Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4502-14T4
12-14-2016
Jeffrey W. Beisser, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Donna M. Bates argued the cause for respondent (Blank Rome, LLP, attorneys; Ms. Bates, of counsel; Bhaveen R. Jani, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Espinosa and Guadagno. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. F-027823-07. Jeffrey W. Beisser, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Donna M. Bates argued the cause for respondent (Blank Rome, LLP, attorneys; Ms. Bates, of counsel; Bhaveen R. Jani, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In May 2008, an order was entered granting final judgment to Indymac, F.S.B. against defendant Jeffrey W. Beisser in this foreclosure action. U.S. Bank National Association was substituted as plaintiff in the action by order dated January 18, 2012. Despite the entry of final judgment, the initial complaint was administratively dismissed in July 2013. An order was entered reinstating the matter in March 2015. Defendant did not appeal from the order reinstating the matter.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by order dated April 24, 2015. In his notice of appeal, defendant identified this order as the order appealed from and has provided only the transcript setting forth the judge's reasons for denying the motion for reconsideration.
Defendant's motion for reconsideration was governed by Rule 4:49-2 and is a matter to be exercised in the trial court's sound discretion. Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 521 (2008) (citing Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250, 257 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 (1988)).
Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases . . . [that] fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.
[Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).]See also Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002).
In support of his motion for reconsideration, defendant submitted a certification, claiming a contrary result was required by Washington v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Washington), No. 14-14573-TBA, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4649 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2014), an unpublished opinion in which the Bankruptcy Court held that a six-year statute of limitations established in N.J.S.A. 12A:3-118 applied to bar a mortgagee from foreclosing on a mortgage.
This case, which was subsequently reversed, Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC v. Washington, No. 2:14-cv-8063-SDW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105794 (D.N.J. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Washington v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon (In re Washington), No 15-3210, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 17727 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2016), did not provide a basis for reconsideration of the trial court's original decision. The original order merely reinstated a complaint that had been administratively dismissed in error in a case in which final judgment had already been entered.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION