No. 08-01-00300-CR.
May 1, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
Appeal from the 70th District Court of Ector County, Texas.
Before BARAJAS, C.J., LARSEN, and CHEW, JJ.
DAVID WELLINGTON CHEW, Justice
Appellant, Juan Manuel Urquidez, Jr., was tried and found guilty by a jury of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated. He pled "true" to the enhancement paragraphs of the indictment and was sentenced by the trial court to 25 years' incarceration. Appellant now brings this appeal raising three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting State's Exhibit No. 1 over the objection of Appellant; (2) whether the trial court erred in not striking State's Exhibit No. 2 as per the motion of Appellant; (3) whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
Shortly after 2 a.m. on June 15, 2000, troopers from the Department of Public Safety were dispatched to the scene of an accident at the intersection of 16th Street and Loop 338 in Ector County. A single-car accident had occurred when Appellant drove his white Isuzu pick-up truck off an elevated portion of the roadway. At the time of the accident, Appellant was traveling alone. Before Appellant was transported from the scene of the accident to the hospital, he spoke briefly to Trooper Jarzombek and admitted he was the driver of the vehicle. He also admitted to drinking some alcohol prior to the accident. The troopers found multiple bottles of beer, most of them broken, in the bed of the truck and around the accident area. Appellant was taken to the hospital for treatment and later released. Several days later, he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. At trial, the State called four witnesses and offered four exhibits in support of the prosecution. Trooper Jarzombek testified about the accident scene and Appellant's demeanor at the time of the accident and later at the hospital. He told the jury, Appellant initially admitted he had been drinking alcohol, but later claimed otherwise. He also testified that Appellant was confused about the time of day, had glassy and bloodshot eyes, and smelled like alcohol when he spoke with him after the accident. Trooper Jarzombek also indicated Appellant had refused to give a blood specimen, and due to the injuries he sustained, was unable to perform any field sobriety tests. Trooper Jarzombek testified that based on his observations and interactions with Appellant, he concluded Appellant was intoxicated the night of the accident. Trooper McNeil also testified on behalf of the State. He stated that he was present with Trooper Jarzombek at the scene of the accident and had assisted in the investigation. Trooper McNeil was primarily responsible for inventorying Appellant's vehicle and reconstructing the accident. According to his testimony, multiple bottles of beer were found in the bed of the truck. He was uncertain whether any alcohol had been found in the interior cab of the truck. He also discovered a bottle of vodka near the accident scene, but could not establish whether it came from Appellant's vehicle or not. Based on his observations, Trooper McNeil concluded Appellant had been traveling North in the southbound lanes of Loop 338, veered across the median, and then ran off the overpass and landed below on West 16th Street. Through the testimony of Deputy Underwood of the Crane County Sheriff's Department, the State offered State's Exhibit No. 1. This exhibit consists of two documents: (1) a fingerprint card bearing Appellant's fingerprints and dated April 10, 1986; and (2) an arrest record for Appellant indicating he was arrested for driving while intoxicated and resisting arrest in Crane County on January 18, 1991. Deputy Underwood testified that at the time of the arrest in 1991, it was the policy and procedure of the Sheriff's Department to check contemporary arrest records against previous records. She explained that if the department had previously taken a set of fingerprints on a particular offender, then a duplicate set of prints would not be taken. The original set of prints would accompany the offender's records for the subsequent offenses. Accordingly, the fingerprint card bearing Appellant's prints from 1986 accompanied his arrest record for the offenses in 1991. The trial court also admitted State's Exhibit No. 2 and State's Exhibit No. 3. State's Exhibit No. 2 contains a certified copy of Appellant's 1991 DWI conviction in Crane County. State's Exhibit No. 3 contains records of an additional judgment and sentence against Appellant for driving while intoxicated in Ector County in 1996. These records include Appellant's fingerprints, taken in July 1996, and included on the documentation of the Ector County Court Judgment. The State's final witness was Shelly Stanford, a fingerprint expert, who took Appellant's fingerprints on the day of the trial. Ms. Stanford testified that the three sets of fingerprints matched. The fingerprints taken the day of trial were admitted as State's Exhibit No. 4. The jury found Appellant guilty of felony driving while intoxicated. Appellant elected sentencing by the court and received a sentence of twenty-five years' incarceration. The instance appeal was timely filed. With his first two issues, Appellant essentially complains the trial court erred in admitting two exhibits into evidence. Because the proper admission of both pieces of evidence rests on a question of conditional relevancy, we will address the issues together. Because Appellant challenges the trial court's evidentiary rulings, we will review the issues under an abuse of discretion standard. