" (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Updike, Kelly and Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 655-56 850 A.2d 145. In Count Five, the plaintiff re-alleges the forty-two paragraphs of the previous counts and alleges four additional paragraphs.

"All three criteria do not need to be established to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of these criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three," Updike, Kelly Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 655, 666 (2004). The second prong of the cigarette rule talks of immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous acts or practices. Belt notes that "a trade practice that is undertaken to maximize the defendant's profit at the expense of the plaintiff's rights" falls under the second prong of the rule, Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc., 273 Conn. 478, 485 (2005).

To state a claim for intentional misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) that it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) that it was made to induce the other party to act on it; and (4) that the latter did so act on it to his injury.” Id. at 446 (quoting Updike, Kelly, & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 643 (2004))

To make out a claim for intentional misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish "(1) that a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) that it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) that it was made to induce the other party to act on it; and (4) that the latter did so act on it to his injury." 456 Corp. v. Utd. Nat'l Foods, Inc. , 2011 WL 87292, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 11, 2011) (quoting Updike, Kelly, & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett , 269 Conn. 613, 643, 850 A.2d 145 (2004) ). To make out a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant made a misrepresentation of fact (2) that the defendant knew or should have known was false, (3) that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation and thus (4) suffered pecuniary harm.

“Under Connecticut law, the essential elements of a cause of action sounding in fraud, including claims of misrepresentation and fraud in the inducement, are: ‘(1) that a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) that it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) that it was made to induce the other party to act on it; and (4) that the latter did so act on it to his injury.’ ” 456 Corp. v. United Natural Foods, Inc., No. 3:09cv1983 (JBA), 2011 WL 87292, at *3 (D.Conn. Jan. 11, 2011) (quoting Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 643, 850 A.2d 145 (2004)).

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 648 n.28, 850 A.2d 145 (2004). This court has noted that ''potential conflicts of interest are especially significant in the context of the final disposition of a client's estate ....'' Krawczyk v. Stingle, supra, 208 Conn. 247.

Whether the defendant's interest in the retirement payments was a mere expectancy or sufficiently concrete, reasonable, and justifiable to constitute distributable property under § 46b-81 was the ultimate legal issue to be decided by the trial court, not a factual issue on which an expert witness may opine. See, e.g., Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C.v.Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 652 n.30, 850 A.2d 145 (2004) (agreeing that expert testimony ''amounted to an improper legal opinion on the ultimate issue in the case''); Kellyv.Waterbury, 96 Conn. 494, 499-501, 114 A. 530 (1921) (expert witness was not permitted to testify as to ultimate legal issue of defendant's negligence); Fullerv.Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 647, 677, 41 A. 4 (1898) (expert testimony on ''[t]he meaning and legal effect of the [insurance] policy'' was inadmissible because that issue ''was a question of law for the court''); 1 R. Mosteller et al., McCormick on Evidence (8th Ed. 2020) § 16, p. 168-69 (''at common law courts do not allow opinion on a question of law, unless the issue concerns foreign law'' (footnote omitted)). To the extent that Harrison's opinion may be characterized as one of fact, it was devoid of the requisite casespecific evidentiary support.

Moreover, even if a fiduciary duty could properly be found to exist in the present case, any averment by Walsh as to whether that duty was breached would be inadmissible. See Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 652 n. 30, 850 A.2d 145 (2004) (expert testimony that certain conduct constituted breach of fiduciary duty was improper legal opinion on ultimate issue).In response, the defendants argue that the Appellate Court did not conclude that a tax return preparer can never have a fiduciary relationship with a client.

Moreover, even if a fiduciary duty could properly be found to exist in the present case, any averment by Walsh as to whether that duty was breached would be inadmissible. See Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 652 n.30, 850 A.2d 145 (2004) (expert testimony that certain conduct constituted breach of fiduciary duty was improper legal opinion on ultimate issue). In response, the defendants argue that the Appellate Court did not conclude that a tax return preparer can never have a fiduciary relationship with a client.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613, 649, 850 A.2d 145 (2004). I