Opinion
1:22-CV-00008-SPB
08-05-2024
KURTIS L. UREY, Plaintiff v. SGT. CULVER; C.O. BAUMCRATZ; C.O. MUSSER, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ECF NO. 78
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendants Culver, Baumcratz, and Muser (“Defendants”) have moved for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense that Plaintiff, Kurtis Urey (“Urey”) failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this lawsuit. See ECF No. 78. The motion is before the Undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be denied.
I. Introduction and Procedural History
At all times relevant to this action, Urey has been in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at its State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”). His Complaint alleges that he suffered a “nervous breakdown” on November 19, 2019, prompting him to tie-up his cellmate and set his cell on fire. ECF No, 5, ¶ 8. His Complaint further alleges that the Defendant correction officers responded to this incident by subjecting him to excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. Specifically, Urey alleges that Defendants Musser and Baumcratz entered his cell and assaulted him by “slamming” him into a bunk bed, hitting his head against a wall, and throwing him to the ground. Id., ¶ 15. Urey further alleges that Defendant Culver stood by the cell door, encouraging the other Defendants to “kick his ass.” Id.
The Defendants have moved for summary judgment (ECF No. 78), asserting that Urey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in accordance with DOC policy and as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997c. The Defendants have filed a brief in support of their motion (ECF No. 79), an appendix of exhibits (ECF No. 80), and a concise statement of material facts in compliance with our Local Rules (ECF No. 80). Urey filed a brief in opposition (ECF No. 84) as well as a responsive concise statement of material facts (ECF No. 85). The Defendants' motion is ripe for disposition.
By prior order, the Court dismissed Urey's claims against Defendant Sutherland while permitting him leave to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies of his claim against Sutherland. See ECF No. 45. Urey opted not to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court then converted its dismissal of the claim against Sutherland to one with prejudice and terminated him as a Defendant in this action. See ECF No. 52.
II. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283,1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Where a party is proceeding pro se, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affs., 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999). “However, despite this liberal interpretation, the same standards for summary judgment apply to pro se litigants.” Watson v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 629 F.Supp.2d 481, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing United States v. Asken, 2002 WL 32175416, at *1 n.11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2002)). In other words, the party opposing summary judgment, whether pro se or counseled, “must present evidence, through affidavits, depositions, or admissions on file, to show that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). See also Kwanzaa v. Tell, 2024 WL 2991194, at *5 (D.N.J. June 14, 2024).
III. Discussion and Analysis
A. Because the DOC Defendants did not adhere to their own grievance and remand deadlines, Urey is deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies.
The PLRA mandates that an inmate exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing a suit challenging prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating to prison life that do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). An inmate's failure to exhaust, however, is an affirmative defense that a defendant must plead and prove, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007), and, as such, it is non-jurisdictional and waivable. See Andrews v. Behr, 2023 WL 8809302, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2023) (citing Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2018)). When raised by a defendant, exhaustion constitutes a threshold issue the Court must address before reaching the merits of the case. Andrews, 2023 WL 8809302, at *2.
“[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,' rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (citation omitted) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). An inmate's failure to comply with the requirements of the prison grievance process constitutes a procedural default that may preclude proper exhaustion. See Williams v. Wetzel et al., 2021 WL 5298872, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2021) (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230-32 (3d Cir. 2004).
The DOC's Inmate Grievance Policy, DC-ADM 804, applies to most inmate complaints concerning conditions of confinement. “The Inmate Grievance System [of DC-ADM 804] is intended to deal with a wide range of issues, procedures, or events that may be of concern to an inmate.” DC-ADM 804.1.A.2. DC-ADM 804 also specifies subjects and actions that are excluded from its procedures:
Three administrative remedy processes provide inmates in the custody of the Pennsylvania DOC with an avenue to challenge aspects of their confinement. See McClain v. Alveriaz, 2009 WL 3467836, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2009) (citations omitted). Those policies are: (1) the Inmate Discipline Policy, DC-ADM 801; (2) the Administrative Custody policy, DC-ADM 802; and (3) the Inmate Grievance Policy, DC-ADM 804. Id. Which of these policies applies in a given instance depends on the subject matter of the inmate's concern and his or her custody classification.
Issues concerning a specific inmate misconduct charge, conduct of hearing, statements written within a misconduct and/or other report, a specific disciplinary sanction, and/or the reasons for placement in administrative custody will not be addressed through the Inmate Grievance System and must be addressed through Department policy DC-ADM 801, “Inmate Discipline” and/or DC-ADM 802, “Administrative Custody Procedures.” Issues other than specified above must be addressed through the Inmate Grievance System.
DC-ADM 804.1.A.7.