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (Opin. on reh'g). If the court's rulings fall within the zone of reasonable disagreement, they will not be disturbed. Id. Appellant first complains the trial court erred in admitting State's Exhibit No. 1. Appellant objected to the admission of the exhibit at trial on the basis of relevance. He also argued admission was improper because the fingerprint card was dated five years earlier than the accompanying arrest records from 1991. Appellant's objection was overruled and the records were admitted. Appellant concedes the fingerprints contained on 1986 card were proven to be his own. However, Appellant now argues admission of the fingerprint card was improper because the card itself lists no offense, cause number, or court. He also notes the booking sheet admitted as part of State's Exhibit No. 1 also fails to include a cause number or convicting court. With his second issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred by not granting his motion to strike State's Exhibit No. 2 at the close of the State's case-in-chief. State's Exhibit No. 2 is a packet of information related to Appellant's prior conviction for driving while intoxicated in Crane County from 1991. The packet includes: (1) the Information and Complaint filed by the County Attorney in cause number 5153, identifying Juan Manuel Urquidez, Jr. as the offender and listing the date of the offense; (2) a signed document entitled, Waiver Of Proceeding, indicating the Defendant, Juan Manuel Urquidez, Jr., voluntarily pled guilty to the offense as charged; and (3) the judgment and sentence of the trial court. The judgment from the trial court is signed by the court, but does not include the signature or fingerprints of the defendant affixed on the document. Establishing the identity of a defendant is a procedural matter involving a question of conditional relevance. Rosales v. State, 867 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, no pet.). The relevance of a piece of evidence offered to prove a prior conviction is conditioned upon the production of evidence sufficient to show the defendants are one and the same person. Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 210-11 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Evidence should not be excluded because its probative strength is alone insufficient to prove a significant fact. Rosales, 867 S.W.2d at 72. Nor should evidence be excluded because its relevance may depend upon the production of additional evidence at a later point in trial. Id. "Where proof of a prior conviction is a jurisdictional element, the fact of the prior conviction, including the identity of the accused, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Zimmer v. State, 989 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd). There must be evidence of identity independent of or in addition to the evidence shown in a penitentiary packet or similar records. If independent evidence of identity is not established, the records of a prior conviction are not admissible and should be struck from the record. Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210. Proof of prior convictions for enhancement purposes may be established by a variety of approaches and types of evidence. See Rosales, 867 S.W.2d at 72 (where the court describes a number of methods approved by the Court of Criminal Appeals in various cases). The most common method of proving a prior conviction is through the introduction of certified copies of a judgment and sentence and authenticated copies of penitentiary records including fingerprints. This evidence is then supported by expert testimony identifying the fingerprints in the judgment and/or penitentiary packet as identical to with known prints of the defendant on trial. Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 209. In this case, Appellant objected to the relevance of the fingerprint card included in State's Exhibit No. 1 at trial. The State explained that the documents, including the fingerprint card, were offered to prove Appellant was the same individual previously convicted in Cause Number 5153 in Crane County as alleged in the indictment. The prosecutor indicated other evidence and testimony would further support this assertion. Additionally, the State noted that Appellant's concerns related to the weight and credibility given the evidence, not the admissibility of the exhibit. Appellant also objected to the admission of State's Exhibit No. 2 when it was initially offered. The court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence on the condition the State prove the identity of Appellant and the identity of the individual named in the prior conviction were one and the same. At the conclusion of the State's presentation of evidence, Appellant moved to strike State's Exhibit No. 2, arguing the State failed to