Opinion
No. MMX-CV-09-16728-S
August 31, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an action for summary process whereby the plaintiff landlord, Michael Ursini, seeks possession of a dwelling unit, located at 72 Nooks Hill Road in Cromwell, Connecticut, for nonpayment of rent against the defendant, James Barnett.
Trial commenced on July 6, 2009, and concluded on July 30, 2009. The plaintiff and the defendant were present and represented by counsel. Both parties testified and several witnesses were called. The evidence at trial established the following facts: The defendant, in order to avoid foreclosure of his home, located at 72 Nooks Hill Road in Cromwell, Connecticut, sold it to the plaintiff. The foreclosure was scheduled for June 28, 2008. On the date of the closing on the property, June 5, 2008, the parties executed a one-year written lease to purchase option agreement for use and occupancy whereby the plaintiff leased to the defendant the subject premises. The option to purchase expired on June 5, 2009. The lease was signed by the plaintiff and the defendant. The term of the lease was for a period of one year, for the period of June 5, 2008 through June 5, 2009, and provided that the defendant would pay a monthly rent of $1,650 commencing on July 1, 2008, to the plaintiff. The defendant admitted that he paid the first month's rent but failed to pay the rent due under the lease for the remaining term of the lease. Thereafter, the plaintiff served a Notice to Quit upon the defendant on October 14, 2008, which specified that the defendant was to quit possession of the premises on or before October 28, 2008. The defendant did not vacate the subject premises by October 28, 2008. The plaintiff then commenced the instant summary process action against the defendant on October 30, 2008. The defendant, in his answer, denies that he entered into the lease agreement for use and occupancy for a term of one year, denies that he agreed to pay a monthly rent of $1,650 on the first day of each month, denies that he took possession of the subject premises and denies that he failed to pay the rent due under the lease. The defendant leaves the plaintiff to his proof as to whether the plaintiff caused a notice to quit to be served on the defendant to vacate the premises on or before October 28, 2008. The defendant admits that he still occupies the subject premises. The defendant filed special defenses claiming fraudulent inducement; that the lease between the plaintiff and defendant is illegal and against public policy; and that it would be unconscionable to enforce the conditions of the lease. It should be noted that the defendant was represented by an attorney at the closing, but that attorney was not consulted or retained with regard to the subject lease.
With regard to this summary process action, the plaintiff has met his burden of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The court finds that the parties entered into a written lease agreement for use and occupancy of the subject property by the defendant. The defendant agreed to pay $1,650 per month for a one year period. The defendant paid the first month's rent but failed to make any payments thereafter as required by the terms of the lease. A proper notice to quit was served upon the defendant and the defendant has failed to vacate the premises by the termination date as set forth in the notice to quit, and continues to remain in possession of the premises. See General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(1)(D); Pinnone v. Kem Auto Sales, LLC., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP-14564 (March 17, 2009, Gilligan, J.).
With regard to the defendant's special defenses, the defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof. Turning to the defendant's first special defense wherein the defendant claims fraudulent inducement on the part of the plaintiff upon the defendant to sign the lease, the defendant testified that he was aware that he was signing the lease. The defendant did not present any evidence that he was fraudulently induced to sign the lease agreement. He acknowledged that he knew he had to make the rental payments for one year and admitted that he failed to do so. See Citino v. Redevelopment Agency, 51 Conn.App. 262, 275-76, 721 A.2d 1197 (1998). No evidence was presented that a false representation was made by the plaintiff to the defendant as a statement of fact, nor any evidence that a representation was untrue nor that the defendant was induced by the plaintiff to act upon it to this detriment with regard to the lease. Indeed, the defendant testified that he knew that his house would be foreclosed upon within several weeks of the date of the closing and that the lease back arrangement with the defendant would prevent that foreclosure. While the defendant contends that the circumstances surrounding the sale and closing of the subject property were fraudulent, the court finds no evidence of fraud with regard to the lease. Therefore, the defendant has not met his burden with regard to the special defense of fraudulent inducement.
