Opinion
Record No. 2527-92-2
April 19, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF COLONIAL HEIGHTS WILLIAM R. SHELTON, JUDGE
Russell L. Watson, Jr., for appellant.
Marla Lynn Graff, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Nelson King Urquhart appeals his conviction for grand larceny. He contends that the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to deprive the owner permanently of the automobile that he drove away from the owner's house. We affirm the conviction.
The evidence proved that at 5:40 a.m. on December 5, 1991, the temperature was twenty-eight degrees. A nurse started her automobile and left it idling in front of her house. She left the doors of her automobile unlocked and returned to her house to collect items to take to work. As she was leaving her house again, she saw her automobile moving along the street. Shortly after she saw the moving automobile, the person inside the automobile turned on its lights and drove the automobile away from the house. The nurse had not given anyone permission to drive her automobile.
A police officer who was on a main thoroughfare near the residence received a report of the incident. Shortly after the officer received the report, he saw the automobile passing him. The officer followed the automobile. When the officer activated his warning lights and siren as a signal for the driver to stop, the driver turned left onto another street and continued to drive away. As other police vehicles arrived, the driver turned onto several more streets, failed to stop at three stop signs, circled around the backyard of a residence, drove back onto a street and continued to drive away. With three police vehicles following the driver along a small street and two police vehicles approaching from the opposite direction, the driver finally stopped.
The police arrested Urquhart, who was the only person in the automobile. Urquhart told the arresting officer that he took the automobile because he was cold. He later told the officer that he had attempted to get arrested the previous night in an adjoining city in order to have a warm place to sleep.
In his defense at trial, Urquhart testified that he had sought help in the adjoining city for alcohol and drug problems. He said that after he failed to obtain aid, he began to drink alcohol and take valium. He also testified that he did not have enough money to get home and last remembered going to a motel with friends. He testified that he did not recall getting into the automobile and driving it.
On this evidence, the trial judge convicted Urquhart of grand larceny of the automobile. The trial judge sentenced Urquhart to twenty years in the penitentiary and suspended sixteen years of that sentence upon various conditions.
"Larceny is defined as the 'wrongful taking of the goods of another without the owner's consent and with the intention to permanently deprive the owner of possession of the goods.'"Nelson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 268, 270, 403 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1991) (quoting Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 251, 356 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1987)). Urquhart contends that the evidence failed to prove that he intended to deprive the owner permanently of her automobile. He argues that, at best, the evidence proved only that he used the automobile without authorization, a lesser included offense of larceny. See Hewitt v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 605, 606, 194 S.E.2d 893, 894 (1973).
The trial judge had sufficient evidence to determine Urquhart's intent. Urquhart's "conduct . . . and all the circumstances revealed by the evidence," Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987), provided a sufficient basis from which the trial judge could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Urquhart intended to deprive the owner permanently of the automobile. Urquhart took the automobile furtively. He turned on the automobile's lights only after he drove away from the residence. Moreover, when the officer signalled Urquhart to stop, Urquhart continued to drive, disregarded traffic control signs, and made several turns in an apparent attempt to evade the police. Although Urquhart contends that he stopped of his own accord, the evidence proved that he was about to be hemmed in by police vehicles on a narrow street. Thus, Urquhart's conduct provided a basis to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that he sought to escape the police pursuit and keep the automobile.
Moreover, Urquhart's own testimony did not negate the inferences drawn from his conduct. Urquhart's testimony that he was cold and took the automobile to find warmth did not negate an intent to deprive the owner permanently of the property. Likewise, although his testimony provided a basis to conclude that he intended to use the automobile as a means to get home, that also was not inconsistent with an intent to deprive the owner permanently of her property. Furthermore, the trial judge was not required to believe implausible, self-serving testimony. See Carter v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 528, 532, 290 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1982).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge had sufficient evidence from which he could have found that Urquhart intended to deprive the owner permanently of her automobile.
Affirmed.