prove the necessary element of identity. The motion was overruled. The testimony of Deputy Underwood established the relevance of the fingerprint card dated from 1986. As she explained, the older set of prints were designated as belonging to an individual arrested in 1991. Additionally, the testimony of Shelley Stanford established the prints on the card to be those of the Appellant. The court's decision to admit State's Exhibit No. 1 over the relevance objection of Appellant was not an abuse of discretion. The State established the relevance of the exhibit and the trial court's decision certainly fell within the zone of reasonable disagreement. With regard to the court's decision to admit State's Exhibit No. 2 and overrule Appellant's motion to strike, the trial court was required to consider the evidence in aggregate and determine whether the State had adduced sufficient evidence to prove the prior conviction. Appellant's argument at trial and now on appeal focuses largely on whether the State established the element of identity. The arrest records included in State's Exhibit No. 1 identified the arrestee as Juan Urquidez, Jr., with the alias of "Johnnie." The document also includes the Social Security Number of the arrestee. These records indicate the arrest occurred on January 18, 1991. The individual was arrested for DWI and Resisting Arrest. Both the fingerprint card and the arrest documentation included in State's Exhibit No. 1 are signed by "Johnny Urquidez." The signatures from both documents appear to be signed by the same person. The Information and Complaint included in State's Exhibit No. 2 indicate "Juan Manuel Urquidez Jr." committed the offense of driving while intoxicated on January 18, 1991. The offense designated and the date corresponds with the arrest documentation provided in State's Exhibit No. 1. In addition to State's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, the court also had other evidence linking Appellant to the prior conviction in 1991 and establishing him as the same person identified in the documentary evidence discussed. As previously discussed, the testimony of Shelley Stanford, coupled with State's Exhibit No. 4 and the fingerprint evidence contained in State's Exhibit No. 3, established the fingerprints contained in State's Exhibit No. 1 to be those of Appellant. When this evidence is viewed in the aggregate, it does support a rational finding that Appellant is the same person convicted for driving while intoxicated under cause number 5153 in 1991. Accordingly, the court properly admitted the evidence. No abuse of discretion is shown. Appellant's first two issues on appeal are overruled. Appellant's final issue challenges the legal sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction for felony driving while intoxicated under Section 49.09 of the Texas Penal Code. Appellant's claim appears to be limited to whether the State provided sufficient evidence of two prior convictions. He maintains the evidence was insufficient to prove a second conviction and urges this Court to enter a verdict of acquittal because proof of the charged offense fails. In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); Todd v. State, 911 S.W.2d 807, 814 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, no pet.). The same standard is used in reviewing the sufficiency of both direct and circumstantial evidence. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 159-161 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Todd, 911 S.W.2d at 814. The role of the appellate court is not to judge the credibility of the evidence presented or to substitute our evaluation of the facts for those of the fact finder. Sharpe v. State, 881 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, no pet.). Instead, the reviewing court serves as the final due process safeguard and surety of the fact finder's rationality. Id. at 488-89. Our sole determination is whether the explicit and implicit findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. Lucero v. State, 915 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, pet. ref'd). Any inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Id. Felony DWI
Driving while intoxicated is a felony when the offender has been twice previously convicted of driving while intoxicated or a similar offense. See Tex.Pen. Code Ann. § 49.09(b) (Vernon 2003). Therefore, in the case sub judice the State was required to prove Appellant committed the offense of driving while intoxicated as alleged, and that he had also been twice previously convicted as alleged. Barfield v. State, 63 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Having found the trial court's admission of evidence proper under Appellant's Issues One and Two, we decline to accept Appellant's argument that State's Exhibit No. 2 should not have been admitted into evidence. As discussed previously, the State presented ample evidence of the second conviction. After viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of felony driving while intoxicated. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2781; Butler, 769 S.W.2d at 239; Todd, 911 S.W.2d at 814. Appellant's third issue is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.