The petitioner bears the burden of proving his statutory eligibility, and where, as here, we review the BIA's finding that the alien is not statutorily-eligible (i.e., is not a "refugee"), our review is limited to determining whether the BIA's decision is supported in the record with substantial evidence. Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 226 (7th Cir. 1995); Milosevic v. INS, 18 F.3d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 1994). This is a highly deferential standard, and the BIA's findings must be upheld if "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record as a whole."

In Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 224 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1995), we provided the following history of Bulgaria's Pirin region:

"Whether a person is a `refugee' is a factual determination that we review under the substantial evidence test." Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Krastev v. I.N.S., 101 F.3d 1213, 1216 (7th Cir. 1996). We will uphold the Board's decision if it is "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole."

The main issue in Draganova's petition for review is whether she established a claim of past persecution. As set out in Urukov v. I.N.S., 55 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1995), the Attorney General may grant or deny asylum as follows: The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to `refugees,' 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).

In a case such as this one, where the BIA adopts the reasoning of the IJ, we have held that the BIA adequately explains its decision when it adopts the IJ's decision, and we base our review solely on the IJ's analysis. Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1995); Cuevas v. INS, 43 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1995).

Mr. Moreno was forced to stand at attention for long periods of time as a matter of military discipline, apparently because he believed he was perceived as being disloyal to the governing regime and insubordinate for refusing to recite a political motto, but he was never physically mistreated. He was also transferred to a different unit in Caracas, which he describes as a "gang-infested territory," Aplt. Br. at 2, but military discipline and station assignments generally fail to evidence persecution, see, e.g., Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim of persecution based on alien's displeasure with where he was stationed in the military and fifteen-day incarceration for fighting with fellow soldiers). Additionally, Mr. Moreno was summoned for questioning on his political views, taunted, and allegedly threatened with imprisonment, but "[m]ere denigration, harassment, and threats" do not qualify as persecution, Pang, 665 F.3d at 1231 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although we recognize the unfortunate circumstances of this case, we have consistently held that "immigration policy . . . is traditionally [within] the province of the political branches." Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir.2002); see also Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir.1992) (recognizing that "immigration policy is the clear purview of the legislative branch"); Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 228 (7th Cir.1995) (same). For this reason, § 241(a)(5) precludes Lino from seeking relief by adjusting her status under § 245(i). III. Conclusion

This court has previously joined the majority of circuits in approving the authority of the BIA to affirm the immigration judge's decision without giving additional reasons. Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that, where the BIA affirmed without additional explanation, this court would review the immigration judge's decision); see also Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n. 2 (3d. Cir. 2001); Giday v. INS, 113 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1996); Prado-Gonzalez v. INS, 75 F.3d 631, 632 (11th Cir. 1996); Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 227-28 (7th Cir. 1995); Alaelua v. INS, 45 F.3d 1379, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1995); Maashio v. INS, 45 F.3d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir. 1995); Gandarillas-Zambrana v. BIA, 44 F.3d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1995); Arango-Aradondo v. INS, 13 F.3d 610, 613 (2d. Cir. 1994). The First Circuit recently rejected a due process challenge to the BIA's summary affirmance procedures.

This court has determined that unhappiness with work conditions does not demonstrate persecution. See Krastev v. INS, 101 F.3d 1213, 1217 (7th Cir. 1996) (hard work not commensurate with one's training did not amount to persecution required for asylum); Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1995) (Bulgarian government's restriction of ethnic-Macedonian's employment opportunities "does not rise to the level of 'infliction of harm' . . . that we find 'illegitimate' to justify granting asylum"). See also Guentchev v. INS, 77 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996) (inability to obtain desired work does not establish persecution).

This observation was proper: while Teodorescu had some difficulty obtaining a passport, he obtained one nonetheless, and issuance of a passport may constitute evidence that future persecution is unlikely. See Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 229 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that applicant's ability to leave country with a valid passport undermined his political persecution argument). III.