The operative version of DC-ADM 804 has been in effect since May 1, 2015. It provides a three-stage grievance process that inmates must follow to exhaust their administrative remedies. First, “within 15 working days after the event upon which the claim is based,” the prisoner must submit a written grievance for review by the Facility Grievance Coordinator (“FGC”) or the FGC's designee using the DOC's DC-804, Part 1 form. DC-ADM 804, § 1.A.8. The FGC/designee must provide an initial review response (“IRR”) to the grievance to the inmate “within 15 working days from the date the grievance was entered into the Automated Inmate Grievance Tracking System” (“GTS”). Id. at § 1.C.5.g. Second, if the FGC/designee has rejected the grievance or the inmate is otherwise dissatisfied with the IRR, the inmate may appeal to the prison's Facility Manager/designee (“FM”) “within 15 working days from the date” the inmate receives “the initial review response/rejection.” Id. at § 2.A. 1 .a, b. The FM must then notify the inmate in writing “of his/her decision within 15 working days of receiving the appeal.” Id. at § 2.A.2.d. Finally, “[a]ny inmate who is dissatisfied with the disposition of an appeal from the Facility Manager/designee may submit an Inmate Appeal to Final Review” to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”) “within 15 working days from the date of the Facility Manager/designee's decision.” Id. at § 2.B.1.b. “Only issues raised in the initial grievance and/or appealed to the Facility Manager may be appealed to Final Review.” Id. “The SOIGA will ensure that... an appeal to final review is responded to within 30 working days of receipt unless otherwise extended and/or referred.” Id. at § 2.B.2.a (emphasis in original).
“The text of the grievance must be legible, understandable, and presented in a courteous manner. The inmate must include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim.
a. The statement of facts shall include the date, approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to the grievance.
b. The inmate shall identify individuals directly involved in the event(s).
c. The inmate shall specifically state any claims he/she wishes to make concerning violations of Department directives, regulations, court orders, or other law.
d. If the inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court, the inmate must request the specific relief sought in his/her initial grievance.”Id. at§ l.A. (11).
“[A]n extension often additional working days may be requested from the [FGC/designee] if the investigation of the grievance is ongoing,” in which case the “the extension must be entered into the [GTS] and the inmate must be notified in writing using the Extension Form...” Id. at § 1.C.5.h, 6.e (emphasis in original).
The Facility Manager may “authorize an extension of up to ten additional working days if the investigation of the appeal is ongoing” and must provide the inmate notice of this extension via the Extension Form. Id. at § 2.A.2.d. The Facility Manager may also remand the IRR to the Grievance Officer “for further investigation and/or reconsideration,” in which case notification must be provided to the inmate and the inmate must receive the subsequent IRR within 15 working days. Id. § 2.A.2.d(4), e(2), e(3).
“An inmate appealing a grievance to final review is responsible for providing the SOIGA with all required documentation relevant to the appeal. A proper appeal to final review must include: (1) a legible copy of the Initial Grievance; (2) a copy of the initial review response/rejection and/or remanded initial review response/rejection; (3) a legible copy of the Inmate Appeal to the Facility Manager; (4) a copy of the Facility Manager/designee's decision and/or remanded Facility Manager/designee's decision; (5) a written appeal to the SOIGA ...” Cameron v. Swartz, 810 Fed.Appx. 143, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting DC-ADM 804, § 2.B.1.j).
The Chief of SOIGA can likewise provide up to ten additional days for an ongoing investigation into the inmate's appeal, at which point written notice must be provided to the inmate. See DC-ADM 804, § 2.B.2.a(3).
To establish a plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies at the summary judgment stage, the moving party must produce a record demonstrating his entitlement to judgment on the defense as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). See also Brown v. Smith, 2021 WL 4429847, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2021). Typically, this involves a defendant producing the plaintiffs entire grievance record relating to the subject matter of the claim or claims asserted in his lawsuit. See, e.g., Green v. Maxa, 2019 WL 1207535, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2019); Jackson v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 671 Fed.Appx. 23, 24 (3d Cir. 2016). Where the plaintiff has failed to file a grievance concerning his claim or claims, missed a step in the grievance process, or otherwise deviated from the procedural requirements of DC-ADM 804, an affidavit from a person with knowledge or a properly authenticated business record affirming factually the plaintiffs failure to properly exhaust is normally sufficient to satisfy the defendant's burden of production. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4); Wiggins v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC, 2017 WL 11550519, at *5, *7-8 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2017); Muhammad v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 621 Fed.Appx. 725, 727 (3d Cir. 2015) (affidavit attesting that plaintiff failed to appeal to SOIGA); accord Martin v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 395 Fed.Appx. 885, 886 (3d Cir. 2010) (affidavit stating plaintiff “never sought final review”).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has emphasized the importance of prison officials adhering to their own procedural rules. See Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 367 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting that “what is good for the goose is good for the gander”). Prison officials must adhere to the deadlines and other requirements of their grievance policies if they wish to raise exhaustion as an affirmative defense. Downey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Glenn v. Lundy, 2024 WL 2943761, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2024); Betancourth v. Knorr, 2024 WL 3330567 at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 8, 2024). When prison officials fail to respond to a properly filed grievance within prescribed time limits, any further administrative remedies are deemed “unavailable,” and the inmate is deemed to have exhausted his available administrative remedies within the meaning of the PLRA. Shifflett, 934 F.3d at 365 (holding “that as soon as a prison fails to respond to a properly submitted grievance or appeal within the time limits prescribed by its own policies, it has made its administrative remedies unavailable and the prisoner has fully discharged the PLRA's exhaustion requirement”) (citing Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2016)); see also Betancourth, 2024 WL 3330567 at *3 (citing Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that “prisoner's administrative remedies are deemed exhausted when a valid grievance has been filed and the state's time for responding thereto has expired”).
