U.S. at 901, 117 S.Ct. at 1795, and stated that "there could be no question that, if it could be proved, such compensatory, camouflaging bias on Maloney's part in petitioner's own case would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., 520 U.S. at 905, 117 S.Ct. at 1797.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a federal court to order relief from a final judgment under certain circumstances. "Fraud on the court," which is "conduct that might be thought to corrupt the judicial process itself, as where a party bribes a judge . . .," is a valid ground for attacking a judgment under Rule 60(b). Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc. v. Expeditors Int'l of Washington, Inc., 127 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2000). Petitioner claims that Judge Maloney, the presiding judge in both his jury trials, attempted to solicit a bribe from Petitioner and, after Petitioner refused the offer, Judge Maloney exacted retribution for the refusal against Petitioner at trial. If true, this scenario would certainly qualify as "conduct . . . thought to corrupt the judicial process itself." Petitioner, however, does not argue that fraud was had on this court and that a decision rendered here should be examined. Instead, Petitioner asks this court to use Rule 60(b) as a vehicle for examining his state court criminal conviction judgment since habeas corpus relief is no longer available.
Federal courts are generally prohibited from reviewing state court civil judgments pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which "dictates that the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, even if the state court judgment was erroneous or unconstitutional." Long v. Shorebank Dev., Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Homola v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the effect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "is based on the principle that inferior federal courts cannot reexamine the decisions of state tribunals in civil litigation"). A petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of a state court criminal conviction is not subject to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but, as previously stated, Petitioner is foreclosed from seeking habeas corpus relief. Petitioner does not address the basis for this court's jurisdiction, since it is now beyond dispute that he cannot maintain his present habeas corpus action, but instead cites case law he believes show that this court may entertain his request for relief. These cases are inapposite.
In Fierro v. Johnson, 197 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit only considered whether Rule 60(b) allowed relief from a district court's denial of a habeas corpus petitioner's petition, not from the state court judgment itself so too with United States v. McDonald, 161 F.3d 4, No. 97-7297, 1998 WL 637184 (4th Cir. 1998), where a habeas corpus petitioner moved under Rule 60(b) to reopen his previous habeas corpus petition and argued that the district court's denial of that petition was based on fraud upon the court. Here, unlike the procedural posture of Fierro and McDonald, Petitioner is attempting to directly challenge his state court conviction.
Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999), is likewise of no help. Federal review of a state court civil judgment can sometimes take place when a plaintiff asserts a federal claim over which a district court has jurisdiction and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, as was done in Long. In that case, the plaintiff asserted, inter alia, "four counts in her complaint which would invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court." 182 F.3d at 555 (plaintiff claimed violation of three Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provisions and the deprivation of property without due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Petitioner here, however, is not attacking a civil judgment and has no federally based cause of action pending before the court save his untimely habeas corpus petition. Petitioner correctly quotes a portion of a statement made by the Seventh Circuit in Long but apparently neglected to read the entire sentence. The Seventh Circuit began its statement, as Petitioner notes, with the acknowledgment that under Illinois law, "[a] void judgment . . . or an order procured by fraud can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally," but Petitioner failed to quote the balance of the statement, which concluded, "provided that the party is properly before the court." Id. at 561 (emphasis added but internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Putting aside the fact that the Seventh Circuit was restating Illinois, not federal, law and the state court judgment was a civil judgment, not a criminal conviction, Long still fails to support Petitioner's request for relief since his habeas corpus petition is untimely and he is not properly before this court. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit recently repeated that "every collateral attack by a state prisoner on a final judgment of conviction necessarily depends on § 2254. It is not possible to escape its limitations by citing some other statute." Owens v. Boyd, ___ F.3d ___ No. 00-1521, 2000 WL 1848455 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000) (citing Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Although neither Owens nor Walker addressed Rule 60(b) and, for the most part, discussed the effect of characterizing a petition as one under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the general habeas corpus statute, instead of under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court believes this statement applies with equal force here. Cf. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed. 2d 383 (1994) (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damage actions are inappropriate "vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments"). The court also notes that even if Petitioner were convicted in a federal district court, he would still be foreclosed from using Rule 60(b) to directly attack his judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature. . . ."); United States v. Mosavi, 138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998) ("The judgment and order that the defendant contests were entered, not in a civil case, but in a criminal case, and a proper appeal of the forfeitures should have been raised in the defendant's criminal appeal of his conviction and sentence. Rule 60(b) simply does not provide for relief from judgment in a criminal case, and as such the defendant cannot challenge the criminal forfeitures at issue under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).").
Petitioner, perhaps sensing the futility of his Rule 60(b) argument, also argues that AEDPA's strict time limits should be equitably tolled in this case. The Seventh Circuit recently addressed equitable tolling and AEDPA in Owens v. Boyd and stated that "§ 2244(d)(1)(D) is itself a kind of tolling rule, and it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to add time on a theory that would amount to little more than disagreement with the way Congress wrote § 2244(d)." 200 WL 1848455, at *4 "Tolling may be available," the court continued, "when some impediment of a variety not covered in § 2244(d)(1) prevents the filing of a federal collateral attack," but concluded that the petitioner in that case failed to identify such an impediment. Id. Petitioner admits that he informed the United States Attorney's office of the alleged bribe in January, 1987 but offers no explanation as to why he failed to assert this claim within the time frame set forth by AEDPA. In light of the Seventh Circuit's clear direction that AEDPA's time limitations should not be tolled unless a habeas corpus petitioner shows that he was prevented from filing his petition in a timely manner, this court must reject Petitioner's request for equitable tolling here.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the court finds that Petitioner may not seek review of his state court conviction under Rule 60(b) and that equitable tolling of AEDPA's time limitations is not appropriate in this case. The court, therefore, grants Respondent's motion for reconsideration and dismisses Petitioner's habeas corpus petition.