The court, therefore, properly concluded that the defendant’s testimony regarding the fair rental value of the property was not hearsay. The plaintiff contends that our Supreme Court’s decision in Urich v. Fish, 261 Conn. 575, 804 A.2d 795 (2002), "applies squarely" to his case. We disagree.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Urich v. Fish, 261 Conn. 575, 580–81, 804 A.2d 795 (2002). The following facts demonstrate that the defendant has not met this burden.
Our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had improperly admitted certain evidence, reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Urich v. Fish, 261 Conn. 575, 804 A.2d 795 (2002). A new trial on the defendant's counterclaim was held before the court, Hon. Frank S. Meadow, judge trial referee, over the course of ten days in May and June, 2004.
Judge Blue on November 27, 2000 in his Memorandum of Decision dated November 27, 2000 wrote in his Memorandum Pleading #125 that the decision of the Appellate Court in 58 Conn.App. 176 limited the scope of his decision to the Second and Third Counts of the Counterclaim [28 Conn. L. Rptr. 615]. The Second Count claimed items that should have been included in the sale of the yacht and the Third Count of Unfair Trade Practices in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b. Judge Blue's decision was appealed to the Supreme Court by Urich, that reversed August 27, 2002 as to the Second and Third Counts of Judge Blue's decision, Urich v. Fish, 261 Conn. 575. The court (Meadow, J.T.R.) then tried the Second and Third Counts, rendered its decision November 9, 2004 awarding damages in the amount of $12,427.41, prejudgment interest pursuant to § 37-3a in the amount of $14,395, punitive damages in the amount of $20,000 and attorneys fees in the amount of $25,000.
See State v. Mortoro, 157 Conn. 392, 396, 254 A.2d 574 (1969) (statement that person did a good job committing crime admitted not for its truth but to show relationship between parties in prosecution for hindering state's witness); Gyro Brass Mfg. Corp. v. United Automobile, Aircraft Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 147 Conn. 76, 80, 157 A.2d 241 (1959) (testimony about oral modification of sales agreement was admissible nonhearsay because testimony was being offered to prove only that utterance was made, not for truth of any statements within utterance); State v. Tolisano, 136 Conn. 210, 214, 70 A.2d 118 (1949) (statements by anonymous callers to suspected bookie's apartment admissible because statements offered not for truth of their content but as proof of verbal act of placing bet). . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Urich v. Fish, 261 Conn. 575, 584-85, 804 A.2d 795 (2002). The defendant's statement that he wanted to return to the accident scene cannot be considered a verbal act because it was offered to prove just that, namely, that the defendant wanted to return to the accident scene.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Urich v. Fish, 261 Conn. 575, 580-81, 804 A.2d 795 (2002). "When judging the likely effect of such a trial court ruling, the reviewing court is constrained to make its determination on the basis of the printed record before it."
With this background in mind, we conclude that, even if the trial court improperly concluded that the testimony of King and Riley violated the parol evidence rule, it was not likely to have affected the result because the defendant was allowed nevertheless to present extrinsic evidence regarding the settlement agreement. See Urich v. Fish, 261 Conn. 575, 580-81, 804 A.2d 795 (2002) ("[t]he harmless error standard in a civil case is whether the improper ruling would likely affect the result" [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Scanlon v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 258 Conn. 436, 448, 782 A.2d 87 (2001) ("[w]e have often stated that before a party is entitled to a new trial . . . he or she has the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful" [internal quotation marks omitted]). The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion in limine but, after the plaintiff moved for reconsideration, granted the motion as to King.
(Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Urich v. Fish, 261 Conn. 575, 580, 804 A.2d 795 (2002) ; see also Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Gilmore, 289 Conn. 88, 128, 956 A.2d 1145 (2008) ("Even when a trial court's evidentiary ruling is deemed to be improper, we must determine whether that ruling was so harmful as to require a new trial.... In other words, an evidentiary ruling will result in a new trial only if the ruling was both wrong and harmful." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ).
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Urich v. Fish , 261 Conn. 575, 580–81, 804 A.2d 795 (2002)."A determination of harm requires us to evaluate the effect of the evidentiary impropriety in the context of the totality of the evidence adduced at trial.... Thus, our analysis [would include] a review of: (1) the relationship of the improper evidence to the central issues in the case, particularly as highlighted by the parties' summations ; (2) whether the trial court took any measures, such as corrective instructions, that might mitigate the effect of the evidentiary impropriety; and (3) whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other validly admitted testimony.... The overriding question [we must answer] is whether the trial court's improper ruling affected the jury's perception of the remaining evidence."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Urich v. Fish, 261 Conn. 575, 580, 804 A.2d 795 (2002). “To be admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, a trial court judge must find that the record satisfies each of the three conditions set forth in ... § 52–180.