In support of their position that Urey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the Defendants have submitted Urey's grievance record and the declaration of Keri Moore, SOIGA's Assistant Chief Grievance Officer. See ECF Nos. 81-1 through 81-7. This record demonstrates, however, that it was the DOC which failed to adhere to its own deadlines and policies.
Urey filed one grievance related to his excessive force claim: Grievance no. 902389. See ECF No. 81-1, p. 1. Although the alleged excessive force incident occurred on November 19, 2019, Urey did not file this grievance until December 3, 2020, more than a year later. Id. In that grievance, Urey complained that he had a “bump on the outside of my right leg just above my ankle just smaller than a golf ball.” Id. The grievance appears to relate this condition to Defendant Baumcratz' actions in November of 2019: “Baumcratz slammed a shield into my back causing me to trip and twist my ankle, then 3 more times slammed the shield into my back for no reason.” Id. On December 16, 2020, the Grievance Officer denied the grievance as frivolous on initial review: “Inmate Urey's allegation of an injury that occurred as a result of the incident happening over a year ago that has just now been discovered or reported is frivolous and lacks any fact to support his claim.” ECF No. 81-2, p. 1.
On December 17, 2020, Urey appealed the denial of the grievance to the Facility Manager. ECF No. 81-4, p. 1. Urey did not receive a response from the Facility Manager until January 28, 2021, which is twenty-six days from the date Urey submitted his appeal and eleven days beyond the fifteen days DC-ADM 804(2)(d)(1) requires for a response. ECF No. 81-5, p. 1. In any event, the Facility Manager remanded the grievance to the Grievance Officer “for additional review and appropriate responses.” ECF No. 81-5, p. 1. And although DC-ADM 804 requires the Grievance Officer, on remand, to respond to the inmate within fifteen working days, Urey did not receive a response until October 20, 2021-more than eight months later. See ECF No. 81-6, p. 1. The record includes no evidence that any extension of time was granted for the Grievance Officer's review response.
Because Urey did not receive a response to his remanded grievance within the specified time limit, his further administrative remedies were rendered unavailable, thereby permitting him “at that moment... to come into federal court.” Shifflett, 934 F.3d at 366; see also Strode v. Park, 2022 WL 1749249, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 31, 2022) (citing Shifflett, supra). The Court, therefore, should deny the DOC Defendants summary judgment based on their assertion that Urey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his excessive force claim. See, e.g, Strode, 2022 WL 1749249, at *3-4.
It appears that Urey's initial grievance was untimely, although the Grievance Officer denied the grievance as factually frivolous. But the fact that the DOC Defendants may have had a valid basis for denying the grievance did not excuse prison officials' failure to timely respond to Urey's appeal of the grievance denial or their failure to respond to the Facility Manager's remand of the grievance to the Grievance Officer. These failures rendered Urey's further administrative remedies unavailable and his grievance fully exhausted.
B. The Court should deny the Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Urey's claim for compensatory and punitive damages.
The PLRA bars recovery of compensatory damages in actions filed by prisoners alleging only mental or emotional injury, suffered in custody, without a prior showing of physical injury. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). As an alternative argument, the Defendants seek to bar Urey from recovering compensatory or punitive damages. See ECF No. 79, p. 6. They contend that Urey has not established a physical injury. The Defendants' concise statement of material facts states that, at the time of the incident, Urey was examined at a hospital and no injuries were found. See ECF No. 80, ¶ 4. In his responsive concise statement of material facts, Urey responds that he was only treated for smoke inhalation and that he complained about sore arms at the time but received no treatment. ECF No. 85, ¶ 10. He also refers to “shoulder pain” contemporaneously with the November 2019 incident which he believed would subside. Id., ¶ 12. He states that on January 10, 2020, he submitted sick call requests for this pain, but these were ignored. Id. Urey's responsive statement of material facts is sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Urey sustained a physical injury within the meaning of the PLRA. These issues of fact preclude summary judgment on the issue of compensatory damages and, therefore, will have to be resolved at trial.
Defendants additionally seek to bar Urey from recovering punitive damages. ECF No. 79, p. 8. Punitive damages, however, may be awarded “based solely on a constitutional violation, provided the proper showing is made.” Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000). That is, punitive damages may be appropriate “when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Based on the current record, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that punitive damages are not recoverable. See, e.g, Cruz v. Auker, 2024 WL 3597047, at *7 (M.D. Pa. July 30, 2024). The sufficiency of these evidence to allow a claim of punitive damages also must await trial.
IV. Conclusion
It is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be denied.
V. Notice Concerning Objection
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72((b)(2), and Local Rule 72(D)(2), the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72(D)(2).