Opinion
21-P-75
04-28-2022
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, trustee, v. Steven ARSENAULT & another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Pro se defendant Steven Arsenault appeals from a Housing Court judgment entered in this postforeclosure summary process action in which judgment for possession and damages was granted to the plaintiff bank. We affirm the judgment for the bank.
While defendant Therese M. Arsenault's name appears on the appellant brief, she did not file a notice of appeal.
This case has had a long and complicated history, and separate judgments in Federal court as well as in the Housing Court. The facts relevant to this case are few, but dispositive. Arsenault claims in this appeal, as he apparently did in Federal court, that the foreclosure was improper, and that he should not lose his home. However, at the summary process trial in this matter, Arsenault failed to appear, and a default judgment entered for the bank. Three days later, Arsenault filed a motion to vacate the default judgment on the grounds that "[he] did not meet federal guidelines to appeal." That motion was denied, and this appeal ensued.
Arsenault does not directly challenge the denial of the motion to vacate the default judgment. The default judgment itself is not appealable, although the denial of the motion to vacate the default judgment is. See Rule 12 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (2004). See also Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 856 (2019) ("Default judgments issue at 10 a.m. on the business day following their entry, and are not subject to appeal"). In any event, we review the denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Johnny's Oil Co. v. Eldayha, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 708 (2012). No abuse of discretion is apparent on this record.
On appeal, Arsenault claims that the Housing Court had no jurisdiction over this case, stating that the "Housing [C]ourt may exercise jurisdiction over a summary process action only after ownership has been legally established and tenancy has been properly terminated." Arsenault's argument that the Housing Court must hear challenges to a foreclosure before having jurisdiction over a summary process action is incorrect. Former owners who live in the home after foreclosure may bring counterclaims to challenge the validity of the foreclosure in the summary process action. See generally Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613 (2013) ; Bank of N.Y. v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327 (2011). The Housing Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the summary process action and Arsenault's challenges to the foreclosure at the same time.
Whatever latitude may be shown to self-represented litigants, the failure to appear for trial means that Arsenault gave up any right he may have had to be heard in State court on his claim that the foreclosure was unlawful -- even if those claims survived after the Federal litigation was resolved against him. See Rule 10 (a) of the Uniform Summary Process Rules (2004). Accordingly, there is no validity to the claim that Arsenault's rights to due process were violated.
Because we affirm the judgment on other grounds, we need not reach the bank's argument that the judgment in the Federal court action was res judicata on Arsenault's claims in State court, or in plain English, that Arsenault could not challenge the validity of the foreclosure in the summary process action because he already lost that fight in Federal court.
Final judgment affirmed.