With regard to the defendant's second special defense that the lease was illegal and against public policy, the court finds that the defendant has not met his burden of proof as no evidence was presented by the defendant in support of said special defense.
With regard to the defendant's third special defense of unconscionability, the defendant presented no evidence to demonstrate that the lease was unconscionable. No showing was made by the defendant of unfair surprise and oppression. See Emlee Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Waterbury Transmission, Inc., 31 Conn.App. 455, 463 n. 12, 626 A.2d 307 (1993). The defendant testified that he read and signed the lease, and understood that the lease required monthly rental payments of $1,650. There was no evidence presented that he was forced to sign the lease. The court's review of the lease agreement does not reveal any language that would appear to be unconscionable. Therefore, the court finds that the defendant did not meet his burden of proof with regard to his third special defense.
The defendant also argues, in his trial brief, that the equitable doctrine against forfeiture is applicable to the present case. Connecticut courts have utilized the equitable doctrine against forfeiture to prevent a tenant's eviction in a summary process action for failure to pay rent. Fellows v. Martin, 217 Conn. 57, 66, 584 A.2d 458 (1991). The Appellate Session of the Superior Court has stated: "It is elementary that a court of equity, even in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake may grant relief to prevent a forfeiture resulting from the breach of a covenant to pay rent upon payment or tender of all arrears of rent with interest. Thompson v. Coe, 96 Conn. 644, 655, 115 A. 219 (1921)." Zitomer v. Palmer, 38 Conn.Sup. 341, 345, 446 A.2d 1084 (1982). "Equity will intervene where `the delay has been slight, the loss to the lessor small, and when not to grant relief would result in such hardship to the tenant as to make it unconscionable to enforce literally' the conditions of the lease. Nicoli v. Frouge Corporation, 171 Conn. 245, 247, 368 A.2d 74 (1976), quoting F.B. Fountain Co. v. Stein, 97 Conn. 619, 626-27, 118 A. 47 (1922); see Galvin v. Simons, 128 Conn. 616, 620, 25 A.2d 64 (1942)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zitomer v. Palmer, supra, 345. "The doctrine against forfeiture cannot be dilatorily invoked to eviscerate the statutory mandate of our summary process laws. Under circumstances, however, where the conscience is shocked or the forfeiture unconscionable, the doctrine against forfeiture should be an available shield to the tenant. Mobilia, Inc. v. Santos, 4 Conn.App. 128, 131, 492 A.2d 544 (1985), quoting Zitomer v. Palmer, [ supra, 346]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Lamothe, 27 Conn.App. 755, 762, 610 A.2d 695 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 225 Conn. 757, 627 A.2d 367 (1993).
However, our Supreme Court has noted that "(t)he doctrine against forfeitures applies to a failure to pay rent in full when that failure is accompanied by a good faith intent to comply with the lease or a good faith dispute over the meaning of a lease." Fellows v. Martin, supra, 217 Conn. 69. In this instant case, the defendant has not proven a good faith intent to comply with the lease. Indeed, the defendant paid only the first month rent due under the lease. He testified that he stopped paying rent because he "had a feeling something was wrong" which demonstrates the defendant's intent not to comply with the lease. Further, the defendant did not present any evidence that there was a good faith dispute over the meaning of the subject lease. The defendant has occupied the subject premises without paying any rent since August 1, 2008. He presented no evidence of any outside circumstances which prevented him from making the rental payments other than this testimony that he felt something was wrong. The court's conscience is not shocked nor does it find forfeiture to be unconscionable under the facts of this case. After extensive review of the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the equities here are more clearly with the plaintiff and, therefore, the defendant has not met his burden to invoice the equitable doctrine against forfeiture.
For the foregoing reasons, judgment for possession is entered for the plaintiff and against the defendant.